Corruption in Mexico
Corruption in Mexico has permeated several segments of societypolitical, economic, and socialand has greatly affected the country's legitimacy, transparency, accountability, and effectiveness. Many of these dimensions have evolved as a product of Mexico's legacy of elite, oligarchic consolidation of power and authoritarian rule.
Transparency International's 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index scored Mexico at 26 on a scale from 0 to 100, its lowest score ever. When ranked by score, Mexico ranked 140th among the 180 countries in the Index, where the country ranked first is perceived to have the most honest public sector. For comparison with regional scores, the best score among the countries of the Americas was 76, the average score was 42 and the worst score was 10. For comparison with worldwide scores, the best score was 90, the average score was 43, and the worst score was 8.
History
traces back to colonial times. With the arrival of Spanish conquistadors to Mexico, the Spanish crown granted positions of power to certain wealthy and influential individuals. These offices were often short-lived because officials were charged with collecting revenue, maintaining order and sustaining their regions while only relying on local sources of wealth and sustenance. People began to attempt to influence their local political leaders and would hold fiestas to gain favour with them. This system of bribery and purchasing one's way into power and influence continued into post-colonial times, where Mexican society adopted a class system and organised itself into a pyramid-like hierarchy, with the rich and powerful at the top. After independence, corruption was used not only as a means of advancement, but also as a means to provide goods and services. Over time, the practice of using unofficial means became a way for bureaucrats to generate revenue for infrastructural and social projects as well as to supplement their incomes.PRI rule
Although the Institutional Revolutionary Party came to power through cooptation and peace, it maintained power for 71 years straight by establishing patronage networks and relying on personalistic measures, resulting in Mexico functioning as a one-party state and characterized by a system in which politicians provided bribes to their constituents in exchange for support and votes for reelection. This type of clientelism constructed a platform through which political corruption had the opportunity to flourish: little political competition and organization outside of the party existed; it was not possible to independently contest the PRI system. Political contestation equated to political, economic, and social isolation and neglect. The party remained securely in power, and government accountability was low.Hierarchization was the norm. Power was consolidated in the hands of an elite few, and even more narrowly, the president controlled almost all of the practical power across the three branches of government. This central figure had both the formal and informal power to exercise extralegal authority over the judiciary and legislature and to relegate these other branches to the executive's political will.
Beyond this, few checks were set on elected officials’ actions throughout the PRI's unbroken reign. Consequently, sustained PRI rule yielded low levels of transparency and legitimacy within the councils of Mexico's government. 71 years of power provided an opportunity for corruption to accumulate and become increasingly complex. Civil society developed around economic interest aggregation that was organized by the clientelistic government; the PRI allowed citizens to collectively bargain under the condition that they would continue to provide political loyalty to the party. Anthony Kruszewski, Tony Payan, and Kathleen Staudt explain,
With this type of institutionalized corruption, the political path in Mexico was very narrow. There were specified political participation channels and selective electoral mobilization. These issues, deeply engrained in Mexico's political culture after over half a century's existence, have continued to generate and institutionalize political corruption in today's Mexico.
Vote buying
Due to weak law enforcement and weak political institutions, vote-buying and electoral fraud are phenomena that typically do not see any consequences. As a result of a pervasive, tainted electoral culture, vote buying is common among major political parties that they sometimes reference the phenomenon in their slogans, "Toma lo que los demás dan, ¡pero vota Partido Acción Nacional!"Organized crime
Border issues
’s geographic location has played largely in the development of the country’s role in organized crime and drug trafficking. Not only is Mexico adjacent to the world’s largest illegal drug market – the United States – but it also borders Central and South America, the latter being a region of nations with a similarly high demand for drugs. This positions Mexican drug cartels at an advantage; demand for drugs is not simply confined to the Mexican state, but rather it extends to several other nearby countries. Because of this, Mexico’s borders are especially crucial to drug cartels and transnational criminal organizations, which can exploit the borders as a passageway for contraband and as a method for consolidation of power.As drug cartels and TCOs have increasingly made use of these areas, the groups have become progressively more complex, violent, and diverse. Trafficking has been accompanied by other forms of illegal activity – such as extortion, kidnappings, and political corruption – as disparate factions compete for control over the same, lucrative areas.
The Mexican government has historically accomplished very little in terms of effectively curbing the offenses of these TCOs and cartels and has often actually been complicit in aiding their actions. Many of Mexico’s institutions – including those for law, policy, justice, and finance – function under a patron-client system in which officials receive money, political support, or other bribes from TCOs in exchange for minimal interference in, or impunity for, those criminal groups’ affairs. In these scenarios of narco-corruption, Mexico's power structure is defined by leaders who guide TCOs’ behaviors, receive payoffs, manipulate government resources, and align public policies with legislation that will further their personal and political objectives. These relationships have served as an impetus for new and problematic sources of violent, drug-related deaths, ineffective governance and policy implementation, terror-based TCO tactics, and a deepening drug market. Under this system, TCOs’ influence has extended beyond violent criminal activity or drug trade and has reached into Mexico's institutional bases.
These networks – alongside a lack of government transparency and checks and balances – have allowed corruption in government to flourish.
Transition to PAN rule
The growing prevalence and diversification of organized crime are in many ways linked to the political changes that Mexico underwent in 2000. For the first time in 71 years, the PRI ceded power to a different party, the National Action Party . The traditional power structure, which had enabled patronage networks to flourish and TCOs to operate, became challenged by government forces that attempted to curb violence and illegal activity.However, social decomposition quickly followed the fall of the PRI. The PAN, never before in the seat of power, was in many ways inexperienced in broad governance, and criminal factions capitalized on the party's perceived weakness. New conflicts emerged among cartels, as different groups competed to further develop their criminal networks and to work against a political regime that struggled to fight corruption, establish legitimacy, and foster legislative effectiveness.
Calderón administration
During PAN President Felipe Calderón's administration, Mexico experienced a vast increase in organized crime. Anthony Kruszewski, Tony Payan, and Kathleen Staudt note,In this, beyond further diversifying criminal activity, TCOs further developed their connections to Mexico's institutions and corruption. Many members of the Federal Police and the Army joined TCOs and participated in abuses against the citizenry. This corruption permeated the social atmosphere along the border, where violence became increasingly heightened and fatal.
Attempting to combat this security crisis, Calderón deployed the military against criminal organizations along the border. However, rather than resolving the corruption and violence issues that pervaded the area, the army deepened problems and crime. Citizens claimed that armed soldiers, connected to TCOs through their patronage networks, initiated abuses against the population, including illegal searches, unwarranted arrests, beatings, theft, rape, and torture.
The employment of the military by the Calderón administration exacerbated Mexico's violence and organized crime, adding human rights violations to the border's climate of lawlessness. Anthony Kruszewski, Tony Payan, and Kathleen Staudt examine, The arrival of the military corresponded with institutional disintegration as the corruption of elected officials, soldiers, and police demonstrated the entrenched culture of dishonesty and illegality of Mexico's systems.
To mitigate the negative consequences of militia employment, Calderón changed his policy strategy to one of reconstruction – rebuilding the Federal Police to have an increase in technical and operational activities, to have more comprehensive offices and departments, and to have a more selective personnel recruitment process. These measures reduced some of the corruption that had been embedded under his administration, but still left many realms of Mexico in the clutches of institutional corruption.