Mali War
The Mali War is an ongoing conflict that began on 16 January 2012 with a Tuareg rebellion in northern Mali. The rebels included the secular-oriented National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad, a group fighting for independence or greater autonomy of a region they called Azawad. The MNLA was initially allied with the jihadist Ansar Dine, which, in turn, was allied to other Salafi jihadist organizations such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and its splinter, Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa.
On 22 March 2012, President Amadou Toumani Touré was ousted in a coup d'état over his handling of the crisis, a month before a presidential election was to have taken place. Mutinous soldiers, calling themselves the National Committee for the Restoration of Democracy and State, took control and suspended the constitution of Mali. During the uncertainty that followed, resistance put up by government forces in the north began to melt away, enabling the rebels to capture the three provincial capitals of Timbuktu, Kidal, and Gao in three days. On 6 April 2012, stating that it had secured all of its desired territory, the MNLA declared independence from Mali, which was rejected as invalid by the African Union and the European Union.
The MNLA and the jihadist groups soon found themselves at odds, unable to reconcile their conflicting visions for Azawad. Efforts to find common ground failed, and open conflict broke out between them, resulting in a decisive defeat for the MNLA. The jihadists seized control of nearly all of Azawad, with only a few towns and isolated pockets remaining under MNLA and allied militia control.
The government of Mali asked for foreign military help to re-take the north. On 11 January 2013, the French military began operations against the Islamists. By the time of the 2013 presidential election, thanks to French, African, and international military support, government forces had regained most of the territory previously controlled by Islamists and Tuareg nationalists.
A peace deal between the government and Tuareg rebels was signed on 18 June 2013, however on 26 September 2013 the rebels pulled out of the peace agreement and claimed that the government had not respected its commitments to the truce. In mid-2014, the French military in Mali ended its Operation Serval and transitioned to the broader regional counterterrorist effort, Operation Barkhane. In June 2015, negotiations between the government, the pro-government Platform coalition, and the rebel Coordination of Azawad Movements culminated in the Algiers Accords, which aimed to decentralize the Malian state, integrate former rebels into the national army, and promote economic development in the north. Despite this, fighting between the two coalitions and various splinter groups continued periodically.
In 2017, Ansar Dine, the Sahara branch of AQIM, Katiba Macina, and the rest of Al-Mourabitoun merged to form the Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin coalition, pledging allegiance to Ayman al-Zawahiri, then-leader of Al-Qaeda. From the founding of the Islamic State – Sahel Province in 2015, the proxy groups of the Islamic State and al-Qaeda in the country, in what researchers called the "Sahel exception" or "Sahel anomaly", peacefully co-existed in their fights against the Malian government and her allies.
By the first half of 2018, rebel attacks had intensified significantly, and by July of that year, northern Mali had largely slipped from government control. Jihadist activity was no longer confined to the north; it expanded rapidly into central Mali. By 2020, some estimates suggested that only one-third of the country remained under government authority. The "jihadist idyll" ended in 2019 when open conflict broke out between JNIM and the ISSP.
Following mass protests, elements of the Malian armed forces, led by Special Forces Col. Assimi Goïta, began a mutiny, and subsequently undertook a coup d'état against Keita in 2020. Bah Ndaw was appointed interim president, although it was presumed he would serve as a figurehead, as Goïta, being in the military, would have been controversial in the eyes of Western governments. A second coup by Goïta followed in 2021 due to differences between them and their respective camps over whether to cooperate with France or Russia.
By the end of the year, hundreds of Wagner Group mercenaries, who would go on to commit several civilian massacres, began deploying across Mali. Their presence prompted strong objections from international forces, despite widespread anti-French sentiment among the Malian population. In February 2022, Canada, France, and its European partners announced a full troop withdrawal within six months, citing Wagner's presence.
In 2023, the withdrawal of MINUSMA and the handover of its 12 military bases at the junta's request heightened tensions between the government and the Strategic Framework for the Defense of the People of Azawad, a coalition of the CMA and Platform. Disputes arose particularly over bases in Ber and the Kidal region, which they argued, under the accords, they were entitled to, even if small army units may be located there. They would not allow the army to take over the bases without prior negotiations. Later, after previously accusing the junta and Wagner of multiple ceasefire and human rights violations, the CMA declared war on the government, prompting most Platform groups to leave the CSP. On 30 November 2024, the members of the CSP dissolved themselves and merged into the Azawad Liberation Front, officially returning to demands for the independence of Azawad.
Background
Since independence, pressures from government policies aimed at crushing traditional power structures, social mores, and local justice customs have caused several rebellions by the Tuaregs. Repeated promises of autonomy made in the aftermath of these uprisings were ignored, and Tuareg leaders were frequently sidelined from national politics. By late 2010, Tuareg political activists were renewing calls for Azawadi independence, asserting that they were marginalized and consequently impoverished in both Mali and Niger, and that mining projects had damaged important pastoral areas. Contributing to these grievances were broader issues such as climate change and a long history of forced modernization imposed on the nomadic societies of northern Mali, which deepened the divide between Tuareg communities and the central government.During the 2000s, Salafi jihadists and preachers associated with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb began infiltrating northern Mali from southern Algeria. Seeking refuge from Algerian security forces, they established the region as a strategic rear base, a hub for illicit trade, and a training ground. They radicalized local youth, leading them to attempt to seek a better future through joining the ranks of Al-Qahda. Meanwhile, Southern Algeria AQIM leaders cultivated relationships with tribal and community leaders in northern Mali. By 2012, AQIM had entrenched itself in the region's political, social, and economic networks. Internal disagreements over the Algerian-centric focus of the group led to a split in 2011. The breakaway faction, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa, aimed to expand operations across the Sahel and West Africa.
From February 2011, with the collapse of Gaddafi's Libya, hundreds of his Tuareg fighters, many veterans of the previous rebellions and now unemployed, returned to Mali with large stockpiles of weapons. Rebels in the National Transitional Council also returned, driven by financial reasons and the alleged racism of the NTC's fighters and militias. Upon returning, they found that, despite past promises, little had changed in the relationship between their communities and the central government.
In October 2011, the returning fighters began negotiations in Zakak with local leaders in the region, resulting in the formation of the secular-oriented National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad, composed of these veterans and several other groups. Although dominated by Tuaregs, the MNLA claimed to represent other ethnic communities as well, and was reportedly joined by some Arab leaders. Bilal Ag Acherif, leader of the MNLA, declared that the responsibility was on Mali to grant the Saharan peoples their right to self-determination, otherwise they would take it themselves. Estimates of returning fighters ranged from 800 to 4,000, later bolstered by as many as 1,500 Tuaregs who deserted the Malian army and up to 500 young recruits from within the region.
1990s vet Iyad Ag Ghaly, who had made an unsuccessful bid to become the secretary general of the MNLA at Zakak and to become the successor to the amenukal of the Ifoghas Tuaregs, started his own group, Ansar Dine, which drew from members of the Ifoghas tribe and Tuareg jihadists. The former faction of the party included prominent figures who were not fully committed to jihadist ideology but were willing to collaborate to achieve shared goals. Eventually, the jihadist faction would gain the upper hand as they had adsorbed AQIM numbers and were favored by Ghali.
Despite historically having difficulty maintaining alliances between secular and Islamist factions, on 10 January 2012, the MNLA and Ansar Dine came to an agreement to combine their forces in their upcoming rebellion. Separately, Ansar Dine formed an alliance with other Salafi Islamist groups, including MOJWA and AQIM. By January 2013, the combined strength of these three groups was estimated at 3,000. Cooperation between these jihadist groups with Boko Haram and Ansaru militants, who came from Nigeria via Niger, was reported during the rebellion. Furthermore, reports during the rebellion indicated that Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau was in Gao, receiving shelter after being wounded by Nigerian forces, before leaving in January 2013. The MNLA was de facto allied with the other Jihadist groups. In 2011, the size of the Malian army was around 12,150.