United States campaigns in World War I


The United States campaigns in World War I began after American entry in the war in early April 1917. The American Expeditionary Force served on the Western Front, under General John J. Pershing, and engaged in 13 official military campaigns between 1917 and 1918, for which campaign streamers were designated. The streamer uses the colors of the World War I Victory Medal ribbon which had a red center with a rainbow on each side of the center stripe and a purple edge. The double rainbow symbolizes the dawn of a new era and the calm which follows the storm.
The details above and following are taken from "The Army Flag and Its Streamers", a pamphlet which was originally prepared in 1964 by the Office of the Chief of Military History, in cooperation with the Office of the Chief of Information and the U.S. Army Exhibit Unit, to provide general summaries of each of the campaign ribbons authorized to be displayed on the Army flag. It was subsequently updated by the Center of Military History to add the campaigns from Vietnam.

Cambrai, 20 November – 7 December 1917

The year the United States entered World War I was marked by near disaster for the Allies on all the European fronts. A French offensive in April, with which the British cooperated, was a failure, and was followed by widespread mutinies in the French armies. The British maintained strong pressure on their front throughout the year; but British attacks at Messines Ridge, at Passchendaele, and at Cambrai failed in their main objective–the capture of German submarine bases–and took a severe toll of British fighting strength. Three American engineer regiments–the 11th, 12th, and 14th–were engaged in construction activity behind the British lines at Cambrai in November, when they were unexpectedly called upon to go into the front lines during an emergency. They thus became the first AEF units to meet the enemy.

Somme Defensive, 21 March – 6 April 1918

  • The German High Command decided to attack on the British-held Somme front in the direction of Amiens. A breakthrough at this point would separate the French from the British, push the latter into a pocket in Flanders, and open the way to the Channel ports
  • The German spring offensive began on 21 March 1918 with three German armies in the assault. British defense lines were pierced in rapid succession. By 26 March Amiens was seriously threatened, and on the following day a gap was created between the French and British armies. But the Germans lacked reserves to exploit their initial phenomenal successes, and the Allies moved in enough reserves to bring the offensive to a halt by 6 April. The Germans had advanced up to, had captured of ground and 70,000 prisoners, and had inflicted some 200,000 casualties. They had failed, however, to achieve any of their strategic objectives; destruction of the British, disruption of Allied lateral communicational and the capture of Amiens.
  • On 25 March 1918, at the height at the German drive, Pershing placed the four American divisions, at that time the only ones ready for combat, at the disposal of the French. But only a few American units actually engaged. They included the 6th, 12th, and 14th Engineers, the 69th Infantry Regiment and the 17th, 22nd, and 148th Aero Squadrons resulting in a combined total of about 2200 men.

    Lys, 9–27 April 1918

  • Ludendorff still hoped to destroy the damaged British Expeditionary Force before it had a chance to recover from the effects of the Somme drive. This was the goal of a new German attack launched on 9 April 1918 on a narrow front along the Lys River in Flanders. The Germans committed 46 divisions to the assault, and, using Hutier attacks once again, quickly scored a breakthrough. Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, Commander-in-Chief of the BEF, issued his famous "backs to the wall" order and appealed to Marshal Ferdinand Foch, the Supreme Allied Commander, for reinforcements. But Foch, convinced that the British could hold their line, refused to commit reserves, as he was building up in anticipation of the day when the Allies would again be able to seize the initiative. Foch's judgment proved to be correct, and Ludendorff called off the offensive on 29 April.
  • As of 21 March, the Germans had suffered some 350,000 casualties yet were unable to break any ground; in the same period, the British had an estimated 305,000 casualties. About 500 Americans participated in the campaign, including troops from the 16th Engineers, 28th Aero Squadron, and 1st Gas Regiment.

    Aisne, 27 May – 5 June 1918

  • The next major German attack was on the 27th of May in the thinly held but formidable terrain along the Aisne River known as the Chemin des Dames. The original objective of this new offensive was to draw southward the Allied reserves accumulated back of the British sector, in preparation for a final German attempt to destroy the British Army in Flanders. The French and British defenders were taken completely by surprise, and their positions were overrun rapidly on a forty-mile front. German progress on the first day was so rapid that Ludendorff altered his plans and decided to make the diversionary attack a main effort. Most of the Aisne bridges were captured intact. The thrust toward Rheims failed but Soissons was taken, and by 31 May the Germans had reached the outskirts of Château-Thierry on the Marne, less than East from Paris.
  • In the next few days the Germans sought to exploit and expand the deep and exposed offensive line which they had established. But by 4 June they had reached formidable resistance from some 27,500 American troops of the American Expeditionary Forces which had taken part in the check of the German advance. The 3rd Division foiled enemy attempts in the across 1 and 4 June to secure a firm bridgehead across the Marne at Château-Thierry. West of the town the 2nd Division, which included a Marine brigade, defended the road to Paris, and on 6 June they had successfully launched a counterattack in the Battle of Belleau Wood.

    Montdidier-Noyon, 9–13 June 1918

Ludendorff followed up his stalled Aisne offensive with a small-scale drive in the Montdidier-Noyon sector on 9 June 1918. Twenty-one German divisions attacked the French on a twenty-three mile front extending from Montdidier to the Oise River. The French anticipated the assault and contained it after a nine-mile penetration by the Germans, counterattacking strongly. The fighting was over by 12 June, and the enemy had little to show for the heavy losses incurred. No large American units were in the immediate vicinity of this action, although the 1st Division at Cantigny was subjected to artillery fire and diversionary raids.

Champagne-Marne, 15–18 July 1918

In the four great offensives from 21 March to 13 June 1918 the Germans gained considerable ground, but failed to achieve a decisive advantage at any point on the front. Furthermore, success was bought at a price in manpower and material which they could ill afford. Their more than 600,000 casualties were irreplaceable, whereas the Allied loss of some 800,000 men was soon more than compensated for by new American units arriving at the front in ever-mounting numbers. By July 1918 Allied troops outnumbered German troops on the Western Front. Other factors also contributed to the decline of German morale, notably the pinch of the blockade and the effectiveness of the Allied propaganda, which was distributed widely by air at the front and in German cities behind the lines. But Ludendorff refused to consider peace negotiations, and planned two more offensives for July which he hoped would bring victory. The first of the new drives was designed to capture Rheims, to make more secure the supply of the Merge salient, and to draw in Allied reserves. The second and larger offensive, destined never to be launched, would strike once again at the British in Flanders.
When the two-pronged German assault on either side of Rheims began on 15 July the Allies were prepared for it. Plans for the attack had leaked out of Berlin, and Allied airplanes had detected the unusual activity behind the enemy front. Foch had time to draw up reserves, and Petain, the French commander, skillfully deployed his troops in defense-in-depth tactics. Consequently, the German drive east of Rheims fell far short of its objective. The attack west of the city succeeded in pushing across the Marne near Château-Thierry, but was checked there by French and American units. Among the A.E.F. units involved in this action were the 3rd Infantry Division, 26th and 28th Divisions, the 42nd Infantry Division, the 369th Infantry Regiment, and supporting elements. It was here that the 38th Infantry and the 30th Infantry Regiments of the 3rd Division gained the motto, "Rock of the Marne."
By 17 July the Champagne-Marne offensive had petered out and the initiative passed to the Allies. The German people had built up great hopes for the success of this Friedensturm ; its failure was a tremendous psychological blow to the whole nation.

Aisne-Marne, 18 July – 6 August 1918

  • Several days before the Germans launched their abortive Champagne-Marne drive, the French high command had made plans for a general converging offensive against the Marne salient. Petain issued orders on 12 July for the attack to begin on the 18th, with five French armies – the Tenth, Sixth, Ninth, Fifth, and Fourth, placed around the salient from left to right – taking part. Spearheading the attack were the five divisions of the French XX Corps, including the American 1st and 2nd Divisions. Early on 18 July the two American divisions and a French Moroccan division, jumping off behind a heavy barrage, launched the main blow at the northwest base of the salient near Soissons. Enemy frontline troops, taken by surprise, initially gave ground, although resistance stiffened after an Allied penetration of some three miles. Before the 1st and 2d Divisions were relieved they had advanced 6 to, made Soissons untenable for the enemy, and captured 6,500 prisoners at a cost of over 10,000 American casualties.
  • Meanwhile, the other French armies in the offensive also made important gains, and the German commander ordered a general retreat from the Marne salient. The French Sixth Army, on the right of the Tenth, advanced steadily from the southwest, reaching the Vesle River on 3 August. By 28 July this army included the American 3d, 4th, 28th, and 42d Divisions. The 4th and 42d Divisions were under control of the I Corps, the first American corps headquarters to participate in combat. On 4 August the American III Corps headquarters entered combat, taking control of the 28th and 32d Divisions. By 5 August the entire Sixth Army front was held by the two American corps. East of the Sixth Army the French Ninth and Fifth Armies also advanced into the salient. The Germans retired across the Aisne and Vesle Rivers, resolutely defending each strong point as they went.
  • By 6 August the Aisne-Marne Offensive was over. The threat to Paris was ended by wiping out the Marne salient. The initiative now had definitely passed to the Allies, ending any possibility that Ludendorff could carry out his planned offensive in Flanders. Moreover, the success of the offensive revealed the advantages of Allied unity of command and the fighting qualities of American units. The eight A.E.F. divisions in the action had spearheaded much of the advance, demonstrating offensive capabilities that helped to inspire new confidence in the war-weary Allied armies. About 270,000 Americans took part in the battle.
  • On 24 July, while the Aisne-Marne drive was under way, Foch had outlined his plans for the remainder of 1918 at the only conference of Allied commanders that he called during the war. He proposed that the immediate objective of the Allied offensive should be the reduction of the three main German salients, with the goal of improving lateral communications behind the front in preparation for a general offensive in the fall. Reduction of the St. Mihiel salient was assigned to Pershing at his own request.
  • The contribution made by American troops in the Aisne-Marne Offensive gave Pershing an opportunity to press again for the formation of an independent American army. Preliminary steps in the organization of the American First Army had been taken in early July 1918. On the 4th LTC Hugh A. Drum was selected as chief of staff and directed to begin establishment of army headquarters. After conferences on 10 and 21 July, Foch agreed on the 22d to the formal organization of the First Army, and to the formation of two American sectors – a temporary combat sector in the Château-Thierry region, where the already active I and III Corps could comprise the nucleus of the First Army, and a quiet sector farther east, extending from Nomeny to a point north of St. Mihiel – which would become the actual theater of operations for the American Army as soon as circumstances permitted concentration of A.E.F. divisions there. Orders issued on 24 July announced formal organization of the First Army, effective on 10 August; designated Pershing as its commander; and located its headquarters at La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, west of Château-Thierry. Thus, 15 months after its declaration of war, the US finally had committed its formations on the ground.
  • Stabilization of the Vesle River front in early August led Pershing to alter his plan for forming the First Army. Instead of organizing it in the Château-Thierry region and then moving it eastward for the St. Mihiel Offensive, he secured Foch's consent on 9 August to a build-up of First Army units in the vicinity of the St. Mihiel salient. Tentative plans for reduction of the salient called for the concentration of three American corps on a front extending from Port-sur-Seille westward around the bulge to Watronville. Three American divisions would remain on the Vesle front.
  • Meanwhile, Allied forces, including some American units operating in other sectors of the Western Front, were making significant gains in the preliminary phases of the great final offensives. For the sake of clarity, the role of American units in the Somme Offensive, Oise-Aisne, and Ypres-Lys Campaigns will be described briefly, before considering in more detail the activities of the main body of A.E.F. troops in the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne Campaigns.