Battle of Broodseinde

The Battle of Broodseinde was fought on 4 October 1917 near Ypres in Belgium, at the east end of the Gheluvelt plateau, by the British Second and Fifth armies against the German 4th Army. The battle was the most successful Allied attack of the Third Battle of Ypres. Using bite-and-hold tactics, with objectives limited to what could be held against German counter-attacks, the British devastated the German defence, prompted a crisis among the German commanders and caused a severe loss of morale in the 4th Army. Preparations were made by the Germans for local withdrawals and planning began for a greater withdrawal, which would entail the abandonment by the Germans of the Belgian coast, one of the strategic aims of the Flanders Offensive.
After the period of unsettled but drier weather in September, heavy rain began again on 4 October and affected the remainder of the campaign, working more to the advantage of the German defenders, being pushed back on to far less damaged ground. The British had to move their artillery forward into the area devastated by shellfire and soaked by the autumn rains, restricting the routes on which guns and ammunition could be moved, presenting German artillery with easier targets. At the Battle of Poelcappelle on 9 October, after several more days of rain, the German defence achieved a costly success, holding the approaches to Passchendaele village, the most tactically important ground on the battlefield.

Background

Tactical developments

The Battle of Broodseinde was the third of the developed form of British bite-and-hold attacks in the Flanders Offensive, conducted by the Second Army. The unseasonal heavy rains in August had hampered British attempts to advance along the Gheluvelt Plateau more than German attempts to maintain their positions. The plateau ran along the southern edge of the Ypres Salient and formed an obstacle to further eastward attacks, preventing the Allies from advancing out of the salient. The British Expeditionary Force had transferred more guns and troops from the armies further south to reinforce the Second Army and force the Germans to defend the southern fringe of the plateau, diluting German artillery firepower. Broodseinde followed the Battle of the Menin Road Ridge on 20 September and the Battle of Polygon Wood on 26 September, which had captured much of the plateau and inflicted many casualties on the German defenders. The 4th Army had undertaken at least 24 counter-attacks since 20 September and several more after the Battle of Polygon Wood, particularly on 30 September and 1 October, when larger German methodical counter-attacks had been costly failures.
On 28 September, Sir Douglas Haig had met Plumer and the Fifth Army commander General Hubert Gough to explain his intentions, in view of the victories of 20 and 26 September, the fine weather, disarray among the German defenders and the limited prospect of German reinforcements arriving from the Russian front. Haig judged that the next attack, due on 6 October, would conclude the period of strictly limited advances. The following step would be a deeper advance, with provision made for exploitation. Haig wanted XV Corps on the Belgian coast and the amphibious force of Operation Hush readied, in case of a general withdrawal by the Germans. Reserve formations of infantry, artillery, cavalry and tanks were to be made ready behind the Fifth and Second armies, to exploit a successful attack. Gough and Plumer replied over the next couple of days, that they felt that the proposals were premature and that exploitation would not be feasible until Passchendaele ridge had been captured as far north as Westroosebeke. Capturing the ridge would probably take two more steps at three-day intervals, followed by another four days to repair roads over the captured ground. Haig explained that although it was not certain that the attack due on 10 October could be exploited, he desired the armies to make the arrangements, since they could always be used at a later date.

Prelude

British preparations

Date	Rain mm	°F
27	0.0	67	dull
28	0.0	67	dull
29	0.0	65	fine
30	0.0	67	fine
1	0.0	69	fine
2	2.7	76	rain
3	1.2	64	dull
4	4.6	60	dull

The British tactical refinements had sought to undermine the German defence-in-depth, by limiting objectives to a shallower penetration and then fighting the principal battle against Eingreif divisions as they counter-attacked, rather than against the local defenders. By further reorganising the infantry reserves, Plumer had ensured that the depth of the attacking divisions corresponded closer to the depth of the local German counter-attack reserves and their Eingreif divisions, providing more support for the advance and consolidation against German counter-attacks. Divisions attacked on narrower fronts and troops advanced no more than into the German defence zone, before consolidating their position. When the Germans counter-attacked, they encountered a reciprocal defence-in-depth, protected by a mass of artillery like the British green and black lines on 31 July and suffered many casualties to little effect. The tempo of the British operations added to the difficulty the Germans had in replacing tired divisions through the transport bottlenecks behind the German front.
The Battle of the Menin Road Ridge on 20 September, was the first attack with the more limited territorial objectives developed since 31 July, to benefit from the artillery reinforcements brought into the Second Army area and a pause of three weeks for preparation, during which the clouds dispersed and the sun began to dry the ground. The shorter intervals between attacks since then had several effects, allowing less time for either side to prepare and the Germans had to take more risks on the rest of the Western Front, to replace tired and depleted divisions in Flanders. German troops and ammunition trains overloaded the rail network in west Flanders, while more German artillery escaped British counter-battery fire and less time was available for wire cutting and pillbox destruction, although the Germans generally left these to give battle in the open. The British artillery preparation before Polygon Wood on 26 September, began 24 hours before the infantry attack. No formal artillery preparation was conducted before 4 October, except for the normal heavy artillery counter-battery fire and destructive fire on German strong-points.
To mislead the Germans as to the date and time of the infantry attack, when a hurricane bombardment was to be fired at zero hour, "practice" barrages were begun on 27 September and increased to two barrages a day from 1 October. Despite practice barrages as a ruse, "a very reliable agent" informed the Germans that an attack was coming from as early as 1 October. The battle was almost called off when heavy rain began again on 2 October, turning parts of the ground into a morass. British military intelligence predicted the German defensive changes after the defeats of 20 and 26 September, in an intelligence summary of 1 October which led to the British being ready for Unternehmen Höhensturm, a big German counter-attack to recapture the area around Zonnebeke on 4 October.

Plan

The attack aimed to complete the capture of the Gheluvelt Plateau by the occupation of Broodseinde Ridge and Gravenstafel Spur. This would protect the southern flank of the British line and permit attacks on Passchendaele Ridge to the north-east. The attack was planned for 6 October, to give the II Anzac Corps time to prepare. Haig was anxious about the possibility of deteriorating weather and on 26 September, was able to order the date to be advanced by two days, because of the quick relief of V Corps by the II Anzac Corps north of the Ypres–Roulers railway. Twelve divisions were involved in the attack on a front. The original plan was to have the I Anzac Corps relieved after the Battle of Polygon Wood but the corps had fewer casualties and was fresher than expected and it remained in the front line.
The IX Corps was to attack with the 37th Division in the area beyond Tower Hamlets, south of the Ypres–Menin road, the X Corps was to attack with the 5th Division in the Reutelbeek valley, the 21st Division and 7th Division on a front further north up to Polygon Wood, to take Reutel and the ground overlooking the village. The two right flanking corps had guns and howitzers supported by and medium pieces. In the I Anzac Corps area, the 1st Australian Division objectives required an advance of, the 2nd Australian Division on fronts.
In the II Anzac Corps area, the 3rd Australian Division objectives were deep, also on a frontage and the New Zealand Division objectives were deep on a front. The first objective for the Anzac divisions was set just short of the crest of Broodseinde Ridge and the final objective another beyond. The flanking corps conformed to this depth of advance and also attacked with one battalion for the first objective per brigade and two for the final objective, except in the II Anzac Corps, where two intermediate objectives were set for the 3rd Australian Division, because of the state of the ground with a battalion of each brigade for each objective.
The artillery plan had the first belt of creeping barrage beginning beyond the jumping-off tapes. After three minutes the barrage was to creep forward by lifts in four minutes for, when the machine-gun barrage would begin, then every six minutes to the protective line, beyond first objective. During the pause the barrage was to move further to hit German counter-attacks and then suddenly return. At minutes, it was to advance in lifts every eight minutes to the final objective. After another pause the barrage was to creep forward at hourly intervals for into the German defences. The defensive barrage by the first two belts from the field artillery was to stop at except for SOS fire and the two back belts of heavy and medium artillery at