Battle of the Imjin River
The Battle of the Imjin River, also known as the Battle of Solma-ri or Battle of Gloster Hill in South Korea, or as Battle of Xuemali in China, took place 22–25 April 1951 during the Korean War. Troops from the Chinese People's Volunteer Army attacked United Nations Command positions on the lower Imjin River in an attempt to achieve a breakthrough and recapture the South Korean capital Seoul. The attack was part of the Chinese Spring Offensive, the aim of which was to regain the initiative on the battlefield after a series of successful UN counter-offensives in January–March 1951 had allowed UN forces to establish themselves beyond the 38th Parallel at the Kansas Line.
The section of the UN line where the battle took place was defended primarily by British forces of the 29th Infantry Brigade, consisting of three British and one Belgian infantry battalions supported by tanks and artillery. Despite facing a greatly numerically superior enemy, the brigade held its general positions for three days. When the units of the 29th Infantry Brigade were ultimately forced to fall back, their actions in the Battle of the Imjin River together with those of other UN forces, for example in the Battle of Kapyong, had blunted the impetus of the PVA offensive and allowed UN forces to retreat to prepared defensive positions north of Seoul, where the PVA were halted. It is often known as the "Battle that saved Seoul."
"Though minor in scale, the battle's ferocity caught the imagination of the world", especially the fate of the 1st Battalion, The Gloucestershire Regiment, which was outnumbered and eventually surrounded by Chinese forces on Hill 235, a feature that became known as Gloster Hill. The stand of the Gloucestershire battalion, together with other actions of the 29th Brigade in the Battle of the Imjin River, has become an important part of British military history and tradition.
Background
Following the Soviet-backed North Korean invasion of South Korea on 25 June 1950, a UN counter-offensive had reached the North Korean border with China. On the premise of fearing for its own security, China committed troops it had already moved to the border and began three offensives between 3 November 1950 and 24 January 1951 which pushed the UN forces south of the original border between North and South Korea along the 38th Parallel and captured Seoul. A fourth offensive in mid-February was blunted by UN forces in the Battle of Chipyong-ni and Third Battle of Wonju. At the end of February the UN launched a series of offensive operations, recapturing Seoul on 15 March and pushing the front line back northwards. In early April Operation Rugged established the front in a line that followed the lower Imjin river, then eastwards to the and on to the Yangyang area on the east coast, known as the Kansas Line. The subsequent Operation Dauntless pushed out a salient between the Imjin river as it dog-legged north and the Hwacheon Reservoir, known as the Utah Line.UN Forces
On 22 April the front line in the west along Lines Kansas and Utah was held by the United States Army I Corps comprising, from west to east, the South Korean Republic of Korea Army 1st Division, the US 3rd Division with the attached British 29th Brigade, the US 25th Division with the attached Turkish Brigade and the US 24th Division. The 29th Infantry Brigade, commanded by Brigadier Tom Brodie, consisted of the 1st Battalion Gloucestershire Regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel James P. Carne; the 1st Battalion Royal Northumberland Fusiliers, under Lieutenant-Colonel Kingsley Foster; the 1st Battalion Royal Ulster Rifles, under the temporary command of Major Gerald Rickord; and the Belgian Battalion, under Lieutenant-Colonel Albert Crahay, to which Luxembourg's contribution to the UN forces was attached. The brigade was supported by the 25 pounders of 45 Field Regiment Royal Artillery commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel MT Young, the 4.2 inch mortars of 170 Independent Mortar Battery RA, the Centurion tanks of C Squadron 8th King's Royal Irish Hussars under the command of Major Henry Huth, and by 55 Squadron Royal Engineers.The four battalions of 29th Brigade covered a front of. Gaps between units had to be accepted because there was no possibility of forming a continuous line with the forces available. "Brigadier Brodie determined to deploy his men in separate unit positions, centred upon key hill features" On the left flank, the Glosters were guarding a ford over the Imjin east of the ROK 1st Division; the Fusiliers were deployed near the centre, around northeast of the Glosters; the Belgians, occupying a feature called Hill 194 on the right, were the only element of the 29th Brigade north of the river. Their connection with the rest of the brigade depended on two pontoon bridges about apart. These bridges connected the Belgians with Route 11, the 29th Brigade's main line of supply and communication. The Rifles served as the brigade's reserve and were deployed along Route 11. Extensive defensive preparations were not completed because the British expected to hold the position for only a short time. Neither minefields, deeply dug shelters nor extensive wire obstacles had been constructed. The British position on the Imjin river "was deemed safe" but vulnerable in case of an attack.
Chinese forces
The commander-in-chief of the PVA and North Korean Korean People's Army forces in the Field, Marshal Peng Dehuai, planned to "wipe out...the American 3rd Division...the British 29th Brigade and the 1st Division of the Republic of Korean Army...after this we can wipe out the American 24th Division and 25th Division", and promised the capture of Seoul as a May Day gift to Mao Zedong. To achieve the objective Peng planned to converge on Seoul with three PVA army groups and a KPA corps; a total strength of some 305,000 men. The III and IX Army Groups were to attack the right flank of the US 3rd Division and the 24th and 25th Divisions on the Utah Line, east of the Imjin where it turned north. The XIX Army Group on the PVA right flank, west of the Imjin river where it turned north, were to attack the remainder of the 3rd Division and the ROK 1st Division. On the XIX Army Group front, the KPA I Corps and PVA 64th Army would attack the ROK 1st Division, while the 63rd Army would attack on their left, pitting it against 29th Brigade. The 63rd Army comprised three divisions, the 187th, 188th and 189th, with each division comprising three regiments, each of which comprised three battalions. Some 27,000 men in 27 battalions would be attacking 29th Brigade's four battalions, albeit in echelon, one division after the other.Battle
The first night
The battle opened on the night of 22 April 1951. A PVA patrol on the north bank of the river moved around the Belgians on Hill 194 and continued to advance east towards the two bridges on which the Belgians depended. Elements of the 29th Brigade's reserve, the 1st RUR, were deployed forward at about 22:00 to secure the crossing but were soon engaged by PVA forces trying to cross the river. The Royal Ulster Rifles were unable to secure the bridges. This development meant that the Belgian battalion on the north bank of the river was in danger of being isolated from the rest of the 29th Brigade.PVA forces following the initial patrol either attacked the Belgian positions on Hill 194 or continued their advance towards the bridges. Those who were able to cross the Imjin attacked the Fusiliers' right rear company, Z Company, on Hill 257, a position close to the river and almost directly south of the crossings. Further downstream, PVA forces managed to ford the Imjin and attacked the Fusiliers' left forward company, X Company, on Hill 152. The retreat of X Company from Hill 152 had serious consequences for Y Company, which occupied the right forward position of what can be described as a squarish fusilier position marked out by four widely spaced company perimeters at the corners. Although Y Company was not attacked directly, PVA forces threatened its flanks by forcing Z and X Companies from their positions. After unsuccessful British attempts to regain those lost positions on Hill 257 and 194, Y Company's position was abandoned, the retreat being covered by C Squadron, 8th Hussars.
On the left of the brigade's line, a patrol of 17 men from the Glosters' C Company lying in wait on the river bank repulsed three attempts by a battalion of the 559th Regiment, 187th Division to cross the river, eventually retiring without loss when their ammunition ran low and assaulting troops finally gained the opposite bank. During the night the Glosters' A and D Companies were attacked, and by 07:30 A Company, outnumbered six to one, had been forced from its position on Castle Hill. An attempt to retake it failed, during which Lieutenant Philip Curtis single-handedly destroyed a PVA machine-gun position with a grenade but was himself killed by a burst of machine-gun fire in the process. He was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross.
The Glosters' withdrawal to Hill 235
On 23 April, attempts by the Fusiliers and forces from the US 3rd Infantry Division's reserve to regain control of areas lost during the night failed. An attack by the US 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, on enemy forces near Hill 257 was ordered to support the Belgian withdrawal from the north bank of the Imjin River. Despite losing seven vehicles, the Belgian Battalion successfully withdrew to the east and took up new positions south of the Glosters and the Fusiliers before moving to the vicinity of the 29th Brigade's command post.At around 20:30 on 23 April, the Glosters' A Company, now at less than half strength and with all officers killed or wounded, fell back to Hill 235. The withdrawal left D Company's position exposed, and with one of its platoons badly mauled in the overnight fighting, it too withdrew to the hill. B Company had not been pressed during the night, but the withdrawal of D Company on their left and the Fusiliers on their right left them exposed, and they were withdrawn to Hill 316, east of C Company.
During the night of 23/24 April, the Glosters' B Company, outnumbered 18:1, endured six assaults, calling in artillery on their own position to break up the last of them. Low on ammunition and having taken many casualties, the seventh assault at 08:10 forced them to abandon their position, and just 20 survivors made it to Hill 235, to which battalion HQ, the Support Company and C Company had already withdrawn. As B Company fought for its life, the PVA 188th Division crossed the Imjin and attacked the Fusiliers and the Royal Ulster Rifles on the right of the brigade's line. The 187th Division also engaged the brigade's battalions on the right, while the 189th Division kept up the pressure on the left.
Most dangerous for the integrity of the 29th Brigade was the deep penetration of the line between the Glosters and the Fusiliers which had cut off the former. To counter the PVA attack and protect the Glosters from being completely surrounded, the Philippine 10th Battalion Combat Team was temporarily attached to the 29th Brigade. A combined force of 3 M24 tanks from the 10th BCT's reconnaissance company and 10 Centurions from C Squadron of the 8th Hussars supported by infantry reached a point from Hill 235 on 24 April. However, the column failed to make contact as the lead M24 tank was hit by PVA fire and knocked out, blocking the route and making any further advance against heavy resistance impossible. At this point, according to an official American narrative of operations, "the brigade commander considered it unwise to continue the effort to relieve the Gloucester Battalion and withdrew the relief force".
The Glosters were not alone on Hill 235. Throughout the battle, they were supported by the men of C Troop 170th Mortar Battery, Royal Artillery.
As with The Glosters, C Troop lost men and fought to the end.
Those who survived were taken prisoner with the Glosters and marched North.