Valley Forge
Valley Forge was the winter encampment of the Continental Army, under the command of George Washington, during the American Revolutionary War. The Valley Forge encampment lasted six months, from December 19, 1777, to June 19, 1778.
Three months prior to the encampment at Valley Forge, in September 1777, the Second Continental Congress was forced to flee the revolutionary capital of Philadelphia ahead of an imminent British attack on the city following Washington's defeat in the Battle of Brandywine, a key battle during the British Army's Philadelphia campaign. Unable to defend Philadelphia, Washington led his 12,000-man army into winter quarters at Valley Forge, located approximately northwest of Philadelphia.
At Valley Forge, the Continental Army struggled to manage a disastrous supply crisis while simultaneously retraining and reorganizing their units in an effort to mount successful counterattacks against the British. During the encampment at Valley Forge, an estimated 1,700 to 2,000 soldiers died from disease, possibly exacerbated by malnutrition and cold, wet weather. In 1976, in recognition of the enormous historical significance of Valley Forge in American history, Valley Forge National Historical Park was established and named a national historic site, which protects and preserves nearly of the original Valley Forge encampment site. The park is a popular tourist destination, drawing nearly 2 million visitors each year.
Pre-encampment
In 1777, Valley Forge consisted of a small proto-industrial community located at the confluence of Valley Creek and the Schuylkill River. In 1742, Quaker industrialists established the Mount Joy Iron Forge in Valley Forge. Capital improvements made by John Potts and his family over the following decades permitted the small community to expand its ironworks, establish mills, and construct new dwellings for the village's residents. Valley Forge was surrounded by rich farmland, where mainly Welsh Quaker farmers grew wheat, rye, hay, Indian corn, and other crops, and raised livestock, including cattle, sheep, pigs, and barnyard fowl. Settlers of German and Swedish descent also lived nearby.In the summer of 1777, the Continental Army's quartermaster general, Thomas Mifflin, decided to station a portion of the Continental Army's supplies in buildings in the village because the area had a variety of structures and was a secluded location surrounded by two hills. Fearing such a concentration of military supplies would become a target for British raids, the forge's ironmaster, William Dewees Jr., expressed concerns about the army's proposal. Mifflin heeded Dewees' concerns but established a magazine at Valley Forge anyway.
Philadelphia campaign
After British forces landed at the Head of Elk in present-day Elkton, Maryland, on August 25, 1777, they maneuvered out of the Chesapeake basin and headed north as part of the Philadelphia campaign. Following the British victories at the Battle of Brandywine on September 11, 1777, and the Battle of the Clouds five days later, several hundred Hessian soldiers under General Wilhelm von Knyphausen raided the supply magazine at Valley Forge on September 18. Despite the best efforts of Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Hamilton and Captain Henry Lee III, the two Continental Army officers tasked with evacuating the supplies at Valley Forge, von Knyphausen's troops captured and burnt the magazine, taking or destroying all supplies contained within.Valley Forge encampment
Political, strategic, and environmental factors all influenced the Continental Army's decision to establish their encampment near Valley Forge, Pennsylvania, in the winter of 1777–1778. The site was selected after George Washington conferred with his officers to select a strategic location that would prove most advantageous to the Continental Army.Site selection
On October 29, 1777, Washington first presented his generals with the question of where to quarter the Continental Army in the winter of 1777–1778. In addition to suggestions from his officers, Washington also had to consider the recommendations of politicians. Pennsylvania state legislators and the Second Continental Congress expected the Continental Army to select an encampment site that could protect the countryside around the revolutionary capital of Philadelphia. Some members of the Continental Congress also believed that the army might be able to launch a winter campaign. Interested parties suggested other sites for an encampment, including Lancaster, Pennsylvania and Wilmington, Delaware. Following the inconclusive Battle of Whitemarsh from December 5–8, however, increasing numbers of officers and politicians began to appreciate the need to defend the greater Philadelphia region from British attack.Considering these questions, an encampment at Valley Forge had notable advantages. Valley Forge's high terrain meant that enemy attacks would be difficult. Wide, open areas provided space for drilling and training, and its location allowed for soldiers to be readily detached to protect the countryside. On December 19, Washington conducted his 12,000-man army to Valley Forge to establish the encampment.
The encampment was primarily situated along the high, flat ground east of Mount Joy and south of the Schuylkill River. In addition to a concentration of soldiers at Valley Forge, Washington ordered nearly 2,000 soldiers to encamp at Wilmington, Delaware. He posted the army's mounted troops at Trenton, New Jersey, and additional outposts at Downingtown and Radnor, Pennsylvania, among other places. In the two winter encampments prior to Valley Forge, the Continental Army had sheltered themselves in a combination of tents, constructed huts, civilian barns and other buildings. Valley Forge marked the first time Washington ordered the Continental Army primarily to concentrate into a more permanent post, which required them to construct their own shelters. This strategic shift encouraged a whole new host of problems for the American Patriots.
March in and hut construction
Washington later wrote of the march into Valley Forge: "To see men without clothes to cover their nakedness, without blankets to lay on, without shoes by which their marches might be traced by the blood from their feet, and almost as often without provisions as with; marching through frost and snow and at Christmas taking up their winter quarters within a day's march of the enemy, without a house or hut to cover them till they could be built, and submitting to it without a murmur is a mark of patience and obedience which in my opinion can scarce be paralleled."The Valley Forge encampment became the Continental Army's first large-scale construction of living quarters. While no accurate account exists for the number of log huts built, experts estimate a range between 1,500 and 2,000 structures. There are no known contemporary images of the Valley Forge cantonment. The correspondence of General Washington and other soldiers’ letters and notebooks are the only accounts of what took place. Brigadier General Louis Lebègue de Presle Duportail selected grounds for the brigade encampments and planned the defenses. Afterwards, brigadier generals appointed officers from each regiment to mark out the precise spot for every officer and all enlisted men's huts.
Despite commanders' attempts at standardization, the huts varied in terms of size, materials, and construction techniques. Military historian John B. B. Trussell Jr. writes that many squads "dug their floors almost two feet below ground level," to reduce wind exposure or the number of logs required for construction. In addition, some huts had thatched straw roofs, while others consisted of brush, canvas, or clapboards.
On February 16, 1778, from Valley Forge, Washington reached out to George Clinton, then governor of the Province of New York, for support, writing, "for some days past, there has been little less, than a famine in camp. A part of the army has been a week, without any kind of flesh, and the rest for three or four days. Naked and starving as they are, we cannot enough admire the incomparable patience and fidelity of the soldiery, that they have not been ere this excited by their sufferings, to a general mutiny or dispersion. Strong symptoms, however, discontent have appeared in particular instances; and nothing but the most active efforts every where can long avert so shocking a catastrophe."
In a letter to his wife Adrienne, Lafayette described the huts as "small barracks, which are scarcely more cheerful than dungeons."
Supply challenges
The Continental Army that marched into Valley Forge consisted of about 12,000 people, including soldiers, artificers, women, and children. Throughout the winter, patriot commanders and legislators faced the challenge of supplying a population the size of a large colonial city. In May and June 1777, the Continental Congress authorized the reorganization of the supply department. Implementation of those changes never fully took effect because of the fighting surrounding Philadelphia. Consequently, the supply chain had broken down even before the Continental Army arrived at Valley Forge. In large part, supplies dried up due to neglect by Congress so that by the end of December 1777 Washington had no way to feed or to adequately clothe the soldiers. Washington chose the Valley Forge area partly for its strategic benefits, but wintertime road conditions impeded supply wagons en route to the encampment.That winter, starvation and disease killed nearly 2,000 soldiers and perhaps as many as 1,500 horses. The men suffered from continual, gnawing hunger and cold. Washington ordered that soldiers' rations include either one to one and a half pounds of flour or bread, one pound of salted beef or fish, or three-quarters pound of salted pork, or one and a half pounds of flour or bread, a half pound of bacon or salted pork, a half pint of peas or beans, and one gill of whiskey or spirits. In practice, however, the army could not reliably supply the full ration. Perishable foods began to rot before reaching the troops because of poor storage, transportation problems, or confusion regarding the supplies' whereabouts. Other rations became lost or captured by the enemy. Traveling to market proved dangerous for some vendors. When combined with the Continental Army's lack of hard currency, prices for perishable goods inflated. Therefore, during the first few days of constructing their huts, the Continentals primarily ate firecakes, a tasteless mixture of flour and water cooked upon heated rocks. In his memoir, Joseph Plumb Martin wrote that "to go into the wild woods and build us habitations to stay in, in such a weak, starved and naked condition, was appalling in the highest degree." Resentment swelled within the ranks towards those deemed responsible for their hardship.
On December 23, Washington wrote Henry Laurens, the President of the Continental Congress. Washington related how his commanders had just exerted themselves with some difficulty to quell a "dangerous mutiny", because of the lack of provision. Washington continued with a dire warning to Congress: "unless some great and capital change suddenly takes place in that line, this Army must inevitably be reduced to one or other of these three things, Starve, dissolve, or disperse, in order to obtain subsistence in the best manner they can."
That winter was not particularly harsh at Valley Forge; rather than bitter cold and snow, the weather fluctuated often between rain and snow. Many soldiers remained unfit for duty, owing to disease and to lack of proper clothing and uniforms. Years later, Lafayette recalled that "the unfortunate soldiers were in want of everything; they had neither coats, hats, shirts, nor shoes; their feet and legs froze till they had become almost black, and it was often necessary to amputate them."
On January 7, Christopher Marshall related how "ten teams of oxen, fit for slaughtering, came into camp, driven by loyal Philadelphia women. They also brought 2,000 shirts, smuggled from the city, sewn under the eyes of the enemy." While these women provided crucial assistance, most people remained relatively unaware of the Continental Army's plight—"an unavoidable result of a general policy" to prevent such intelligence from reaching the British.
The outlook for the army's situation improved when a five-man congressional delegation arrived on January 24. The delegates consisted of "Francis Dana of Massachusetts, Nathaniel Folsom of New Hampshire, John Harvie of Virginia, Gouverneur Morris of New York, and Joseph Reed of Pennsylvania." According to historian Wayne Bodle, they came to understand through their visit "how vulnerable the new army could be to logistical disruption, owing to its size, its organizational complexity, and its increasing mobility." Washington and his aides convinced them to implement recommended reforms to the supply department. In March 1778, Congress also appointed Nathanael Greene as Quartermaster General, who reluctantly accepted at Washington's behest. One of the Continental Army's most able generals, Greene did not want an administrative position. Yet he and his staff better supplied the troops at a time when the weather and road conditions began to improve. The Schuylkill River also thawed, allowing the Continental Army to more easily transport convoys from the main supply depot at Reading.