Bell Boeing V-22 Osprey
The Bell Boeing V-22 Osprey is an American multi-use, tiltrotor military transport and cargo aircraft with both vertical takeoff and landing and short takeoff and landing capabilities. It is designed to combine the functionality of a conventional helicopter with the long-range, high-speed cruise performance of a turboprop aircraft. The V-22 is operated by the United States and Japan, and is not only a new aircraft design, but a new type of aircraft that entered service in the 2000s, a tiltrotor compared to fixed wing and helicopter designs. The V-22 first flew in 1989 and after a long development was fielded in 2007. The design combines the vertical takeoff ability of a helicopter with the speed and range of a fixed-wing airplane.
The failure of Operation Eagle Claw in 1980 during the Iran hostage crisis underscored that there were military roles for which neither conventional helicopters nor fixed-wing transport aircraft were well-suited. The United States Department of Defense initiated a program to develop an innovative transport aircraft with long-range, high-speed, and vertical-takeoff capabilities, and the Joint-service Vertical take-off/landing Experimental program officially began in 1981. A partnership between Bell Helicopter and Boeing Helicopters was awarded a development contract in 1983 for the V-22 tiltrotor aircraft. The Bell-Boeing team jointly produces the aircraft. The V-22 first flew in 1989 and began flight testing and design alterations; the complexity and difficulties of being the first tiltrotor for military service led to many years of development.
The United States Marine Corps began crew training for the MV-22B Osprey in 2000 and fielded it in 2007; it supplemented and then replaced their Boeing Vertol CH-46 Sea Knights. The U.S. Air Force fielded its version of the tiltrotor, the CV-22B, in 2009. Since entering service with the Marine Corps and Air Force, the Osprey has been deployed in transportation and medevac operations over Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and Kuwait. The U.S. Navy began using the CMV-22B for carrier onboard delivery duties in 2021.
Development
Origins
The failure of Operation Eagle Claw, the Iran hostage rescue mission, in 1980 demonstrated to the U.S. military a need for "a new type of aircraft, that could not only take off and land vertically but also could carry combat troops, and do so at speed." Additionally, a concentrated force is vulnerable to a single nuclear weapon. Airborne solutions with high speed and range allow for their rapid dispersal to reduce this vulnerability. The U.S. Department of Defense began the JVX aircraft program in 1981, under U.S. Army leadership.The established tactical purpose of the USMC is to perform an amphibious landing, which the JVX program promised to facilitate. The USMC's primary helicopter model, the CH-46 Sea Knight, was aging, and no replacement had been accepted. Because the USMC's amphibious capability would be significantly reduced without the CH-46, USMC leadership believed a proposal to merge the Marine Corps with the Army was a credible threat. This potential merger was akin to a proposal by President Truman following World War II. The Office of the Secretary of Defense and Navy administration opposed the tiltrotor project, but pressure from Congress had a significant effect on the program's development.
The Navy and USMC were given the lead in 1983. The JVX combined requirements from the USMC, USAF, Army and Navy. A request for preliminary design proposals was issued in December 1982. Interest was expressed by Aérospatiale, Bell Helicopter, Boeing Vertol, Grumman, Lockheed, and Westland. Contractors were encouraged to form teams. Bell partnered with Boeing Vertol to submit a proposal for an enlarged version of the Bell XV-15 prototype on 17 February 1983. Since this was the only proposal the JVX program received, a preliminary design contract was awarded on 26 April 1983.
The JVX aircraft was designated V-22 Osprey on 15 January 1985; by that March, the first six prototypes were being produced, and Boeing Vertol was expanded to handle the workload. Production work is split between Bell and Boeing. Bell Helicopter manufactures and integrates the wing, nacelles, rotors, drive system, tail surfaces, and aft ramp, as well as integrating the Rolls-Royce engines and performing final assembly. Boeing Helicopters manufactures and integrates the fuselage, cockpit, avionics, and flight controls. The USMC variant received the MV-22 designation, and the USAF variant received CV-22; this was reversed from normal procedure to prevent USMC Ospreys from having a conflicting CV designation with aircraft carriers. Full-scale development began in 1986. On 3 May 1986, Bell Boeing was awarded a US$1.714 billion contract for the V-22 by the U.S. Navy. At this point, all four U.S. military services had acquisition plans for the V-22.
The first V-22 was publicly rolled out in May 1988. That year, the U.S. Army left the program, citing a need to focus its budget on more immediate aviation programs. In 1989, the V-22 survived two separate Senate votes that could have resulted in cancellation. Despite the Senate's decision, the Department of Defense instructed the Navy not to spend more money on the V-22. As development cost projections greatly increased in 1988, Defense Secretary Dick Cheney tried to defund it from 1989 to 1992, but was overruled by Congress, which provided unrequested program funding. Multiple studies of alternatives found the V-22 provided more capability and effectiveness with similar operating costs. The Clinton Administration was supportive of the V-22, helping it attain funding.
Although the Army departed the program, it eventually developed and chose a tiltrotor to replace the UH-60 Blackhawk in the 21st century, and as of the mid-2020s the Army is planning to field the V-280 Valor tiltrotor.
Flight testing and design changes
The first of six prototypes first flew on 19 March 1989 in the helicopter mode and on 14 September 1989 in fixed-wing mode. The third and fourth prototypes successfully completed the first sea trials on in December 1990. The fourth and fifth prototypes crashed in 1991–92. From October 1992 to April 1993, the V-22 was redesigned to reduce empty weight, simplify manufacture, and reduce build costs; it was designated V-22B. Flights resumed in June 1993 after safety changes were made to the prototypes. Bell Boeing received a contract for the engineering manufacturing development phase in June 1994. The prototypes were also modified to resemble the V-22B standard. At this stage, testing focused on flight envelope expansion, measuring flight loads, and supporting the EMD redesign. Flight testing with the early V-22s continued into 1997.Flight testing of four full-scale development V-22s began at the Naval Air Warfare Test Center, Naval Air Station Patuxent River, Maryland. The first EMD flight took place on 5 February 1997. Testing soon fell behind schedule. The first of four low rate initial production aircraft, ordered on 28 April 1997, was delivered on 27 May 1999. The second sea trials were completed onboard in January 1999. During external load testing in April 1999, a V-22 transported the lightweight M777 howitzer.
In 2000, there were two fatal crashes, killing a total of 23 marines, and the V-22 was again grounded while the crashes' causes were investigated and various parts were redesigned. In June 2005, the V-22 completed its final operational evaluation, including long-range deployments, high altitude, desert and shipboard operations; problems previously identified had reportedly been resolved.
U.S. Naval Air Systems Command worked on software upgrades to increase the maximum speed from, increase helicopter mode altitude limit from or, and increase lift performance. By 2012, changes had been made to the hardware, software, and procedures in response to hydraulic fires in the nacelles, vortex ring state control issues, and opposed landings; reliability has improved accordingly.
An MV-22 landed and refueled on board in an evaluation in October 2012. In 2013, cargo handling trials occurred on. In October 2015, NAVAIR tested rolling landings and takeoffs on a carrier, preparing for carrier onboard delivery.
Discussions
Development was protracted and controversial, partly because of large cost increases, some of which were caused by a requirement to fold wings and rotors to fit aboard ships. The development budget was first set at US$2.5 billion in 1986, increasing to a projected US$30 billion in 1988. By 2008, US$27 billion had been spent and another US$27.2 billion was required for planned production numbers. Between 2008 and 2011, the V-22's estimated lifetime cost grew by 61%, mostly for maintenance and support.In 2001, Lieutenant Colonel Odin Leberman, commander of the V-22 squadron at Marine Corps Air Station New River, was relieved of duty after allegations that he instructed his unit to falsify maintenance records to make it appear more reliable. Three officers were implicated for their roles in the falsification scandal.
In October 2007, a Time magazine article condemned the V-22 as unsafe, overpriced, and inadequate; the USMC responded that the article's data was partly obsolete, inaccurate, and held high expectations for any new field of aircraft. In 2011, the controversial defense industry-supported Lexington Institute reported that the average mishap rate per flight hour over the past 10 years was the lowest of any USMC rotorcraft, approximately half of the average fleet accident rate. In 2011, Wired magazine reported that the safety record had excluded ground incidents; the USMC responded that MV-22 reporting used the same standards as other Navy aircraft.
By 2012, the USMC reported fleetwide readiness rate had risen to 68%; however, the DOD's Inspector General later found 167 of 200 reports had "improperly recorded" information. Captain Richard Ulsh blamed errors on incompetence, saying that they were "not malicious" or deliberate. The required mission capable rate was 82%, but the average was 53% from June 2007 to May 2010. In 2010, Naval Air Systems Command aimed for an 85% reliability rate by 2018. From 2009 to 2014, readiness rates rose 25% to the "high 80s", while cost per flight hour had dropped 20% to $9,520 through a rigorous maintenance improvement program that focused on diagnosing problems before failures occur., although the V-22 requires more maintenance and has lower availability than traditional helicopters, it also has a lower mishap rate. The average cost per flight hour is, whereas the Sikorsky CH-53E Super Stallion cost about $20,000 per flight hour in 2007. V-22 ownership cost was $83,000 per hour in 2013. In 2022, the Pentagon evaluated its cost per flight hour at $23,941.
While technically capable of autorotation if both engines fail in helicopter mode, a safe landing is difficult. In 2005, a director of the Pentagon's testing office stated that in a loss of power while hovering below, emergency landings "are not likely to be survivable." V-22 pilot Captain Justin "Moon" McKinney stated that: "We can turn it into a plane and glide it down, just like a C-130." A complete loss of power requires both engines to fail, as one engine can power both proprotors via interconnected drive shafts. Though vortex ring state contributed to a deadly V-22 accident, flight testing found it to be less susceptible to VRS than conventional helicopters. A GAO report stated that the V-22 is "less forgiving than conventional helicopters" during VRS. Several test flights to explore VRS characteristics were canceled. The USMC trains pilots in the recognition of and recovery from VRS, and has instituted operational envelope limits and instrumentation to help avoid VRS conditions.