Richard Haking
Sir Richard Cyril Byrne Haking was a senior British Army officer who is most notable for being the commander of XI Corps for most of the First World War.
Arguments over the late release of XI Corps on the first day of the Battle of Loos in September 1915 were instrumental in forcing the resignation of Field Marshal Sir John French as Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force. Haking is remembered chiefly for the negligible gains and high casualties suffered by his forces at the second Attack at Fromelles, during the Battle of the Somme to the south. Although blocked from further promotion, he continued in command of XI Corps – including in Italy in the winter of 1917–1918 and in Flanders in April 1918 – until the end of the war. After the war he held two politically sensitive posts: he was the League of Nations High Commissioner for the Free City of Danzig in the early 1920s, and then General Officer Commanding British Troops in Egypt.
Haking has enjoyed a poor reputation, especially in Australian writing. More recently, at least two British historians have sought to defend his reputation, including his recent biographer Michael Senior and Gordon Corrigan, who regarded him as an "intelligent and capable man" unfairly maligned in the popular mythology of the war.
Early life and military career
Haking was probably born in Halifax, West Yorkshire, the son of a clergyman, the Reverend Richard Haking. He attended the Royal Military College at Sandhurst and was commissioned with the rank of second lieutenant. Haking joined the 67th Regiment of Foot on 22 January 1881. Haking saw service in Burma 1885–1887, when he was promoted to be his battalion's adjutant and was made captain in 1889. He married Rachel Burford-Hancock, daughter of Sir Henry Burford-Hancock, on 28 September 1891; they had no children.Haking studied at the Staff College, Camberley, from 1896 to 1897. He was made a deputy assistant adjutant general for Cork District from 1898 to 1899. He was promoted to major in March 1899. He served on the staff in the Second Boer War, initially as a DAAG.
Haking later returned to the Staff College, first as a lecturer 1901–1904, then, from February 1904, as a DAAG until 1906. While at Camberley he was promoted to the temporary rank of lieutenant colonel in January 1901. This was made permanent in November 1903 and he was promoted again, to brevet colonel, in June 1905. Haking was then made a substantive colonel and became the assistant adjutant general of the 4th Division, in succession to Colonel Henry Heath, in February 1906. He was then general staff officer, grade 1 of the 3rd Division until 1908, then, after being promoted to the temporary rank of brigadier general in June 1908, was brigadier general, general staff of Southern Command. He was honoured with the Companion of the Order of the Bath in June 1910. Haking was given command of the 5th Infantry Brigade, part of the 2nd Division, in September 1911.
According to Andy Simpson, in the Edwardian era, "he established a reputation as a sound tactical thinker". His book Company Training was partly inspired by Haig's 1909 Field Service Regulations. The book espoused the pre-war belief that morale and leadership were the most important factors in winning a battle. He also argued that the attacker would have the advantage over the defender, even if numerically inferior and deprecated the idea that modern weapons had made defence superior to attack. The book was reprinted during the first part of the war, at least. The book was considered "first class" and in Gordon Corrigan's view "even today... has a freshness about it and an insight into human characteristics that would not be out of place in a modern military work".
Brigade and division commander
Still in command of the 5th Brigade in the summer of 1914, when the First World War began, Haking took it to the Western Front, with the division forming part of I Corps. On 23 August—the day of the Battle of Mons—in accordance with a request by General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, general officer commanding II Corps, Haig sent Haking with three battalions to make contact with II Corps on Haig's left but Haking reported that he had made no contact with the enemy. He helped force the Petit Morin during the Battle of the Marne. During the advance after the Marne, the brigade was at the forefront at the First Battle of the Aisne and on 14 September his was one of the few units to fight its way onto the Chemin des Dames, after the crossing of the River Aisne. Haig recorded that the 5th Brigade made good progress on the eastern slopes of the Beaulne ridges, reaching the ridge of Tilleul de Courtacon, before having to pull back on meeting opposition. On that day he received a head wound that required three months' recuperation.Haking returned to the 5th Brigade on 20 November. On 28 December he was promoted to major general, "for distinguished conduct in the Field", and took command of the 1st Division of the British Expeditionary Force. The 1st Division took part in the Battle of Aubers Ridge in May 1915, where the three attacking divisions suffered 11,600 casualties, almost 4,000 of them being from the 1st Division and where he argued for further attacks despite the clear failure of the first attempt. His attacking brigades lost over 50 per cent of their fighting strength in little over an hour. Haking was not blamed for what Simpson describes as the "flawed artillery plan and lack of artillery support" at Aubers Ridge. With the BEF expanding massively in size, Haking was one of the divisional commanders whom Haig recommended to the Prime Minister, H. H. Asquith, on 8 July 1915 as suitable for command of corps.
Battle of Loos
On 1 September, Haig, commander of the First Army, recommended Haking, as a known "thruster", for command of XI Corps. The promotion was not confirmed until 4 September, as Field Marshal Sir John French, Commander-in-Chief of the BEF, was ill. Haking, now a temporary lieutenant-general, held this command until the end of the war.Preparations
XI Corps took part as a reserve in the Battle of Loos in September 1915. He later told the official historian, James Edmonds, that he had thought Haig wanted XI Corps to fill the gap between I Corps and IV Corps in the offensive, not act as a reserve at all. Before the battle Haking spoke to the men of 2nd Guards Brigade. One observer recorded that he "spoke very confidently, comparing the German line to the crust of a pie, behind which, once broken, he said, there is not much resistance to be expected. He ended up by saying "I don't tell you this to cheer you up. I tell it you because I really believe it". He assured his commanders that there would be no German resistance once their line had been broken. Although "everyone was too optimistic", Haking's promises to regimental officers that there would be "very little opposition" were "altogether misleading" and a "most regrettable travesty of the real facts".The New Army 21st Division and 24th Division in XI Corps were committed to battle but not the Guards Division which was held in reserve. The attacking divisions were tired and hungry after an overnight march to conceal their presence from the enemy, at 2.30 p.m. on 25 September, the first day of the battle. Haig requested the release of the reserve early in the morning, soon after the attack began and an order was indeed telephoned from GHQ after 9 a.m. French also insisted on visiting army and corps headquarters later in the morning to give his final permission. It also seems to be the case that poor traffic control prevented the reserves moving up. Nick Lloyd wrote that French was partly to blame for the confusion for not having decided when the reserves were to be released. General Frederick Maurice of GHQ later blamed himself for not having gone into sufficient detail when briefing Haking as he assumed that the reserves would be passing into First Army control and Haig's staff would sort the matter out.
Second Day
GHQ released the Guards Division to the First Army at 1:45 p.m. on 26 September and it spent the day marching up to the front. Haking was ordered to submit plans for it to attack the next day. The next day Haig wanted to call off the attack but Haking felt it was too short notice. Haking also lifted the artillery barrage off the German front positions to bombard more distant targets at 3:00 p.m., an hour before the attack – Rawlinson, who visited him at 10:00 a.m., thought this a bad idea but kept his doubts to himself. Under pressure from Haig, XI Corps issued orders to the 3rd Guards Brigade that they were not to attack unless the 2nd Guards Brigade attack had succeeded but these orders were not issued until the former had already left their trenches. XI Corps suffered another 8,000 casualties on the second day. Blame for the decision to continue the attack on the second day lies with Haig, although Haking took his men forward without any doubts.Lloyd wrote that Haking "proved unequal to the task" of welding XI Corps into a fighting formation. Poor relations between staff "do not reflect well on his managerial skills". Although Haking was not responsible for the attacks on 25 and 26 September, he offered no dissent to Haig's plans and his subsequent plans shared Haig's underestimation of the enemy and "traditional" view of artillery.
Resignation of Sir John French
The late release of XI Corps on the first day was thought to have thrown away a chance of breakthrough and decisive victory. French blamed poor First Army staff work and traffic control, while Haig alleged that French had released the reserve too late. Rawlinson had telephoned Haking at 12:20 p.m. urging him to get the reserves forward and wrote on the telephone log that Haking reported "traffic" difficulties. In a letter of 10 October, Haking blamed difficulties as his divisions moved through the administration areas of I Corps and IV Corps. Haking, after a meeting with Haig, claimed that this had been based on "memory of verbal statements made to " by the commanders of the 21st Division and the 24th Division on the night of 25 September. He now wrote, "…the most careful arrangements were made by First Army to ensure that the roads were kept clear". He then blamed "indifferent march discipline". In the final paragraph of his report he wrote, "…there is none to blame except GHQ and they know it". Lloyd wrote, "…it is hard to avoid the conclusion that Haking was deliberately falsifying or "cooking" his evidence to make it more palatable to ". Haig's and Haking's slur was bitterly resented by a number of officers who spoke to the official historian in the 1920s about traffic congestion and poor direction by the Military Police.Haking was also one of those who criticised French's deployment of the reserve to King George V when he visited the front in October, as part of the moves which led to French's enforced resignation. Simpson called Loos a "disaster" but "Haking escaped censure on this occasion... he was... quick to back Haig in the subsequent intrigues against French, and after Haig became commander-in-chief the security of Haking's position was not in doubt".