Relativism


Relativism is a family of philosophical views which deny claims to absolute objectivity within a particular domain and assert that valuations in that domain are relative to the perspective of an observer or the context in which they are assessed.
There are many different forms of relativism, with a great deal of variation in scope and differing degrees of controversy among them. Moral relativism encompasses the differences in moral judgments among people and cultures. Epistemic relativism holds that there are no absolute principles regarding normative belief, justification, or rationality, and that there are only relative ones. Alethic relativism is the doctrine that there are no absolute truths, i.e., that truth is always relative to some particular frame of reference, such as a language or a culture, while linguistic relativism asserts that a language's structures influence a speaker's perceptions. Some forms of relativism also bear a resemblance to philosophical skepticism. Descriptive relativism seeks to describe the differences among cultures and people without evaluation, while normative relativism evaluates the word truthfulness of views within a given framework.

Forms

Anthropological versus philosophical relativism

refers to a methodological stance, in which the researcher suspends their own cultural prejudice while trying to understand beliefs or behaviors in their contexts. This has become known as methodological relativism, and concerns itself specifically with avoiding ethnocentrism or the application of one's own cultural standards to the assessment of other cultures. This is also the basis of the so-called "emic" and "etic" distinction, in which:
  • An emic or insider account of behavior is a description of a society in terms that are meaningful to the participant or actor's own culture; an emic account is therefore culture-specific, and typically refers to what is considered "common sense" within the culture under observation.
  • An etic or outsider account is a description of a society by an observer, in terms that can be applied to other cultures; that is, an etic account is culturally neutral, and typically refers to the conceptual framework of the social scientist.
Philosophical relativism, in contrast, asserts that the truth of a proposition depends on the metaphysical, or theoretical frame, or the instrumental method, or the context in which the proposition is expressed, or on the person, groups, or culture who interpret the proposition.
Methodological relativism and philosophical relativism can exist independently from one another, but most anthropologists base their methodological relativism on that of the philosophical variety.

Descriptive versus normative relativism

The concept of relativism also has importance both for philosophers and for anthropologists in another way. In general, anthropologists engage in descriptive relativism, whereas philosophers engage in normative relativism, although there is some overlap.
Descriptive relativism assumes that certain cultural groups have different modes of thought, standards of reasoning, and so forth, and it is the anthropologist's task to describe, but not to evaluate the validity of these principles and practices of a cultural group. It is possible for an anthropologist in his or her fieldwork to be a descriptive relativist about some things that typically concern the philosopher but not about others. However, the descriptive relativist's empirical claims about epistemic principles, moral ideals and the like are often countered by anthropological arguments that such things are universal, and much of the recent literature on these matters is explicitly concerned with the extent of, and evidence for, cultural or moral or linguistic or human universals.
The fact that the various species of descriptive relativism are empirical claims may tempt the philosopher to conclude that they are of little philosophical interest, but there are several reasons why this is not so. First, some philosophers, notably Kant, argue that certain sorts of cognitive differences between human beings are impossible, so such differences could never be found to obtain in fact, an argument that places a priori limits on what empirical inquiry could discover and on what versions of descriptive relativism could be true. Second, claims about actual differences between groups play a central role in some arguments for normative relativism. Finally, the anthropologist's descriptive account of relativism helps to separate the fixed aspects of human nature from those that can vary, and so a descriptive claim that some important aspect of experience or thought does vary across groups of human beings tells us something important about human nature and the human condition.
Normative relativism concerns normative or evaluative claims that modes of thought, standards of reasoning, or the like are only right or wrong relative to a framework. 'Normative' is meant in a general sense, applying to a wide range of views; in the case of beliefs, for example, normative correctness equals truth. This does not mean, of course, that framework-relative correctness or truth is always clear, the first challenge being to explain what it amounts to in any given case. Normative relativism therefore implies that things are not simply true in themselves, but only have truth values relative to broader frameworks.

Legal relativism

In English common law, two separate standards of proof are recognized:
is the theory that there are only relations between individual entities, and no intrinsic
properties. Despite the similarity in name, it is held by some to be a position distinct from relativism—for instance, because "statements about relational properties assert an absolute truth about things in the world".
On the other hand, others wish to equate relativism, relationism and even relativity, which is a precise theory of relationships between physical objects: Nevertheless, "This confluence of relativity theory with relativism became a strong contributing factor in the increasing prominence of relativism".
Whereas previous investigations of science only sought sociological or psychological explanations of failed scientific theories or pathological science, the 'strong programme' is more relativistic, assessing scientific truth and falsehood equally in a historic and cultural context.

Criticisms

A common argument against relativism suggests that it inherently refutes itself: the statement "all is relative" classes either as a relative statement or as an absolute one. If it is relative, then this statement does not rule out absolutes. If the statement is absolute, on the other hand, then it provides an example of an absolute statement, proving that not all truths are relative. However, this argument against relativism only applies to relativism that positions truth as relative–i.e. epistemological/truth-value relativism. More specifically, it is only extreme forms of epistemological relativism that can come in for this criticism as there are many epistemological relativists who posit that some aspects of what is regarded as factually "true" are not universal, yet still accept that other universal truths exist.
Another argument against relativism posits the existence of natural law. Simply put, the physical universe works under basic principles: the "Laws of Nature". Some contend that a natural moral law may also exist, for example as argued by, Immanuel Kant in Critique of Practical Reason, Richard Dawkins in The God Delusion and addressed by C. S. Lewis in Mere Christianity. Dawkins said "I think we face an equal but much more sinister challenge from the left, in the shape of cultural relativism - the view that scientific truth is only one kind of truth and it is not to be especially privileged".

Philosopher Hilary Putnam, among others, states that some forms of relativism make it impossible to believe one is in error. If there is no truth beyond an individual's belief that something is true, then an individual cannot hold their own beliefs to be false or mistaken. A related criticism is that relativizing truth to individuals destroys the distinction between truth and belief.
Philosopher Donald Davidson presented an influential critique of conceptual relativism in his 1974 essay On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme. Conceptual relativism is the idea that different people or even entire communities could make sense of the world in radically different, incommensurable ways. One of the consequences of this idea is that truth is relative to one's way of thinking rather than objective. Davidson attacks what he believes to be the entire framework which makes conceptual relativism intelligible, namely scheme–content dualism, which is the idea that all knowledge is the result of one's scheme of concepts being imposed upon empirical content from the world. In refuting scheme–content dualism, Davidson shows that knowledge of one's scheme of concepts is necessarily inseparable from one's knowledge of the world, and so translation between different people or communities is always possible in principle.
According to Belgian philosopher of science Maarten Boudry, relativism is rarely applied consistently. In an opinion piece, he argues that no one truly acts according to the belief that truth is relative. Even self-proclaimed relativists, he suggests, do not genuinely believe their own slogans and catchphrases. They become indignant when falsely accused of a crime and laugh at those who claim the Earth is flat. Boudry contends that people abandon their relativism when it really matters—for instance, when visiting a doctor for cancer screening or boarding a plane, trusting in the laws of physics. He argues that relativism about truth is not so much a sincere conviction as it is an empty slogan or a convenient rhetorical device people deploy when it suits them. Boudry refers to this phenomenon as “occasional relativism,” highlighting what he sees as the casual and opportunistic nature of such relativist claims.