Svatantrika–Prasaṅgika distinction
The Svātantrika–Prāsaṅgika distinction is a doctrinal distinction made within Tibetan Buddhism between two stances regarding the use of logic and the meaning of conventional truth within the presentation of Madhyamaka.
Svātantrika is a category of Madhyamaka viewpoints attributed primarily to the 6th-century Indian scholar Bhāviveka. Bhāviveka criticised Buddhapalita’s abstinence from syllogistic reasoning in his commentary on Nāgārjuna. Following the example of the influential logician Dignāga, Bhāviveka used autonomous syllogistic reasoning syllogisms in the explanation of Madhyamaka. To have a common ground with essentialist opponents, and make it possible to use syllogistic reasoning in discussion with those essentialists, Bhāviveka argued that things can be said to exist conventionally 'according to characteristics'. This makes it possible to take the mere object as the point of departure for the discussion on inherent existence. From there, it is possible to explain how these things are ultimately empty of inherent existence.
Prāsaṅgika views are based on Candrakīrti's critique of Bhāviveka, arguing for a sole reliance on prasaṅga, "logic consequence," a method of reductio ad absurdum which is used by all Mādhyamikas, using syllogisms to point out the absurd and impossible logical consequences of holding essentialist views. According to Candrakīrti, the mere object can only be discussed if both parties perceive it in the same way. As a consequence svātantrika reasoning is impossible in a debate, since the opponents argue from two irreconcilable points of view, namely a mistaken essentialist perception, and a correct non-essentialist perception. This leaves no ground for a discussion which starts from a similarly perceived object of discussion. And it also makes impossible the use of syllogistic reasoning to convince the opponent.
Candrakīrti's works had no influence on Indian and early Tibetan Madhayamaka, but started to rise to prominence in Tibet in the 12th century. Tsongkhapa, the founder of the Gelugpa school and the most outspoken proponent of the distinction, followed Candrakīrti in his rejection of Bhavaviveka's arguments. According to Tsongkhapa, the Svātantrikas do negate intrinsic nature ultimately, but "accept that things conventionally have intrinsic character or intrinsic nature." Tsongkhapa, commenting on Candrakīrti, says that he "refute essential or intrinsic nature even conventionally." For Tsongkhapa, as well as for the Karma Kagyu school, the differences with Bhavaviveka are of major importance.
Established by Lama Tsongkhapa, Candrakīrti's view replaced the Yogācāra-Mādhyamaka approach of Śāntarakṣita, who synthesized Madhyamaka, Yogācāra and Buddhist logic in a powerful and influential synthesis called Yogācāra-Mādhyamaka. Śāntarakṣita established Buddhism in Tibet, and his Yogācāra-Mādhyamaka was the primary philosophic viewpoint until the 12th century, when the works of Candrakīrti were first translated into Tibetan. In this synthesis, conventional truth or reality is explained and analysed in terms of the Yogācāra system, while the ultimate truth is presented in terms of the Madhyamaka system. While Śāntarakṣita's synthesis reflects the final development of Indian Madhyamaka and post-dates Candrakīrti, Tibetan doxographers ignored the nuances of Śāntarakṣita's synthesis, grouping his approach together with Bhāviveka's, due to their usage of syllogistic reasonings to explain and defend Madhyamaka.
After the 17th century civil war in Tibet and the Mongol intervention which put the Gelugpa school in the center of power, Tsongkhapa's views dominated Tibetan Buddhism until the 20th century. The Rimé movement revived alternate teachings, providing alternatives to Tsongkhapa's interpretation, and reintroducing Śāntarakṣita's nuances. For the Sakya and Nyingma schools, which participated in the Rimé movement, the Svātantrika–Prāsaṅgika distinction is generally viewed to be of lesser importance. For these schools, the key distinction between these viewpoints is whether one works with assertions about the ultimate nature of reality, or if one refrains completely from doing so. If one works with assertions, then that is a Svātantrika approach. Refraining from doing so is a Prāsangika approach. In this context Tenzin Gyatso, his holiness the Dalai Lama, says in a forward to Shantideva's book "A Guide to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life," a work based on the idea that the Mahayana teachings are focused on cultivating a mind wishing to benefit other sentient beings, that Shantideva’s philosophical stance follows the Prāsangika-Madhyamaka viewpoint of Chandrakīrti.
Indian Madhyamaka
originated with the works of- Nāgārjuna, and his commentators. The Svātantrika–Prāsaṅgika distinction can be traced to the following three commentators:
- Buddhapālita, a minor author in India, whom Tibetan tradition credits as the founder of the Prāsaṅgika "school," was an early adopter of syllogistic and consequentialist methods in his writings, although of a particularly limited form;
- Bhāviveka, who was influenced by the developing Buddhist logic initiated by Dignāga, and used syllogistic reasoning in his commentary on Nāgārjuna. He did so to catch up with these developments in Buddhist logic, and prevent Madhyamaka from becoming obsolete. His criticisms of Buddhapalita are retrospectively imagined as the foundation of the Svātantrika "school";
- Candrakīrti, who defended Buddhapālita against Bhāvyaviveka. Although he "attracted almost no following and made no impact on the development of the Madhyamaka tradition" in India, he became regarded by the Tibetan tradition after 1200 CE as an important proponent of Prāsangika.
- Śāntarakṣita, who synthesized Madhyamaka, Yogācāra and Buddhist logic in a powerful and influential synthesis called Yogācāra-Mādhyamaka. He established Buddhism in Tibet, and his Yogācāra-Mādhyamaka was the primary philosophic viewpoint established there, which reigned superior until the 12th century, when the works of Candrakīrti were first translated into Tibetan.
Bhāviveka
argued that autonomous syllogistic reasoning was required when explaining or commenting on Nagarjuna's teachings on voidness or essencelessness. To be able to use syllogistic reasoning, both parties need to share a common object of discussion at the conventional level. While the various opponents have different opinions on the specifics of their teachings, the mere objects or mere forms are commonly appearing to both parties, "enjoy a certain existence 'according to their characteristics."Bhāviveka criticised Buddhapalita for merely repeating Nāgārjuna's ad absurdum approach in his commentary, instead of clarifying Nāgārjuna's teachings. According to Bhāviveka, syllogistic reasoning could be used for the sake of clarification. Bhāviveka further argued that Buddhapalita only showed the logical consequences, and incoherence, of the Samkhya's views on causation and inherent existence, but failed to address their arguments against Buddhist critiques. Furthermore, simply negating the opponent's view, without positing one's own position, "leaves room for doubt in the opponent's mind," and is unwarranted.
To facilitate the possibility of discussing Madhyamaka with opponents, Bhāviveka made a provisional division of the two truths, accepting that phenomena exist "according to their characteristics." Bhāviveka made a further distinction in his treatment of ultimate truth or reality. Ultimate truth or reality transcends discursive thought, and cannot be expressed in words. To be able to talk about it anyway, and distinguish it from relative truth or reality, Bhāviveka makes a distinction between the "world-transcending" or "ultimate truth in itself," which is ineffable and beyond words; and the "pure worldly wisdom" or "approximate truth," which can be talked about and points to the "ultimate truth in itself," which has to be personally experienced.
Dreyfus and McClintock observe that Bhāvaviveka was more influential in Indian Madhyamaka than was Candrakīrti: "In this regard, Bhāvaviveka should probably be seen as quite successful: apart from Candrakīrti and Jayananda, nearly all other Indian Mādhyamikas were to follow in his footsteps and embrace autonomous arguments as important tools in their endeavors to establish the supremacy of the Madhyamaka view."
Candrakīrti
had little impact during his lifetime. The first commentary on his Madhyamakāvatāra was written in India in the 11th century, more than 300 years after his death. In the 12th century his works were translated in Tibetan, and became highly influential.Candrakīrti rejected Bhāviveka's criticism of Buddhapālita, and his use of independent logic. According to Candrakīrti, the mere object can only be discussed if both parties perceive it in the same way. According to Candrakīrti, this is impossible, since the opponents argue from two irreconcilable points of view, namely a mistaken essentialist perception, and a correct non-essentialist perception. This leaves no ground for a discussion starting from a similarly perceived object of discussion, and also makes impossible the use of syllogistic reasoning to convince the opponent. According to Candrakīrti, without a conventionally appearing set of characteristics to designate upon, the Svātantrika would not be able to establish a syllogism.
Candrakīrti also rejected Bhāviveka's argument that autonomous arguments should be used in commentaries to clarify the original text, noting that Nāgārjuna himself, in his auto-commentary on the Vigrahavyavartani, also didn't use autonomous arguments.
Candrakīrti rejected "the use of autonomous arguments, for the very reason that they imply the acceptance of entities. According to Candrakīrti, this mode of thinking is a subtle form of grasping at inherent existence: one's mind is still searching for some way to hold on to an essence, self, or identity for conventionally perceived objects. For Candrakīrti, there is no use in explaining the relative truth in any philosophical system; "the relative truth consists simply of phenomena as we observe them, the unanalyzed constituents of the common consensus." The only aim of consequential arguments "is to introduce the mind to the direct knowledge of emptiness, not an intellectual understanding of it," making "no concessions to the spiritually unprepared."
Candrakīrti's criticism was "part of a wider rejection of the logico-epistemological tradition of Dignāga, which he regarded as a misguided attempt to find "philosophical completeness" and a sense of intellectual security that is antithetical to the fundamental insight of Madhyamaka." Candrakīrti did not reject the use of logic, but it served to demarcate the limits of discursive thought. In the absence of any agreement between Mādhyamikas and substantialists, prasaṅga is the best approach "to indicate the ultimate without making statements that compromise or obscure their own position." Since the use of autonomous arguments implies the acceptance of real entities, even if only provisional, they should not be used.