Palestinian nationalism
Palestinian nationalism is the national movement of the Palestinian people that espouses self-determination and sovereignty over the region of Palestine. Originally formed in the early 20th century in opposition to Zionism, Palestinian nationalism later internationalized and attached itself to other ideologies; it has thus rejected the occupation of the Palestinian territories by the government of Israel since the 1967 Six-Day War. Palestinian nationalists often draw upon broader political traditions in their ideology, such as Arab socialism and ethnic nationalism in the context of Muslim religious nationalism. Related beliefs have shaped the government of Palestine and continue to do so.
In the broader context of the Arab–Israeli conflict in the 21st century, Palestinian nationalist aims have included an end to the refugee status of individuals separated from their native lands during the 1948 Palestinian expulsion and flight, advocates stating that a "right of return" exists either to the occupied territories or to both those areas plus places within Israel itself. Nationalists have additionally worked to advance specific causes in terms of current residents' lives such as freedom of assembly, labor rights, the right to health care, and the right to travel. Divisions exist between nationalists over particular ideological goals, an example being the gulf between Islamist Palestinians favoring a more authoritarian state compared to centrist and secular Palestinians supporting democratic self-determination. Palestinian nationalists are also divided by preferred tactics; some favor nonviolent resistance while others advocate for and engage in political violence both inside and outside Israel.
Origins
Israeli historian Haim Gerber, a professor of Islamic History at Hebrew University of Jerusalem, traces Arab nationalism back to a 17th-century religious leader, Mufti Khayr al-Din al-Ramli who lived in Ramla. Khayr al-Din al-Ramli's religious edicts, collected into final form in 1670 under the name al-Fatawa al-Khayriyah, mentions the concepts Filastin, biladuna, al-Sham, Misr, and diyar, in senses that appear to go beyond objective geography. Gerber describes this as "embryonic territorial awareness, though the reference is to social awareness rather than to a political one". Baruch Kimmerling and Joel Migdal suggest a singular Palestinian identity was first prefigured in the inter-community coalitions which emerged in the region after the 1834 Palestinian Arab revolt against Egyptian conquest and conscription.File:Khalil Beidas 1898 use of the word Palestinians in the preface to his translation of Akim Olesnitsky's A Description of the Holy Land.png|thumb|Khalil Beidas's 1898 use of the word "Palestinians" in the preface to his translation of Akim Olesnitsky's A Description of the Holy Land
Zachary J. Foster suggests the first recorded use of the term "Filastini" to describe the region's Arab inhabitants dates to 1898, when Khalil Beidas used it in the preface to a book he translated from Russian to Arabic. Foster said that the term "Palestinian" had already been used decades earlier in Western languages by the 1846–1863 British Consul in Jerusalem, James Finn; the German Lutheran missionary Johann Ludwig Schneller, founder of the Syrian Orphanage; and the American James Wells. Foster also records early usage of the term by Farid Georges Kassab, "a Beirut-based Orthodox Christian" in 1909. Kassab refers to the Arabic-speaking locals as Palestinians throughout his book, Palestine, Hellenism, and Clericalism, but also says that "the Orthodox Palestinian Ottomans call themselves Arabs". From 1911, the Palestinian Arab Christian newspaper Falastin also addressed its readers as Palestinians.
In his 1997 book, Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness, historian Rashid Khalidi says that Palestinian identity has never been an exclusive one, with "Arabism, religion, and local loyalties" playing an important role. Khalidi describes the Arab population of British Mandatory Palestine as having "overlapping identities", with some or many expressing loyalties to villages, regions, a projected nation of Palestine, an alternative of inclusion in a Greater Syria, an Arab national project, as well as to Islam; and that this had not yet evolved into "nation-state nationalism". He says that modern-day Palestinian identity is informed by the history of Palestine—encompassing the Biblical, Roman, Byzantine, Umayyad, Fatimid, Crusader, Ayyubid, Mamluk and Ottoman periods—as Palestinians have come to understand it over the last century, but says that Palestinian nationalist consciousness is in fact "relatively modern". Khalidi suggests the modern national identity of Palestinians has its roots in nationalist discourses that emerged among the peoples of the Ottoman Empire in the late 19th century, which sharpened following the demarcation of modern nation-state boundaries in the Middle East after World War I. James L. Gelvin suggests the emergence of Palestinian nationalism during the interwar period was a "response to Zionist immigration and settlement". He says this does not make Palestinian identity any less legitimate "or make it less valid than Zionism", since "all nationalisms are defined by what they oppose". Khalidi also says that Zionism played a role in shaping the Palestinian identity, but says "it is a serious mistake to suggest that Palestinian identity emerged mainly as a response to Zionism".
Bernard Lewis says Arab nationalism in the Ottoman Empire "had not reached significant proportions before the outbreak of World War I", and therefore Palestinians could not oppose Zionism based on Palestinian nationalism, since it did not yet exist. Benny Morris suggests that the Arabs in Palestine remained part of a larger Pan-Islamist or Pan-Arab national movement until 1920. Morris says the emergence of the Palestinian national identity can be traced through the successive postwar Palestine Arab Congresses: in January 1919, the First Congress saw "Palestine as part of Arab Syria"; in December 1920, the Third Congress called upon the British to establish a "native government", making no further mention of "Southern Syria". Daniel Pipes suggests that, as a result of the carving of the British Mandate of Palestine out of Greater Syria, the Arabs of the new Mandate were forced to make the best they could of their situation, with a distinctly "Palestinian Arab" identity emerging by the end of 1920.
Late Ottoman context
The collapse of the Ottoman Empire was accompanied by an increasing sense of Arab identity in the Empire's Arab provinces, most notably Syria, considered to include both northern Palestine and Lebanon. This development is often seen as connected to the wider reformist trend known as al-Nahda, which in the late 19th century brought about a redefinition of Arab cultural and political identities with the unifying feature of Arabic.Under the Ottomans, Palestine's Arab population mostly saw themselves as Ottoman subjects. In the 1830s however, Palestine was occupied by the Egyptian vassal of the Ottomans, Muhammad Ali and his son Ibrahim Pasha. The Palestinian Arab revolt was precipitated by popular resistance against heavy demands for conscripts, as peasants were well aware that conscription was little more than a death sentence. Starting in May 1834 the rebels took many cities, among them Jerusalem, Hebron and Nablus. In response, Ibrahim Pasha sent in an army, finally defeating the last rebels on 4 August in Hebron.
File:Flag of Hejaz.svg|thumb|right|The flag of the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire is a prominent symbol of Arab nationalism. Its design and colors are the basis of many of the Arab states' flags.
While Arab nationalism, at least in an early form, and Syrian nationalism were the dominant tendencies along with continuing loyalty to the Ottoman state, Palestinian politics were marked by a reaction to foreign predominance and the growth of foreign immigration, particularly Zionist.
The Egyptian occupation of Palestine in the 1830s resulted in the destruction of Acre and thus, the political importance of Nablus increased. The Ottomans wrested back control of Palestine from the Egyptians in 1840–41. As a result, the Abd al-Hadi clan, who originated in Arrabah in the Sahl Arraba region in northern Samaria, rose to prominence. Loyal allies of Jezzar Pasha and the Tuqans, they gained the governorship of Jabal Nablus and other sanjaqs.
In 1887 the Mutassariflik of Jerusalem was constituted as part of an Ottoman government policy dividing the vilayet of Greater Syria into smaller administrative units. The administration of the mutasarrifate took on a distinctly local appearance.
Michelle Compos records that "Later, after the founding of Tel Aviv in 1909, conflicts over land grew in the direction of explicit national rivalry." Zionist ambitions were increasingly identified as a threat by Palestinian leaders, while cases of purchase of lands by Zionist settlers and the subsequent eviction of Palestinian peasants aggravated the issue.
The programmes of four Palestinian nationalist societies jamyyat al-Ikha’ wal-‘Afaf, al-jam’iyya al-Khayriyya al-Islamiyya, Shirkat al-Iqtissad al-Falastini al-Arabi and Shirkat al-Tijara al-Wataniyya al-Iqtisadiyya were reported in the newspaper Filastin in June 1914 by letter from R. Abu al-Sal’ud. The four societies has similarities in function and ideals; the promotion of patriotism, educational aspirations and support for national industries.