Perry Expedition


The Perry Expedition was a diplomatic and military expedition in two separate voyages to the Tokugawa shogunate by warships of the United States Navy. The goals of this expedition included exploration, surveying, and the establishment of diplomatic relations and negotiation of trade agreements with the various nations in the region. Opening contact with the government of Japan was considered a top priority of the expedition, and was one of the key reasons for its inception.
The expedition was commanded by Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry, under orders from President Millard Fillmore. Perry's primary goal was to force an end to Japan's 220-year-old policy of isolation and to open Japanese ports to American trade, through the use of gunboat diplomacy if necessary. The Perry Expedition led directly to the establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the western Great Powers, and eventually to the collapse of the ruling Tokugawa shogunate and the restoration of the Emperor. Following the expedition, Japan's burgeoning trade routes with the world led to the cultural trend of Japonisme, in which aspects of Japanese culture influenced art in Europe and America.

Background

Growing commerce between America and China, the presence of American whalers in waters off Japan, and the increasing monopolization of potential coaling stations by European colonial powers in Asia were all contributing factors in the decision by President Fillmore to dispatch an expedition to Japan. Shipwrecked Westerners were treated harshly or even executed in Japan, under the policy of Sakoku, including sailors from the American whaling ship the Lawrence in 1846. The Americans were also driven by concepts of manifest destiny and the desire to impose the benefits of Western civilization and the Christian religion on what they perceived as backward Asian nations.
By the early 19th century, the Japanese policy of isolation was increasingly under challenge. In 1844, Dutch King William II sent a letter urging Japan to end the isolation policy on its own before change would be forced from the outside. Between 1790 and 1853, at least twenty-seven U.S. ships, including three warships, visited Japan, only to be turned away.
There were increased sightings and incursions of foreign ships into Japanese waters, and this led to considerable internal debate in Japan on how best to meet this potential threat to Japan's economic and political sovereignty. In May 1851, American Secretary of State Daniel Webster authorized Commodore John H. Aulick, commander of the American East India Squadron, to attempt to return seventeen shipwrecked Japanese sailors residing in San Francisco, which might provide the opportunity for opening commercial relations with Japan. On May 10, 1851, Webster drafted a letter addressed to the "Japanese Emperor" with assurances that the expedition had no religious purpose but was only to request "friendship and commerce" and supplies of coal needed by American ships en route to China.
The letter also boasted of American expansion across the North American continent and its technical prowess, and was signed by President Fillmore. However, Aulick became involved in a diplomatic row with a Brazilian diplomat and quarrels with the captain of his flagship, and was relieved of his command before he could undertake the Japan expedition. His replacement, Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry, was a senior-ranking officer in the United States Navy, and had extensive diplomatic experience.

Preparation

Perry was well aware of the difficulties involved in attempting to establish relations with Japan and initially protested that he would prefer to command the Mediterranean Squadron of the U.S. Navy instead of being assigned to yet another attempt to open Japan, which he considered unlikely to win. Relevant precedents included:
  • From 1797 to 1809, several American ships traded in Nagasaki under the Dutch flag upon the request of the Dutch, who were not able to send their own ships because of their conflict with the United Kingdom during the Napoleonic Wars.
  • In 1837, an American businessman in Canton named Charles W. King saw an opportunity to open trade by trying to return to Japan three Japanese sailors who had been shipwrecked a few years before on the coast of Washington. He went to Uraga Channel with Morrison, an American merchant ship. The ship was attacked several times and sailed back without completing its mission.
  • In 1846, Commander James Biddle, anchored in Edo Bay on an official mission with two ships, including one warship armed with seventy-two cannons, asking for ports to be opened for trade, but his requests for a trade agreement remained unsuccessful.
  • In 1849, Captain James Glynn sailed to Nagasaki, leading at last to the first successful negotiation by an American with Japan. James Glynn recommended to the United States Congress that negotiations to open Japan be backed up by a demonstration of force, thus paving the way for Perry's expedition.
In advance of his voyage, Perry read widely amongst available books about Japan. His research also included consultation with the Japanologist Philipp Franz von Siebold. Siebold spent eight years working, teaching, and studying at the isolated Dutch island-trading post of Dejima in Nagasaki harbour before returning to Leiden in the Netherlands. Perry also demanded greater latitude in his orders from Webster, a demand the Secretary of State granted just before his death in October 1852. Perry thus sailed for Japan with "full and discretionary powers", including possible use of force if the Japanese tried to treat him as they had the unfortunate Commodore Biddle. Perry also refused to allow any professional diplomats to accompany the expedition. He asked the German painter Wilhelm Heine and pioneer daguerreotype photographer Eliphalet M. Brown Jr. to join the expedition as official artists. Agricultural specialist Dr. James Morrow was assigned by the US State Department. Several Japanese castaways were also taken on as unofficial interpreters.
The expedition was assigned the steam warships,, and, the armed store steamships Lexington, Supply, and Southampton, and the sailing sloops,, and. To command his fleet, Perry chose officers with whom he had served in the Mexican–American War. Commander Franklin Buchanan was captain of Susquehanna and Joel Abbot was captain of Macedonian. Commander Henry A. Adams became the Commodore's chief of staff with the title "Captain of the Fleet". Major Jacob Zeilin was the ranking Marine officer, and was stationed on Mississippi. Perry also received permission to take government stores as gifts for the natives, especially obsolete small arms. These included 40 M1819 Hall rifles, 20 percussion pistols, 20 artillery swords, 20 muskets with Maynard percussion locks and 40 light cavalry sabers, as well as 100 Colt revolvers.

First visit to Japan, 1852–1853

Perry chose the black-hulled paddle-wheeled Mississippi as his flagship, and cleared Hampton Roads, Virginia on November 24, 1852. Perry made port calls at Madeira, St Helena, Cape Town, Mauritius, Ceylon, Singapore, and Macao and Hong Kong. There he met with American-born Sinologist Samuel Wells Williams, who provided Chinese-language translations of Perry's official letters, and rendezvoused with Plymouth and Saratoga. He continued to Shanghai, where he met with the Dutch-born American diplomat Anton L. C. Portman, who translated his official letters into the Dutch language, and rendezvoused with Susquehanna.
Perry then switched his flag to Susquehanna and called on the Ryukyu Islands from May 17–26. Ignoring the claims of Satsuma Domain to the islands, as well as his own orders, he threatened and bluffed local authorities by threatening to attack with 200 troops unless he were allowed trading rights and land for a coaling station. Perry landed his Marines, whom he drilled on the beach for hours at a time, and demanded an audience with the Ryukyu King Shō Tai at Shuri Castle. Knowing that his every action would be reported to Japanese authorities in Edo, Perry carefully avoided meeting with low-ranked officials and made much use of military ceremony and shipboard hospitality to demonstrate both American military power and the peaceful intent of his expedition. Perry left with promises that the islands would be completely open to trade with the United States. Continuing on the Ogasawara Islands in mid-June, Perry met with the local inhabitants and even purchased a plot of land.

Threat of force and negotiation

Perry finally reached Uraga at the entrance to Edo Bay in Japan on July 8, 1853. His fleet at this time consisted of four vessels: Susquehanna, Mississippi, Plymouth and Saratoga. As he arrived, Perry ordered his ships to steam past Japanese lines towards the capital of Edo, and position their guns towards the town of Uraga. He also fired blank shots from his 73 cannons, which he claimed was in celebration of the American Independence Day. Perry's ships were equipped with new Paixhans shell guns, cannons capable of wreaking great explosive destruction with every shell.
The American ships were almost surrounded by Japanese guard boats; however, Perry ordered that any attempt at boarding was to be repelled. One boat carried a large sign in French ordering the American fleet to depart immediately. On 9 July, 1853, a yoriki from the Uraga bugyō, Nakajima Saburosuke, accompanied by interpreter Hori Tatsunosuke, rowed out to Susquehanna, but were at first refused permission to come on board. After some negotiation, they were permitted to board, where they displayed the order that no foreign ships were allowed into Japanese ports. Perry remained in his cabin and refused to meet them, sending word through his officers that as he carried a letter from the President of the United States, he would only deal with officials of sufficient stature and authority.
On 10 July, 1853, yoriki Kayama Eizaemon, pretending to be the Uraga bugyō, called on Susquehanna and was allowed to meet Captain Franklin, whom he advised to travel to Nagasaki, as this was the designated port for all foreign contact. Kayama was told that unless a suitable official came to receive the document, Perry would land troops and march on Edo, to deliver the letter in person. Kayama asked for three days in order to respond. The actual Uraga bugyō, Ido Hiromichi, sent a report to the shōgun and advised that his defenses were totally inadequate to repel the Americans by force.
In the meantime, Perry began a campaign of intimidation, by sending boats to survey the surrounding area, and threatened to use force if the Japanese guard boats around the American squadron did not disperse. He also presented the Japanese with a white flag and a letter which told them that in case they chose combat, the Americans would necessarily vanquish them.
The Japanese government was paralyzed due to the incapacitation by illness of Shōgun Tokugawa Ieyoshi and by political indecision on how to handle the unprecedented threat to the nation's capital. On July 11, 1853, senior rōjū Abe Masahiro temporized, deciding that simply accepting a letter from the Americans would not constitute a violation of Japanese sovereignty. The decision was conveyed to Uraga, and Perry was asked to move his fleet slightly southwest to the beach at Kurihama, where he was allowed to land on 14 July.
Perry went ashore with considerable pomp, landing with 250 sailors and Marines in 15 ships' boats after a 13-gun salute from Susquehanna. Major Zeilin's Marines presented arms, and a band played "Hail Columbia". President Fillmore's letter was formally received by hatamoto Toda "Izu-no-kami" Ujiyoshi and by Ido "Iwami-no-kami" Hiromichi. Perry's squadron eventually departed on 17 July for the Chinese coast, promising to return for a reply.
After Perry's departure, an extensive debate ensued within the shogunal court on how to respond to the American's implied threats. Shōgun Tokugawa Ieyoshi died days after Perry's departure, and was succeeded by his sickly young son, Tokugawa Iesada, leaving effective administration in the hands of the Council of Elders led by Abe Masahiro. Abe felt that it was currently impossible for Japan to resist the American demands by military force, and yet was reluctant to take any action on his own authority for such an unprecedented situation. Attempting to legitimize any decision taken, Abe polled all of the daimyōs for their opinions. This was the first time that the Tokugawa shogunate had allowed its decision-making to be a matter of public debate, and had the unforeseen consequence of portraying the shogunate as weak and indecisive.
The results of the poll also failed to provide Abe with an answer, as of the 61 known responses, 19 were in favor of accepting the American demands, and 19 were equally opposed. Of the remainder, 14 gave vague responses expressing concern of possible war, 7 suggested making temporary concessions and two advised that they would simply go along with whatever was decided. The only universal recommendation was that steps be taken immediately to bolster Japan's coastal defenses. Fortifications were hurriedly built close to current day Odaiba in order to protect Edo from a subsequent American naval incursion.