Nuclear weapons of China
was the fifth country to develop and test nuclear weapons. China tested its first nuclear weapon in 1964 and its first full-scale thermonuclear weapon in 1967. It is one of the five nuclear-weapon states recognized by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to which it acceded in 1992. It carried out 45 nuclear tests before signing the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 1996.
The Federation of American Scientists and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimate China's stockpile at approximately 600 nuclear warheads as of 2025, making it the third-largest in the world. It is the only NPT nuclear-weapon state significantly expanding its arsenal, which has doubled since 2019, and is projected to reach between 750 and 1,500 warheads by 2035, although it has not restarted fissile material production. Unlike the United States and Russia, nearly all Chinese warheads are believed to be stored separately from their delivery system.
Since 2020, the People's Liberation Army has operated a nuclear triad. Of its 600 warheads, it is estimated 376 are assigned to its Rocket Force's Dongfeng intermediate and intercontinental ballistic missiles, 72 to its Navy's Julang-3 submarine-launched ballistic missiles on six Type 094 submarines, and 20 to its Air Force's Jinglei-1 air-launched ballistic missiles on Xi'an H-6N strategic bombers. A remaining 132 warheads await assignment. China is upgrading its triad with the in-development Xi'an H-20 stealth bomber, Type 096 submarine, and large missile silo fields. China has also fielded nuclear-capable hypersonic glide vehicles and is reported to be developing and testing a fractional orbital bombardment system.
In 1964, China adopted a policy of no-first-use and called for an international no-first-use treaty, both of which it continues to renew. Some of its nuclear forces are reported to have moved toward a launch on warning posture in the early 2020s. The United States has been China's primary nuclear adversary since the end of the Cold War, before which China was more focused on military threats from the Soviet Union.
China's level of nuclear warhead technology is similar to that of the United States, despite its low number of tests. China received aid and technology transfer from the Soviet nuclear weapons program from 1955 to 1960, prior to the Sino-Soviet split. China was instrumental in the development of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. China is also reported to have operated chemical and biological weapons programs during the Cold War and possibly beyond.
History
Pre-program
CCP Chairman Mao Zedong referred to nuclear weapons as a paper tiger which, although they would not determine the outcome of a war, could still be used by great powers to scare and coerce. In 1946 comments to American journalist Anne Louise Strong, he stated, "The atom bomb is a paper tiger which the US reactionaries use to scare people. It looks terrible, but in fact it isn't. Of course, the atom bomb is a weapon of mass slaughter, but the outcome of a war is decided by the people, not one or two new types of weapon."During the Korean War, the Eisenhower administration pursued the New Look policy through which nuclear weapons would be viewed as a "virtually conventional" force. United States nuclear weapons were deployed to Guam in 1951, Japan in 1954, the Philippines in 1957, and South Korea and Taiwan in 1958. In 1962, United Kingdom nuclear weapons were deployed to Singapore. Some scholars write that the Eisenhower administration's threats during the First Taiwan Strait Crisis to use nuclear weapons against military targets in Fujian province prompted Mao to begin China's nuclear program. Mao favored China's development of nuclear weapons because "In today's world, if we don't want to be bullied by others, we should have atomic weapons by all means."
Mao's attitude toward nuclear weapons sometimes strained relations with the Soviet Union, which regarded his statements as cavalier, particularly his 1955 assertion that:
Early program and Soviet assistance
In July 1954, one Soviet expert began working with the Chinese on uranium ore exploration.On 15 January 1955, China began its nuclear weapons program.
In 1955, the Soviet Union began the granting of student visas for nuclear physics courses to Chinese students. Qian Sanqiang, Jiang Nanxiang, and Yu Wen selected 350 students to study in the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries, in benefit of Chinese nuclear research. From 1955, the two countries began signing nuclear-related treaties.
In November 1956, China established the Third Ministry of Machine Building to oversee its nuclear program.
As a result of the Anti-Party Group incident in the Soviet Union, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's position within the Eastern Bloc became insecure for a time, thus necessitating the support of Chinese Communist Party and Mao. The CCP subsequently traded its support for Khrushchev for Soviet technology of nuclear weapons. In October 1957, concluded the "", which allowed for nuclear-weapons technology transfer, including a model of a Soviet atomic bomb and two R-2 theatre ballistic missiles.File:Jiuquan_Atomic_Energy_Complex,_China,_imaged_by_US_KH-7_GAMBIT_satellite,_1966.png|thumb|The reactor site near Jiuquan for plutonium production, imaged by a US KH-7 Gambit satellite in 1966.In January 1958, China established the Ninth Bureau to be responsible for nuclear weapons research and design. It began developing its research and design base in Haiyan, Qinghai province. In July 1958, the Second Ministry of Machine Building approved plans for a transitional research institute in Beijing while Base 221 was being built. That research institute was where most of the development work on China's first atomic bomb occurred and was where researchers received and studied initial data provided by the Soviet Union.
Construction of a uranium refinement plant in Baotou and enrichment plant in Lanzhou began in 1958, and a plutonium production facility in Jiuquan and the Lop Nur nuclear test site by 1960. The Soviet Union provided assistance in the early Chinese program by sending advisers to help in the facilities devoted to fissile material production. In return, China exported raw uranium ore to the USSR.
Scholar Jeffrey Lewis noted in China's 1958 nuclear program guidelines its explicit rejection of tactical nuclear weapons and view of nuclear weapons as primarily political tools influencing the decision towards a small strategic arsenal.
In 1958, the National Defense Science and Technology Commission was established with Nie Rongzhen as its director to oversee the Second Ministry of Machine Building, the Lop Nur Nuclear Weapon Test Base, and the Fifth Academy of the Defense Ministry.
In July 1958, three Soviet experts visited Beijing to share limited technical details on an atomic weapon. Intended as an introductory lecture, the Soviet experts did not share any information more recent than 1951. It was the only meeting of its kind before the Soviet Union reneged on the New Defense Technical Accord.
In 1958, Khrushchev told Mao that he planned to discuss arms control with the United States and Britain. China was already opposed to Khrushchev's post-Stalin policy of peaceful coexistence. Although Soviet officials assured China that it was under the Soviet nuclear umbrella, the disagreements widened the emerging Sino-Soviet split. The Soviet Union failed to comply with the New Technical Accord and in June 1959 sent a letter formally stating that it would not provide a nuclear bomb prototype. That same month, the two nations formally ended their agreement on military and technology cooperation, and in July 1960, all Soviet assistance with the Chinese nuclear program was abruptly terminated and all Soviet technicians were withdrawn from the program. As the Soviets backed out, Chinese officials realized that they had to develop hydrogen bomb technology without any Soviet assistance and would need to begin the work immediately, without waiting for successful results from a fission bomb.
Independent program
Chinese researchers viewed June 1959 as the rebirth of the nuclear program, with the Second Ministry and the Ninth Bureau commemorating the date of Soviet withdrawal of support in the codename for China's first atomic bomb, "596".In spring 1960, the Ninth Institute reverse engineered the 1951 model presented by Soviet experts in 1958. The Chinese model used a core of uranium-235 instead of the plutonium in the Soviet model.
In July 1960, all Soviet advisers were withdrawn from the Lanzhou enrichment plant, at the time China's only active project for a fissile material production.
In mid-1961, a heightened factional debate threatened the termination of the nuclear program. The debate was influenced by the Great Leap Forward's Great Chinese Famine, the withdrawal of Soviet advisers, Sino-Indian border tensions, and increased American forces in the Vietnam War. Against the nuclear weapons establishment, a group representing the defense establishment, led by He Long and Luo Ruiqing, pushed for its termination, to redirect its large expenses towards conventional weapons. A key issue was the Maoist military doctrine of people's war. The Central Military Commission reaffirmed Mao's statements that "weapons are important elements of war, but they are not decisive", and that "the physical atomic bomb is important, but the spiritual atomic bomb is more important."
At a series of senior leadership meetings, the nuclear weapons establishment emerged on top, with a resolution to accelerate its work ahead of schedule. Nie Rongzhen presented existing achievements of the nuclear program, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Chen Yi added "at present I still do not have adequate backup. If you succeed in producing the atomic bomb and guided missiles, then I can straighten my back."
In 1961, Premier Zhou Enlai articulated China's rationale for its conventional and nuclear military strategies, stating, "Once we have missiles and nuclear weapons, we can then prevent the use of missiles and nuclear weapons; if we don't have missiles, the imperialists can use missiles. But to face combat, we still need conventional weapons."
In 1962, President Liu Shaoqi announced the creation of the Central Special Committee to coordinate the departments with the overlapping authority related to nuclear weapons. Zhou Enlai was appointed director of the group, which became the most body with overall oversight of China's nuclear weapon's program, including nuclear weapons development.
According to Arms Control and Disarmament Agency director William Foster, the American government, under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, was concerned about China's nuclear program and studied ways to sabotage or attack it, perhaps with the aid of Taiwan or the Soviet Union, but Khrushchev was not interested. In 1964 as China prepared for its first nuclear weapon test, Chinese leadership received intelligence which increased its concerns that the United States would commit a surgical strike on its nuclear program. These concerns prompted consideration of whether China should delay its first test, on the theory that a test would alert the United States and the Soviet Union to the progress of China's nuclear capabilities, but China would not yet be able to deploy nuclear devices to deter or counter an attack. In September 1964, Mao decided that the planned test should proceed, stating, "he atomic bomb is to frighten others. It not necessarily utilized. Since it is for frightening, it is better to expose it early." The test preparations proceeded with additional air defenses and security against sabotage.