Svasaṃvedana


In Buddhist philosophy, svasaṃvedana is a term which refers to the reflexive nature of consciousness, or the awareness of being aware. It was initially a theory of cognition held by the Mahāsaṃghika and Sautrāntika schools while the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika school argued against it.
The idea was famously defended by the Indian philosopher Dignāga, and is an important doctrinal term in Indian Mahāyāna thought and Tibetan Buddhism. It is also often translated as self-cognition or self-apperception, and by Malcolm Smith as "one's own vidyā."

Mahāsaṃghika school

According to Zhihua Yao, the theory was first presented by the Mahāsāṃghika school. Their view was preserved in the Sarvāstivāda compendium of Abhidharma called the Mahāvibhāṣa and states:
It is the nature of awareness and so forth to apprehend, thus awareness can apprehend itself as well as others. This is like a lamp that can illuminate itself and others owing to its nature of luminosity.

Jan Westerhoff notes that the Mahāsāṃghikas accepted the doctrine of the natural luminosity of the mind and connects this with svasaṃvedana, "such natural luminosity making it possible that consciousness does not just apprehend other things, but can also apprehend itself."

Sarvāstivāda school

Sarvāstivāda sources which discuss self-cognition mainly do so in order to refute the idea that a mind moment can know itself in that moment. These include the Jñānaprasthāna and Mahāvibhāṣa. However that does not mean the Sarvastivadins reject all theories of self cognition, they developed their own theory which argued that mind moments know themselves only reflexively in regards to the previous mind moments. As Zhihua Yao states, "in other words, the mind knows itself through a reflection of the past mind". The Sarvāstivādins use their metaphysical theory of the real existence of the past, present and future to allow for a present mind to take a past mind as itself.

Sautrāntika school

Sautrāntika authors also discussed the theory. It was extensively covered by Harivarman, the author of the Tattvasiddhi-Śāstra, and shows that he was in a dialogue with both Sarvastivada and Mahāsaṃghika views. Harivarman's view argues against the Mahāsamghika's simultaneous model of self-cognition and instead argues that self-cognition is only seen in the course of successive moments of cognition. That is, it involves multiple mental processes which Harivarman considers as happening in the "present continuum" and is not a case of a single mind moment knowing itself but is a case of the mind grasping the "image" of itself as it is fading away. This is also part of his account of how memory works.

Dignāga

The Buddhist philosopher Dignāga also defended a theory of svasaṃvedana drawing on Sautrāntika and Yogācāra influences. For Dignāga, svasaṃvedana is a kind of perception which is an "internal awareness of mental consciousness" and his theory of perception also entails that it is non-conceptual. He asserts that svasaṃvedana is a valid means to knowledge, just as sense-perception is. Dignāga gives three reasons for why cognition can grasp an object and itself.
  1. Without a self-reflexive nature, there would be no difference between a) cognition of the object, and b) awareness of the cognition of the object.
  2. If the cognition only grasped itself, the content of an earlier cognition would be gone when a later cognition takes place.
  3. Memory proves a self-reflexive nature of cognition because one is able to remember both the object and one's former cognition of it.

    Dharmakīrti

, Dignāga's most influential follower also defended svasaṃvedana. He claimed that cognition and its object are the same because they are perceived together at the same time. If one could not perceive cognition, one could not perceive its content either. He argues that cognition cannot be cognized by another cognition because that would lead to infinite regress: the second cognition would require a third cognition to cognize it and so on.

Yogācāra-Madhyamaka school

summarizes Dignāga's and Dharmakīrti's arguments for svasaṃvedana in his Tattvasaṃgraha. He also discusses two additional features of svasaṃvedana.
  1. Self-awareness is not determined by other cognitions
  2. Self-awareness is a distinctive feature of sentience
Westerhoff also points out that Śāntarakṣita's Tattvasaṃgraha "argues that if an act of consciousness of some object x was not reflexively self-aware, it could also not be conscious of x."

Soteriological and epistemic aspects

According to Yao, the doctrine of self-cognition evolved out of a soteriological context in early materials. He points out that for the Mahāsāṃghika, soteriological and epistemological senses of the doctrine were closely linked, and when Sarvāstivādins rejected the Mahāsāṃghika, they also discussed self-cognition in the soteriological context of omniscience. Moreover, the Sautrāntikas referred to yogic practice when discussing their view that the mental consciousness is self-aware, and within early Yogācāra as well, the understanding of self-cognition was broad and included the sense of self-realization. However, after Dignāga, the doctrine developed in the context of an epistemic inquiry in which the soteriological and epistemological senses were clearly distinguished.
While Yao believes that it is important to maintain a technical distinction between the soteriological concept of "self-realization" and the more epistemological "self-cognition", he points out that in Chinese sources zi zheng 自證 can be used to translate both terms, and that "his ambiguity reflects a more complicated relationship, rather than a clear-cut distinction between the two concepts." Yao also observes that Yogācāra-Madhyamikas such as Śāntarakṣita and his disciple Kamalaśīla attempted a return to more soteriological concerns in their presentation of self-cognition, understanding it less as an epistemic process and more as "the very nature of consciousness." As Kamalaśīla states in his commentary on Śāntarakṣita's Tattvasaṃgraha:
When Cognition is said to be 'self-cognisant', it is not meant that it is the apprehender or cogniser of itself; what is meant is that it shines,—becomes manifested,—by itself,—by its very nature,—just like the Light diffused in the atmosphere.

Yao explains, "by rejecting the articulated epistemological formulations, they have returned to a Mahāsāṃghika position, according to which self-cognition is more simple, fundamental and soteriologically oriented." The Yogācāra-Madhyamaka synthesis was in keeping with the Nirākāravāda position on self-cognition. On the other hand, Sākāravāda thinkers such as Dharmakīrti, Prajñākaragupta and Jñānaśrīmitra exemplified a Sautrāntika-Yogācāra synthesis which aligned with the Sautrāntika tendency to articulate self-cognition within a more epistemological framework.

In Tibetan Buddhism

Svasaṃvedana is at the root of a major doctrinal disagreement in Indian Mahayana Buddhism. While defended by the Yogācāra thinkers such as Dharmakīrti and the eclectic Śāntarakṣita, it was attacked by Prasaṅgika Madhyamika thinkers such as Candrakīrti and Śāntideva. Since in Madhyamaka thought all dharmas are empty of inherent essence, they argued that consciousness could not be an inherently reflexive ultimate reality since that would mean it was self validating and therefore not characterized by emptiness.
In Tibetan Buddhism there are various competing views regarding svasaṃvedana.
In the Nyingma school's Dzogchen tradition, svasaṃvedana is often called 'the very nature of mind' and metaphorically referred to as 'luminosity' or 'clear light'. A common Tibetan metaphor for this reflexivity is that of a lamp in a dark room which in the act of illuminating objects in the room also illuminates itself. Dzogchen meditative practices aim to bring the mind to direct realization of this luminous nature. In Dzogchen svasaṃvedana is seen as the primordial substratum or ground of mind.
Following Je Tsongkhapa's interpretation of the Prasaṅgika Madhyamaka view, the Gelug school completely denies both the conventional and the ultimate existence of reflexive awareness. This is one of Tsongkhapa's "eight difficult points" that distinguish the Prasaṅgika view from others. The Nyingma philosopher Jamgon Ju Mipham Gyatso defended the conventional existence of reflexive awareness as per the Madhyamaka two truths doctrine. According to Mipham, the Prasaṅgika critique of reflexive awareness only applied to its ultimate inherent reality and not its conventional status.
Mipham gives a number of absurd consequences that would follow if the conventional existence of svasaṃvedana were rejected. First, rejecting svasaṃvedana would mean absurdly that one's own consciousness would be hidden to itself. Since one's own consciousness would not be known directly, one would have to rely on inference to know the state of one's own mind in any given moment. This argument draws on a threefold distinction made by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti between: evident objects which can be known by direct perception, hidden objects which must be known by inference, and very hidden objects which can only be known by the authority of the Buddha. Moreover, it follows from this that there would be no difference between the manner in which one knows one's own mind and the way in which one knows the mind of another person. As Williams explains, "just as one has to infer the existence of other minds, so one would have to infer the existence of one's own mind. Absurdly, one would know one's own mind in just the same way as one knows of the minds of other sentient beings." This would mean one would not be able to prove for oneself that one has a mind of one’s own. Finally, if one's mind were hidden to itself, one could have no knowledge of cognitive referents either, and this would amount to a kind of annihilation of the "transactional conventions of awareness."