Move to the Left
The Move to the Left was a policy direction undertaken in Uganda, most notably under President Milton Obote in the period 1968–1971. Despite nominally being a move towards socialism, it also had strong nationalist overtones.
Beginnings
According to Akena Adoko, former head of the General Service Unit in Uganda, it took time for socialism to be established in Uganda because of the political realities of the time:Between 1966 and 1969, however, little of a socialist bent was announced. Selwyn Ryan attributes this to Obote's political instability, suggesting that Obote "did not at first consider himself sufficiently strong politically to embark upon radical economic policies." Yash Tandon observed that "Obote has not until recently been free from the problems of maintaining the basic unity of the country.. was always inclined towards a socialist path for Uganda, but for reasons of state and politics played this down between 1962 and 1968. The second Five Year Plan noted the potential of the state-controlled Uganda Development Corporation, but also sought to promote small, private industry and attract foreign investment. There were few genuine socialists in Uganda, let alone socialists with genuine administrative ability. Of these, very few enjoyed the confidence of Obote.
It was in November 1968 that Obote remarked that Uganda was pursuing a "middle of the road strategy", one that was "neither left nor right", and predicted a leftwards swing in policy during 1969.
According to historian Amii Omara-Otunnu, Obote decided to undertake the Move to the Left to deemphasize his reliance on the Uganda Army to maintain his authority, which had become increasingly apparent after he deposed President Edward Mutesa and consolidated his power during the Mengo Crisis in 1966. He hoped that the policy change would broaden his popular appeal outside of the military and extend it to more of the civilian population.
Key components
The Move to the Left was characterised by five key documents, adopted between October 1969 and the summer of 1970.National Service Proposal
The National Service Proposal, adopted in October 1969, proposed that every able-bodied person should undertake two years of national service.Common Man's Charter
The Common Man's Charter, which was published for comment in October 1969 and approved by the Party on 19 December, was the first major document that attempted to give definition to the Move to the Left. It stated that "the heart of the move to the left can be simply stated. It is.... that political and economic power must be vested in the majority", typifying the mixture of socialist and nationalist motivations the policy represented. The first step was to establish the state owned Uganda Commercial Bank and to require foreign banks operating in Uganda to re-incorporate in Uganda itself.Communication from the Chair
The Communication from the Chair, adopted in April 1970, addressed inequalities among state employees. It proposed unified pay scales and an end to some privileges.Nakivubo Pronouncement
Despite sentiments at the time that these moves had taken the momentum out of the push for socialism, by late 1969 Obote had decided that something more radical needed to be done. On 1 May 1970, he outlined his Nakivubo Pronouncement. It proclaimed that, with immediate effect, the government was to take control of 60% of over 80 corporations in Uganda; they would now be run by state corporations, trade unions, municipal councils and cooperative unions. The list included all banks, insurance companies, manufacturing and mining industries, plantations, oil companies and transport undertakings in Uganda. The pronouncement added that a government monopoly would be enforced in Uganda's import-export markets with the exception of oil.In reality, little preparation had been carried out, nor thought given to the pronouncement's consequences; it seems that the President did not even give the Cabinet any prior warning of his decision. The criteria for nationalisation were not made clear and there was great uncertainty as to whether the nationalisation exercise was complete. It was not even clear whether the nationalisation was supposed to complement the Africanisation of Uganda commerce or to re-prioritise it. The "governmental machine was thrown into the kind of incoherent muddle which became increasingly characteristic of the regime's final phase." The result was that nationalisation was never fully realised, and the government never took control of Uganda's major industries.