Monghyr Mutiny
The Monghyr Mutiny occurred among European officers of the East India Company stationed in Bengal in 1766. The mutiny arose after the East India Company's governor of Bengal, Robert Clive, implemented an order to reduce the batta field allowance paid to its army officers. The batta had been doubled while the troops were in the service of the Nawab of Bengal Mir Jafar. Clive's order came into effect on 1 January 1766 and brought the allowances into line with those paid by the company in the rest of India. At this time the company army in Bengal was divided into three brigades under the command of Sir Robert Fletcher, Richard Smith and Robert Barker.
There was some dissent against reductions to the batta and later evidence showed that plotting against Clive may have begun as early as December 1765. A scheme of mass-resignations was agreed upon and consented to by some 200 officers. The planning was carried out in secret and Clive did not learn of the impending mutiny until he received a note from Barker, via Fletcher, on 25 April stating that he had uncovered it. After this discovery the officers brought forwards their mutiny from 1 June to 1 May. Clive ordered his brigade commanders to arrest any officer who refused to do his duty and brought in reinforcements from other posts to assist him.
Clive determined that the centre of the mutiny was Fletcher's brigade at Monghyr Fort and, on 6 May, set off with a small number of men for this post. Some of Clive's officers arrived at Monghyr on 12 May and separated a number of loyal officers from the mutineers. One of the loyal officers, Captain Smith, mustered two regiments of sepoys and seized the European barracks at the fort on 14 May. Fletcher appeared and joined with Smith to quell the mutiny which was achieved without any bloodshed.
Clive arrived at the fort on 15 May and, after ensuring the post was secured, marched to Smith's brigade which was posted to the frontier to deter a Maratha invasion. The other brigades were less severely affected and only a small minority of officers were dismissed from the service for mutiny. Vacancies in Clive's command were filled with officers taken from the Madras Army. Clive determined that Fletcher had been involved in the mutiny from an early stage and he was cashiered from the service at a court-martial. The event has been described as one of the most dangerous in the history of the East India Company.
Origins
led British forces in India during the Seven Years' War against France and her allies. His victory at the Battle of Plassey in 1757 brought Mir Jafar to power as Nawab of Bengal and brought the province into the sphere of influence of the East India Company. Clive afterwards served as Governor of the company's Bengal Presidency. Clive returned to England in 1760 but failed to establish himself as a politician. Clive was appointed by the company as Governor of Bengal once more in 1765 at a time of crisis for the presidency, Mir Jafar had been deposed by Mir Qasim and the province invaded by the Mughal Emperor Shah Alam II.Upon landing at Calcutta he found the military situation had been saved by the company's victory at the Battle of Buxar but the administration in a poor state. Clive implemented the dual-system of company rule under the nominal sovereignty of the Emperor and Nawab. Tax revenues from Bengal and Bihar were increased and he sought to restrict rampant corruption by forbidding company officials from accepting gifts or entering into commercial trade. Clive's reforms extended to the Bengal Army which had previously had no organisation above the battalion level. Clive consolidated the units into three brigades and centralised them in healthier stations than they had been posted to previously. Each brigade comprised one regiment of European infantry, one company of artillery, six battalions of sepoy infantry, and a troop of sepoy cavalry. The First Brigade was stationed at Monghyr under Lieutenant Colonel Sir Robert Fletcher, the Second Brigade at Allahabad under Colonel Richard Smith and the Third Brigade at Bankipore under Colonel Robert Barker. The entire force numbered some 14,000–15,000 sepoys and 3,000 Europeans.
The officers in the company army had previously supplemented their salaries by engaging in large scale commercial trading, at the expense of military efficiency. The officer corps had demonstrated a lack of discipline in the disorder following the distribution of price money after the February 1756 Battle of Vijaydurg, during which a number of deaths occurred. The officers had also grown accustomed to receiving an allowance, the batta, as a supplement to their salaries. This had originally been awarded to cover officers' expenses in the field and the responsibility for payment had transferred to Mir Jafar, who doubled the allowance, while the troops were in his service. Clive later claimed to have spoken to the officers at this time to caution them that the "double batta" was a strictly temporary arrangement. After the fall of Mir Jaffar, Mir Qasim refused to pay the batta and in lieu of payment offered the districts of Burdwan, Midnapore and Chittagong to the company. The revenues from these districts exceeded the cost of the batta payments so the company accepted.
In peacetime the company came to consider the batta payments an unnecessary expense and ordered Clive to withdraw the allowance. Clive ordered changes to the batta to be implemented from 1 January 1766. It was abolished completely for troops stationed in the company's factories and restricted to half batta for the troops of the First and Third Brigades who were in garrison. The double batta was retained for the Second Brigade while they were posted to active duty in the territory of the Nawab of Oudh, Shuja-ud-Daula, to deter a possible Maratha invasion. This would cease upon their return to Allahabad, where they were permitted a full batta payment on account of the high living expenses at that post. The payments were still in excess of those allowed to the company's officers in other regions, such as those on the Coromandel Coast, who had never received a batta. In compensation for Bengal officers, Clive allocated them a portion of the company's profits on the salt, betel-nut and tobacco monopolies.
Planning
Although there were complaints made to Clive over the batta order, these did not initially strike him as serious in nature. However in a report made by Clive's private secretary Henry Strachey to a secret committee of the House of Commons, from which much of the historical record of the mutiny is derived, Strachey states that he believes the mutiny had been planned as early as December 1765. An investigation later thought the mutiny had its origin at the Monghyr garrison where secret committees of officers, disguised as masonic lodges, met to plan the restoration of the batta. The officers from Monghyr appointed a correspondence officer who communicated with others appointed in the Second and Third Brigades to seek their support. The correspondence officer of the Second Brigade responded to the letter from Monghyr stating that the officers of the brigade considered themselves on active service and would not join the mutiny at this time but would do so if, upon returning to garrison, the batta payment was reduced. The Third Brigade was more committed in its resolve and there was almost unanimous support for the mutiny among its officers.The plan was for all officers to resign their commissions en masse on 1 June 1766 if the batta order was not rescinded, though as a bargaining strategy they would agree to serve unpaid for a further two weeks to allow Clive time to meet their demands. To avoid accusations of mutiny the officers would refuse to draw their salary for June, which was paid in advance. Some 200 officers joined the plot, swearing oaths to not accept reinstatement unless the batta was restored on penalty of a fine of £500. The officers also swore oaths that they would intervene to prevent the executions of any of their comrades. Acknowledging that some officers may be dismissed from the service as a result of the action a subscription was raised among the mutineers and some of the civilians in Calcutta to pay for passage to Britain and for replacement commissions in the British Army for any such man.
Discovery
Clive first learnt of the impending mutiny by a letter from Fletcher, dated 25 April, in which he stated that the officers of his brigade had communicated their intentions to resign their commissions. Fletcher enclosed a letter from Barker which stated that he had uncovered the impending mutiny at a court martial held after a captain had attempted to force an ensign to hand over his commission. Barker claimed he had not learnt of it earlier due to being away from the cantonment on an expedition to Bettiah. The discovery of the plot seems to have convinced the mutineers to bring forwards the date of their resignations to 1 May. Clive ordered Barker and Fletcher to find those involved in the plot and arrest them, for trial by officers of Clive's choosing. Clive received no reply to this letter and began to suspect that Fletcher may have been involved in the affair.Clive considered that the company's order to withdraw the batta was premature but did not want to appear weak by making concessions to the officers. There was considerable ill feeling towards Clive as a result and some threats against his life were made, which he dismissed saying the officers were "Englishmen, not assassins". However, Clive worried that the threatened Maratha invasion or a spread of the mutiny to his Indian regiments would compel him to reach a settlement.
Clive wrote to Calcutta on 29 April to notify the company leadership of the mutiny and to request as many spare officers, cadets in training and European volunteers as could be found be sent to reinforce him. Although some existing military personnel were sent, the request for civilian volunteers went largely unheeded. Of around 100 men of suitable age and ability in Calcutta only two volunteers were forthcoming; these men, who stood a few weeks of parade duty in the city, were rewarded with duty free trade privileges. It seems that the mutineers wrote to their friends elsewhere in India to ask that they refuse to deploy to Bengal. When Clive discovered this he wrote to Calcutta to ask that they hold all post from Bengal.
At the same time Clive wrote to his brigade commanders to reinforce his order that the batta be reduced, to make it clear to the officers that he would not abide dissent in this matter and to request that the commanders seek support from the subedars in case their troops were needed. It appears that the subedars supported Clive and indicated that they would, if necessary, fire upon the mutineers.