List of philosophical problems
This is a list of some of the major problems in philosophy.
Philosophy of language
Counterfactuals
A counterfactual statement is a conditional statement with a false antecedent. For example, the statement "If Joseph Swan had not invented the modern incandescent light bulb, then someone else would have invented it anyway" is a counterfactual, because, in fact, Joseph Swan invented the modern incandescent light bulb. The most immediate task concerning counterfactuals is that of explaining their truth-conditions. As a start, one might assert that background information is assumed when stating and interpreting counterfactual conditionals and that this background information is just every true statement about the world as it is. In the case of the Swan statement, we have certain trends in the history of technology, the utility of artificial light, the discovery of electricity, and so on. We quickly encounter an error with this initial account: among the true statements will be "Joseph Swan did invent the modern incandescent light bulb." From the conjunction of this statement and the antecedent of the counterfactual, we can derive any conclusion, and we have the unwelcome result that any statement follows from any counterfactual. Nelson Goodman takes up this and related issues in his seminal Fact, Fiction, and Forecast; and David Lewis's influential articulation of possible world theory is popularly applied in efforts to solve it.Physicalist approaches offer alternative solutions to the problem of counterfactuals within a materialist framework. The interventionist account, developed by philosophers like James Woodward, solves the problem by defining counterfactuals in terms of specific physical interventions on causal systems. For example, "If Swan had not invented the light bulb" is interpreted as "If we intervened on the physical system to prevent Swan's invention". This approach avoids contradictions by clearly separating the intervened system from background conditions.
Another solution, proposed by Barry Loewer, uses statistical mechanics to ground counterfactuals. This approach defines the truth of counterfactuals based on the most probable evolution of physical microstates consistent with the counterfactual assumption. It resolves the initial problem by replacing abstract possible worlds with concrete physical probabilities, thereby avoiding logical contradictions within a physicalist framework.
Epistemology
Gettier problem
suggests, in his Theaetetus and Meno, that "knowledge" may be defined as justified true belief. For over two millennia, this definition of knowledge was accepted by subsequent philosophers. An item of information's justifiability, truth, and belief were seen as the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge.However, in 1963, Edmund Gettier published an article in the journal Analysis, a peer-reviewed academic journal of philosophy, entitled "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" which offered instances of justified true belief that do not conform to the generally understood meaning of "knowledge." Gettier's examples hinged on instances of epistemic luck: cases where a person appears to have sound evidence for a proposition, and that proposition is in fact true, but the apparent evidence is not causally related to the proposition's truth.
In response to Gettier's article, numerous philosophers have offered modified criteria for "knowledge." There is no general consensus to adopt any of the modified definitions yet proposed. Finally, if infallibilism is true, that would seem to definitively solve the Gettier problem for good. Infallibilism states that knowledge requires certainty, such that, certainty is what serves to bridge the gap so that we arrive at knowledge, which means we would have an adequate definition of knowledge. However, infallibilism is rejected by the overwhelming majority of philosophers/epistemologists.
Physicalist and materialist approaches to the Gettier problem generally attempt to ground knowledge in causal or reliabilist terms, avoiding appeal to abstract justification. For instance, the causal theory of knowledge, proposed by Alvin Goldman, suggests that for a belief to count as knowledge, it must be caused by the fact that makes it true. This approach aims to solve Gettier cases by requiring a direct causal connection between the truth and the belief. Similarly, reliabilist theories, such as those developed by Goldman and others, define knowledge in terms of beliefs produced by reliable cognitive processes. These physicalist perspectives attempt to sidestep the traditional justification requirement that led to Gettier problems, instead focusing on the physical and cognitive mechanisms that produce true beliefs
Among philosophers from the socialist bloc, Polish Marxist Adam Schaff directly engaged with Western epistemological problems, including the Gettier problem. In his work "History and Truth", Schaff critiqued the traditional "justified true belief" definition of knowledge from a materialist perspective. He argued that knowledge should be understood as a process rather than a static state, emphasizing the role of social practice and historical context in knowledge formation. Schaff's approach suggests that Gettier-type problems arise from an overly individualistic and ahistorical conception of knowledge. By reframing knowledge as a socio-historical process, Schaff's theory potentially avoids Gettier cases by grounding knowledge in collective human practice rather than individual justification. This perspective offers a Marxist materialist solution to the Gettier problem, emphasizing the social nature of knowledge over individual belief states.
Problem of the criterion
The problem of the criterion challenges the traditional definition of knowledge as justified true belief. It questions how one can determine if a justification is sound without relying on further justification, potentially leading to an infinite regress. This issue has been a subject of significant debate in epistemology.One perspective, often associated with skepticism, concludes that true knowledge might be impossible due to this infinite regression. However, many philosophers find this conclusion too extreme for practical epistemology.
Several alternative approaches have been proposed:
- Foundationalism, which posits certain basic beliefs as self-justifying, thus halting the regress.
- Coherentism, which argues that beliefs are justified by their coherence with other beliefs. Susan Haack's foundherentism is a notable hybrid approach.
- Infinitism, proposed by Peter D. Klein, which views the infinite regress as unproblematic.
In practice, many philosophers find that there is often a discernible line between sufficient justification and excessive inquiry, allowing for practical epistemological investigations despite the theoretical challenges posed by the problem of the criterion. The debate surrounding this problem remains active, with various approaches offering different insights into the nature of knowledge and justification.
Problem of induction
Scottish philosopher David Hume first formulated the problem of induction, arguing there is no non-circular way to justify inductive reasoning. That is, reasoning based on inferring general conclusions from specific observations. This is a problem because induction is widely used in everyday life and scientific reasoning, e.g., "The sun has risen in the east every day, therefore it will rise in the east tomorrow."Various philosophers have proposed solutions or alternative perspectives:
Karl Popper argued that science and ordinary life do not use induction, and induction is in fact a myth. Instead, knowledge is created by conjecture and criticism. The main role of observations and experiments in science, he argued, is in attempts to criticize and refute existing theories.
Some philosophers, like Nelson Goodman, have attempted to solve the problem by appealing to the notion of entrenchment or the natural kinds that form the basis of our inductive practices.
More recently, some cognitive scientists and philosophers have suggested that induction might be better understood as a fundamental aspect of general intelligence. This view posits that inductive reasoning is not a distinct logical process but rather an emergent property of intelligent systems processing information and recognizing patterns.
This perspective aligns with observations of both human cognition and artificial intelligence systems, such as large language models, which demonstrate inductive-like capabilities without explicitly following inductive rules. It suggests that the problem of induction might be reframed as a question of how general intelligence processes information and makes predictions based on past experiences.
The most popular views are scientific realist around the problem of induction in philosophy usually grounded in cognitive science, problem of induction has implications for our understanding of reasoning, scientific methodology, and artificial intelligence.
Molyneux problem
The Molyneux problem dates back to the following question posed by William Molyneux to John Locke in the 17th century: if a man born blind, and able to distinguish by touch between a cube and a globe, were made to see, could he now tell by sight which was the cube and which the globe, before he touched them? The problem raises fundamental issues in epistemology and the philosophy of mind, and was widely discussed after Locke included it in the second edition of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding.A similar problem was also addressed earlier in the 12th century by Ibn Tufail, in his philosophical novel, Hayy ibn Yaqdhan. His version of the problem, however, dealt mainly with colors rather than shapes.
Empirical studies of human subjects who gained vision after extended congenital blindness have provided clear evidence. The landmark 2011 study by Held et al. demonstrated that subjects were unable to immediately link objects known by touch to their visual appearance. Instead, they gradually developed this ability over days or months. Thus, a person newly given sight cannot immediately identify shapes they previously knew only by touch. The ability to associate tactile and visual information requires learning and experience. Another study suggests, however, that the results might have been due to a visual deficit, rather than a true lack of intermodal neural connections.