Kivu conflict
The Kivu conflict is an umbrella term for a series of protracted armed conflicts in the North Kivu and South Kivu provinces in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo which have occurred since the end of the Second Congo War. Including neighboring Ituri province, there are more than 120 different armed groups active in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. Currently, some of the most active rebel groups include the Allied Democratic Forces, the Cooperative for the Development of the Congo, the March 23 Movement, and many local Mai Mai militias. In addition to armed groups and the governmental FARDC troops, a number of national, regional and international forces have intervened militarily in the conflict, including the United Nations force known as MONUSCO, the militaries of Uganda and Burundi, and a force from the East African Community known as the East African Community Regional Force. The Kivu region is thus regarded as a key geopolitical arena, where local armed groups intersect with broader regional rivalries and international strategic interests. Analysts note that competition over natural resources, cross-border alliances, and external interventions have transformed the conflict from a purely domestic issue into a wider geopolitical struggle.
The conflict began in 2004 in the eastern Congo as an armed conflict between the military of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Hutu Power group Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It has broadly consisted of three phases, the third of which is an ongoing conflict. Prior to March 2009, the main combatant group against the FARDC was the National Congress for the Defence of the People. Following the cessation of hostilities between these two forces, rebel Tutsi forces, formerly under the command of Laurent Nkunda, became the dominant opposition to the government forces.
The United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo has played a large role in the conflict. With 21,000 soldiers in the force, the Kivu conflict constitutes the largest peacekeeping mission currently in operation. In total, 93 peacekeepers have died in the region, with 15 dying in a large-scale attack by the Allied Democratic Forces, in North Kivu in December 2017. The peacekeeping force seeks to prevent escalation of force in the conflict, and minimise human rights abuses like sexual assault and the use of child soldiers in the conflict.
CNDP was sympathetic to the Banyamulenge in Eastern Congo, an ethnic Tutsi group, and to the Tutsi-dominated government of neighboring Rwanda. It was opposed by the FDLR, by the FARDC, and by United Nations forces.
In July 2024, a United Nation Security Council-commissioned report uncovered extensive Rwandan military activities in Nyiragongo, Rutshuru, and Masisi territories. The report revealed that Rwanda conducted 3,000 to 4,000 operations alongside M23 rebels, exerting significant control over them, and by April 2024, Rwandan troop numbers matched or exceeded M23's 3,000 fighters. The report detailed systematic Rwandan Defense Force incursions, heavy weapon use, troop transport, and human rights abuses, including child soldier recruitment. Rwandan intelligence officers forcibly conscripted children as young as 12 from refugee camps, deceiving them with false job promises. The report also noted FARDC's ties to armed groups like FDLR-FOCA and Wazalendo militias in the fight against M23. M23 are engaged in a wide range of abuses in the region: recruitment of child soldiers, violence against the civilian population, looting, illegal mining, and corruption.
Background
Ethnic tensions in the AFDL rebellion
During the First Congo War, the rapid advance of the Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo brought the Banyamulenge into the national spotlight, increasing their political influence and visibility while also worsening cycles of retaliatory violence with neighboring ethnic groups. In early 1996, mounting unrest in South Kivu coincided with the direct involvement of regional militaries, as the Rwandan Patriotic Army, Uganda's People's Defence Force, and the Forces armées burundaises provided support to Banyamulenge militias and other Tutsi armed factions in eastern Zaire. In April, Banyamulenge and allied Tutsi fighters killed eight to ten refugees at Runingu camp. By August, RPA had begun moving Banyamulenge fighters across the Ruzizi River into the Hauts Plateaux as a "military vanguard", which provoked clashes with the Forces armées zaïroises and set off killings, arrests, and intimidation targeting Banyamulenge civilians throughout Uvira Territory. Protest marches were organized in Uvira and Bukavu, during which civil society figures and officials made "aggressive statements" against the Tutsi population. Fear peaked after the South Kivu vice-governor declared in early October 1996 that the Banyamulenge had six days to leave the Hauts Plateaux or be treated as rebels. Soon after, on 6 October, Banyamulenge armed groups massacred more than fifty people, mostly civilians, in Kidoti, killing victims with shrapnel or executing them after forcing them to dig mass graves. That same day, Banyamulenge forces attacked Lemera Hospital, killing 37 people, including medical staff, civilians, and wounded FAZ soldiers, and looting the facility. Other violence followed on the night of 13–14 October, when the Runingu camp was attacked, leaving at least four people dead and seven wounded.Concurrently, the AFDL coalition was being assembled in Kigali under Rwandan supervision, serving in part "as a smokescreen for the ambitions of Rwanda, Uganda, and Angola, whose troops would do much of the fighting". The coalition united four separate Congolese opposition groups under the leadership of Laurent-Désiré Kabila. Among them was the Alliance démocratique des peuples, dominated by Congolese Tutsi and led by Banyamulenge figures such as Dugu wa Mulenge, Joseph Rubibi, and Samson Muzuri. Although Banyamulenge leaders were wary of Kabila because of his role in the Simba rebellion and later uprisings in Fizi Territory during the 1960s and 1970s, they largely viewed the AFDL as vital to their "survival and political emancipation". Several hundred Banyamulenge joined the movement and received military training from Rwandan instructors. The AFDL uprising also transformed leadership dynamics within the Banyamulenge community, as the authority of customary elders declined and younger political and military figures gained influence. After the AFDL's victory and during its period in power between 1997 and 1998, Banyamulenge were appointed to several high-ranking posts in South Kivu's provincial administration and in the administration of Uvira Territory, a development that provoked resentment among other ethnic groups. Notable appointments included Benjamin Serukiza as vice-governor of South Kivu, Jonas Sebatunzi as public prosecutor, and Mutabazi Muntu as director of the Agence nationale de renseignements. At the national level, Banyamulenge held fewer positions, although Bizima Karaha was named Minister of Foreign Affairs, Moïse Nyarugabo became secretary-general of the Office des biens mal acquis, Samson Muzuri was appointed ambassador to Germany, and others served as senior advisers in various ministries. Despite these advances, ties between the Banyamulenge and Rwanda weakened after the AFDL took power. Many Banyamulenge felt that their close association with Rwanda cast doubt on their Congolese citizenship and left them reliant on Kigali for security. Some argued that Rwanda had leveraged their vulnerable social status to advance its own strategic interests rather than to secure Banyamulenge rights. These tensions were compounded by conflicting understandings of identity: while some Rwandan officials viewed the Banyamulenge as part of a wider Rwandan diaspora, most Banyamulenge continued to affirm their Congolese nationality. This gap in perception was mirrored in persistent rumours that Rwanda planned to resettle the entire Banyamulenge population in Kibuye, in western Rwanda, a proposal allegedly discussed with Banyamulenge leaders in December 1996. Other friction stemmed from the Banyamulenge's subordinate role within the reconstituted Congolese Armed Forces. During the rebellion, they had served mainly in lower ranks under Rwandan command and increasingly demanded greater authority after the war.
FRF and the RCD insurgency
Tensions peaked in February 1998 when reports that Colonel James Kabarebe, the Rwandan chief of staff of the Congolese army, planned to redeploy Banyamulenge officers outside the Kivu region started a mutiny in Bukavu. Led by Eric Ruhorimbere, Venant Bisogo, and Mukalay Mushondo, the revolt subsided after Kabarebe personally intervened. Violence continued in March 1998, when around thirty Banyamulenge deserters attacked Rwandan troops in Bukavu, reportedly in response to mistreatment. Led by Richard Tawimbi and Michel "Makanika" Rukunda, many of the rebels were captured, and several were sentenced to death. In June 1998, about thirty Banyamulenge intellectuals and activists convened in Bujumbura to establish an independent political organization. Participants included Manassé "Müller" Ruhimbika, head of the NGO Groupe Milima; Joseph Mutambo, a university lecturer whose parliamentary bid in 1982 had been rejected due to alleged "dubious nationality"; and Gasore Zébédée, a former adviser to a Kinshasa minister. On 14 June 1998, they created the Forces républicaines fédéralistes, an underground party that for many years served as the only independent political platform representing Banyamulenge interests. The FRF promoted federalism as a less confrontational alternative to dependence on Rwanda and called for the establishment of a self-governing administrative unit on the Hauts Plateaux with broad authority, including its own security forces.Subsequent regional developments, however, quickly eclipsed the FRF's initiatives. In July 1998, former AFDL spokesperson and now President Laurent-Désiré Kabila, demanded that Rwandan troops leave Congolese territory. In response, Rwanda backed a new insurgency, the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie, which launched on 2 August 1998. This put the Banyamulenge in a vulnerable position: they faced attacks from Mai-Mai militias while being targeted by Kabila's government, which portrayed them as Rwandan proxies. Official discourse in Kinshasa became increasingly inflammatory, including public calls for the eradication of those described as "vermin" poisoning the nation, rhetoric that coincided with the killing of dozens of Banyamulenge soldiers by non-Banyamulenge comrades in military camps in Kinshasa, Kamina, Kisangani, and Kananga. In response, RCD forces, often commanded in the field by Banyamulenge officers but operating under the overall RPA authority, carried out large-scale massacres of civilians in Makobola, Kasika, and Katogota during 1998 and 1999. Banyamulenge engagement with the RCD was shaped by security, political strategy, and personal advancement. Some community members viewed the insurgency as an opportunity to address the perceived failures of the AFDL, particularly its inability to secure full citizenship rights and durable political representation. As the RCD expanded territorially, it also emerged as a pathway to senior political office. It enabled several Banyamulenge figures to assume prominent roles, including Bizima Karaha as head of security, Moïse Nyarugabo as justice commissioner, and Azarias Ruberwa as secretary-general. The RCD period thus produced mixed outcomes for the community: while it intensified violence between RCD forces and Mai-Mai militias, it also facilitated an unprecedented level of political influence and resulted in the creation, for the first time, of an administrative entity identified with the Banyamulenge, with Minembwe established as a territory and carved out of the Banyamulenge-inhabited areas of Fizi, Mwenga, and Uvira Territories. These gains, however, also strained relations with other groups, worsened by ongoing conflicts between pastoralists and farmers over transhumance, the seasonal southward movement of cattle into grazing areas in Ngandja and Lulenge during the dry season. Cattle often damaged crops, and after the AFDL rebellion began in September 1996, refusals to pay the customary itulo tax inflamed tensions. Mai-Mai groups responded with large-scale cattle raids, which functioned as material losses and as symbolic attacks on the Banyamulenge. Internally, the RCD era worsened divisions within Banyamulenge themselves, as political competition began to intersect with clan affiliations. Estimates of major Banyamulenge clans range from 13 to 26, depending on classification. While each clan traditionally descends from a common ancestor, many expanded through alliances and the incorporation of other families. The community has never been united under a single paramount chief, and inter-clan rivalries long existed; however, these disputes gained new political significance with the rise of the RCD and the Pacifique Masunzu rebellion, which then marked the first prolonged period of sustained internal conflict.