Ultimatum of July 23, 1914
The ultimatum of July 23, 1914, was a diplomatic note delivered by the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Belgrade to the. The issuance of the ultimatum is widely seen as an immediate precursor to the outbreak of World War I in August 1914. The note was Austria-Hungary's response to the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand by Serbia-aligned perpetrators the previous month, following weeks of deliberation.
The text was meticulously constructed to be unacceptable to the Serbian government, thereby ensuring its rejection and thus adding to Austria-Hungary's casus belli. Serbia's response was dismissed by the Austro-Hungarian government.
An agreement between Austria-Hungary and its principal ally, the German Empire, had been reached as early as July 7.
General context
The Sarajevo assassination
On June 28, 1914, Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria|Franz Ferdinand], heir to the thrones of Austria and Hungary, was assassinated alongside his wife, Sophie Chotek, while attending Austro-Hungarian army maneuvers in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The attack, carried out by Gavrilo Princip, a young Serbian nationalist, occurred during the couple's visit to Sarajevo, the provincial capital of annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. Princip's actions were organized by Bosnian Serbs who had been Austro-Hungarian subjects since 1909. The murder was the culmination of a decade of attacks on high Austro-Hungarian officials in the southern Slavic territories of the Dual Monarchy.The Austro-Hungarian police force investigated the assassination. Their preliminary findings blamed ethnic Serb nationals of the Kingdom of Serbia. The investigators lacked definitive proof in 1914,
Austro-Hungarian suspicions
Austro-Hungarian authorities suspected the Kingdom of Serbia's role in the attack before their investigation began. Investigators uncovered a plot with conspirators in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia, and revealed the involvement of the Serbian Black Hand—an organization headed by chief of Serbian military intelligence Dragutin Dimitrijević.Investigators believed that the perpetrators were aided by Kingdom of Serbia military personnel and border guards in both preparing for the attack and in the exfiltration of accomplices, many of whom were still presumed at large after the assassination. Austrian diplomats in Serbia also observed a discrepancy between official expressions of condolence and the public's reaction to the Archduke's murder;
The Dual Monarchy anticipated a major crisis in the Balkan Peninsula months before the assassination, by at least as early as the beginning of 1914, Intelligence sources reported that Tsar Nicholas II favored a conflict with the Dual Monarchy, and were certain that the anticipated crisis would erupt before the year's end. Their assessment was corroborated by assets and agents in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the June investigation.
Russia had progressively marginalized Austria-Hungary in the region since the two Balkan Wars. Bulgaria, allied with the Dual Monarchy, suffered a decisive defeat in the Second War.
Serbia, the "Piedmont of the South Slavs"
By the turn of the 19th century, Austria-Hungary's eastern and southern possessions were restive, and nationalism was on the rise everywhere.The Kingdom of Serbia worried Vienna since it had unilaterally declared its independence in 1878. The Serbian Obrenović dynasty had been a client of Austria-Hungary until its violent dissolution in the 1903 May Coup. New monarch Peter I, with the backing of the Serbian Radical Party, pivoted to a French alliance. Serbia's victory in the Balkan Wars of 1913 only heightened nationalist fervor in Belgrade. Serbia was transforming from a middling state to a rapidly growing power with close ties to Russia; Austria-Hungary and the German Empire were determined to force it back into lockstep with the Central Powers. And the Romania's government in Bucharest, a traditional ally of the Dual Monarchy, was now pivoting to Serbia's position against the Bulgarians, who made no secret of their territorial ambitions in Romania.
Nationalist, ethnic, and religious tensions within the Dual Monarchy also intensified. In 1905, South Slavic representatives in regional assemblies within the Austrian-Hungarian Empire began to form voting blocs in parliaments in Dalmatia and Croatia; in 1908 one such coalition attained a majority in the Sabor in Zagreb.
In the early months of 1914, Serbia, too, was beset by internal strife. Crown Prince Alexander—who had been made regent because of his father's weakened state—feuded with his military, while Prime Minister Nikola Pašić held de facto executive power. Pašić's participation in the parliamentary elections of August 14, 1914 only exacerbated tensions in Belgrade.
The position of the central powers in 1914
By 1914, the German Empire could no longer keep small Balkan states such as Romania, Bulgaria, and Greece within its orbit. The Balkan Wars had exacted a toll on these kingdoms, and their governments sought financial support from outside sources in rebuilding or in bids to reclaim territories lost to the victors. But neither Germany nor Austria-Hungary offered more than token commitments.German economic influence in the Ottoman Empire had also been undermined, a development of which Berlin was only too keenly aware. By the autumn of 1913, the Sublime Porte—despite its pro-German stance—could no longer secure funding from struggling German banks. Like the Greek king, the Porte turned instead to markets in London and Paris for loans. On May 29, 1914, Karl Helfferich, a representative of Deutsche Bank, sent an alarming memorandum to Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg highlighting the Reich's waning status in the Porte. Germany arranged short-term assistance for its dependent allies in June, but its bankers deemed this insufficient to offset future demands on the Reich's treasury.
By the spring of 1914 the Dual Monarchy remained Germany's sole reliable ally; the small Balkan states were increasingly estranged from their erstwhile partners. Vienna's foreign minister Leopold Berchtold commissioned a report on developments in the Balkans since the 1913 wars. A draft delivered on June 23, 1914 advised against any alliance with Romania, advocated for a more aggressive stance against Serbia, and supported an alliance with Bulgaria and the Porte against Belgrade. Five days later Serbian nationalists assassinated the Archduke in Sarajevo.
July 7 – July 23, 1914: Intense preparations
In the wake of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, Austria-Hungary's devised a meticulously orchestrated response in collaboration with the German Reich, aimed at Serbia.The German "blank check"
Despite differing perspectives among Austrians and Hungarians, the leaders of the Austro-Hungarian Empire agreed on the importance of seeking counsel from Germany.On July 2, Austro-Hungarian diplomats were promptly apprised of Kaiser Wilhelm II's stance. The German ambassador in Vienna urged Berchtold to act with prudence and cautioned him against hastily assigning blame on the Serbian government.
On July 4, German diplomats briefed their counterparts in Vienna on the Kaiser's position. Wilhelm II conveyed his personal support for his ally in a statement that reiterated positions he had taken the previous autumn: He expressed his willingness to back the Dual Monarchy should it take decisive action against Serbia. Support was formally confirmed to the Austro-Hungarian envoy on July 6, 1914.
On July 5, Count Hoyos arrived in Berlin, seeking German support for Austro-Hungarian measures against Belgrade. He carried a handwritten letter from Franz Joseph to Wilhelm II
and a memorandum that was highly critical of Serbia.
In the days following the assassination, Wilhelm II had held extensive consultations with his ministers and advisors; their response was to be positive. Reassured by the Kaiser, Austro-Hungarian leaders began preparing their measures against Serbia. German officials now urged swift action to capitalize on the outrage sparked by the attack.
Wilhelm II assured the Romanians that the Central Powers would respect their sovereign neutrality in the event of any Austro-Serbian conflict. Bulgaria, the Central Powers' newest member, had recently threatened to invade Romania's southern flank, further guaranteeing Romanian neutrality.
But the Reich did not limit itself to mere declarations of support or try to maintain a diplomatic balancing act, as observed by historian Fritz Fischer. To limit the oncoming Austro-Serbian conflict, Germany also courted Serbia's potential allies in a bid to steer them away from aiding Belgrade.
In a statement made on July 21 and 22—one day before the issuance of the ultimatum—Reich Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg expressed his view that the Austro-Hungarian note to Serbia was "fair and moderate." On July 24, a circular from the German Foreign Ministry instructed Reich ambassadors to underscore the bilateral nature of the Austro-Serbian dispute.
Moreover, Germany's ambassador in Vienna, Heinrich Leonard von Tschirschky und Bögendorff, exerted considerable influence over the Austro-Hungarian monarchy through his daily interactions and frequent meetings with key policymakers. He advocated for a robust response as a means of restoring the monarchy's waning prestige. It was assumed by officials from both the Reich and Austria-Hungary that a rapid offensive, limited to the capture of Belgrade and its surroundings, would present the Triple Entente with a fait accompli.
The different centers of power in Austria-Hungary (July 7–23)
Throughout the crisis, various institutions within the Dual Monarchy exerted contradictory pressures on Austro-Hungarian foreign policy. The common War Minister Alexander von Krobatin, Foreign Minister Berchtold, and Chief of the General Staff Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf all advocated for prompt military action. However, they encountered resistance from Hungarian Prime Minister István Tisza, who was loath to see the Dual Monarchy seen abroad as the aggressor.Emperor Franz Joseph endorsed a resolute policy towards Serbia. Despite his disinclination towards his slain nephew and successor, the Emperor was determined to safeguard his dynasty and his dominions from any external encroachment. The emperor had the support of powerful friends including Alexander Hoyos, Janos Forgach, Alexander von Musulin, and Franz von Matscheko, as well as the Chief of Staff Conrad von Hötzendorf and Foreign Minister Berchtold. Collectively, these figures exerted considerable influence which enabled the emperor in his confrontation with Serbia. The emperor insisted on establishing the involvement of Serbian intelligence in the assassination in order to secure Berlin's support before any Austro-Hungarian initiative, and to persuade Tisza to approve military action against the Kingdom of Belgrade.
Tisza feared a violent response by minority Slav populations in Hungary to any military action against Serbia. His stance put him at odds with other officials in the Dual Monarchy. From the outset, he encountered resistance from the military, particularly from Conrad, who wanted a swift assault on Belgrade without an ultimatum or declaration of war. Tisza persisted throughout the Austro-Hungarian Council of Ministers on July 7 and in the subsequent days until July 14. He invoked a memorandum he had drafted on June 30 outlining his position on the matter. On July 7 he put forth an alternative diplomatic solution that aimed to bolster alliances with Bulgaria and Romania. His strategy sought to isolate Belgrade and compel Serbian leaders to concede to Austro-Hungarian demands. But Tisza relented to the majority and gave his consent to their demands was ultimately obtained on July 14. Germany ambassador Heinrich von Tschirschky, sent the news to Berlin that same day.
During a joint council of ministers in Vienna on July 19, Tisza dropped his remaining objections after consulting with his close associate Stephan Burián von Rajecz. He also had Conrad's guarantee—contrary to Berchtold's concerns—that the monarchy would not emerge from the conflict without territorial gains and that Hungarian Transylvania would be safeguarded against potential Romanian offensives. Bulgaria, would also receive annexed Serbian territories. This did not resolve all of Tisza's objections, however. His objections were substantial: Romania's likely demands for compensation for their neutrality; Bulgaria's future as an expanded state; the successor to the Karageorgevic dynasty; and the prospect of Russian intervention and its military consequences.
Relations between allies grew tense. Austro-Hungarian officials stopped communicating their plans to their German counterparts through July 22, the day before the ultimatum was delivered; the Austro-Hungarians objected to the conduct of the German diplomats and found reason to question the German Secretary of State's ability to maintain secrecy.
In the weeks leading up to the ultimatum, the Austro-Hungarian intelligence service underwent a transformation. The largely passive information-gathering network became a security apparatus that actively engaged in espionage, monitoring and censorship of communications, and counterintelligence.
The kingdom of Serbia in the aftermath of the assassination
In the hours following the assassination, officials of the Dual Monarchy, with the support of information provided by the imperial and royal ambassador in Belgrade, directed their attention to the Serbian capital. The preliminary interrogations of suspects appeared to substantiate the Austro-Hungarian suspicions. On July 1, Danilo Ilić, an arrested conspirator during police raids on Bosnian-Herzegovinian Serbian nationalist circles, revealed the plot's extensive connections. However, establishing connections to the Kingdom of Serbia proved challenging, partly due to the behavior of prisoners implicated by Ilić.This conclusion is further supported by the observations of Austro-Hungarian diplomats regarding the attitudes of the population within the kingdom. Despite the government in Belgrade's declaration of an official mourning period of eight weeks, which was subsequently reduced to eight days, the population expressed its vehement discontent, and the nationalist press launched impassioned attacks against Austria-Hungary. This occurred despite the appeals of Serbian diplomats stationed in other European countries and the disapproval of the Dual Monarchy. In response, the Serbian government invoked its constitution, which prohibited restrictions on press freedom, as justification for its inaction. Moreover, Austro-Hungarian diplomatic requests for an investigation into the connections of the conspiracy within Serbia yielded no tangible results, largely due to the lack of cooperation from Serbian investigators.
Furthermore, the electoral context in Serbia did not motivate the government to challenge the most radical nationalists. Nevertheless, as early as June 29, Prime Minister Nikola Pašić articulated in a public address that the Kingdom of Serbia would defend itself in the event of an Austro-Hungarian assault.
As outlined by Pašić, the Serbian response unfolded in three distinct phases. These phases reflect a cautious balancing act on the part of the government, which demonstrated a consistent willingness to cooperate with the Dual Monarchy's police throughout the crisis. The initial phase, spanning from June 28 to July 15, was characterized by a cautious and measured approach. The second phase commenced on July 15, following Hungary's decision to adopt a policy of retaliation against Serbia, which persisted until the issuance of the ultimatum. The third phase commenced with the ultimatum's delivery, influencing Serbia's response to the evolving crisis.
A deliberate Austro-Hungarian response
As early as July 6, Austria-Hungary commenced preparations for its response to the assassination of the Habsburg heir apparent. This response was conveyed to the Serbian government in a note delivered on the afternoon of July 23. The drafting process involved consultations among key Austro-Hungarian actors, with particular attention paid to the timing of its delivery.Planning the note
On July 8, Baron Musulin von Gomirje, a proficient Austro-Hungarian diplomat renowned for his literary proficiency and advocacy for crisis resolution through decisive action, was entrusted with the drafting process. The Vienna ministry exercised meticulous supervision over the drafting process, aiming for a text that Serbia might accept, except Point 6, which encroached upon Serbian sovereignty.Upon completion on July 19, the draft was presented to Emperor Franz Joseph on July 20 and received his approval the following morning.
Structure of the ultimatum
The "July 23 Ultimatum" comprised three elements: a diplomatic note, a ten-point ultimatum, and a commentary on the circumstances and conditions of the document's delivery.The introductory note delineated the grievances of the Dual Monarchy against Serbia, citing commitments Serbia had made in 1909 to maintain amicable relations with its neighbors. The Austro-Hungarian government explicitly accused Belgrade not of directly supporting the assassination of the heir but of "tolerating" the activities of the conspirators.
Subsequently, the ultimatum was presented, comprising ten points. The text then proceeded to address the issue of anti-Austrian propaganda. Three points demanded the cessation of anti-Austrian propaganda within Serbian territory, including the prohibition of nationalist press and Yugoslav propaganda. About the matter of judicial actions, Four additional points called for the initiation of legal proceedings against those responsible for the assassination and the apprehension of any Serbian officials who may have been complicit in the plot. Police Cooperation: Points 5 and 6 underscored the importance of Serbian police collaboration with Austro-Hungarian authorities in identifying the perpetrators and permitted Austro-Hungarian officials to operate within Serbian territory.
From the text, it becomes evident that Austro-Hungarian diplomats, at the behest of military leaders and key officials of the Dual Monarchy, sought to assert increasing control over their smaller neighbor. Their objective was to revert to the situation before 1903, effectively transforming the Kingdom of Serbia into a satellite of Austria-Hungary.
Ultimately, the note was accompanied by a commentary intended for the Serbian government, the purpose of which was to elucidate the context in which the Austro-Hungarians had prepared the ultimatum.
Full Text
The following is the Austro-Hungarian note of July 23, 1914, translated by diplomat and writer Gabriel Hanotaux in his Histoire illustrée de la guerre de 1914, Volume 2:Commentary
The note concludes stating The Imperial and Royal Government invites Your Excellency to convey this note to the appropriate government, along with a detailed commentary:Despite this declaration, Serbia pursued actions that directly undermined Austro-Hungarian stability:
In the aftermath of the revolution, a wide range of organizations were established, overtly and covertly, to incite unrest within Austria-Hungary. These groups included influential figures from various sectors, such as “generals, diplomats, state officials, and judges,” reflecting a cross-section of Serbian society.
The Serbian press played a pivotal role in promoting anti-Austrian sentiment:
Serbia also deployed agents to spread propaganda and influence the youth in Austro-Hungarian territories, while its politicians, some with violent histories in Macedonia, shifted their focus to supporting anti-Austrian terrorism:
Despite years of provocation, Austria-Hungary exercised restraint. However, Serbia failed to act against these activities, violating its commitments under the 1909 declaration:
Austria-Hungary had hoped that its lack of territorial ambitions and support for Serbia’s expansion in 1912 would foster cooperation:
However, Serbia continued to tolerate propaganda and actions against Austria-Hungary, leading to the assassination on June 28 of the heir presumptive to the Austro-Hungarian throne—a crime “orchestrated in Belgrade.”
Faced with this reality, Austria-Hungary felt compelled to act decisively to protect its security and territorial integrity:
To substantiate its claims, Austria-Hungary has shared a comprehensive dossier with the French government, detailing Serbia’s role in the assassination. Copies of this communication have also been sent to other signatory powers:
Delivery of the ultimatum
The Austro-Hungarian government's selected course of action was the result of a meticulous planning process. The Austro-Hungarian note was delivered on Thursday, July 23, at precisely 6 p.m. This was the moment when key French officials were expected to be aboard a ship returning from a visit to Russia. Consequently, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador delivered the note to the Serbian Minister of Finance, who was acting instead of the Prime Minister, at his location in Niš. The timing of this action effectively prevented the French and Russians from consulting with each other until the French delegation returned to Dunkirk, temporarily immobilizing two members of the Entente.The timeframe for Serbia's response was also contingent upon the demands of the Austro-Hungarian military. Chief of General Staff Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf took into account the time required for and successfully requested that the response deadline be set for 5 p.m. on Saturday, allowing mobilization orders to be issued overnight.
The note delivered to the Serbian government included the text of the ultimatum and an appendix. The Austro-Hungarian ambassador presented the document to the Serbian minister, who objected to the short deadline, citing the ongoing Serbian electoral campaign. This objection was summarily dismissed.
From the moment the Austro-Hungarian note was delivered, the Serbian government was obliged to accept its terms within a period of 48 hours.
International reactions
The response of the Serbian government was contingent upon the actions of Prime Minister Pašić on July 23 and the position adopted by Russia during the crisis. Initially unavailable due to his engagement in the electoral campaign and subsequent journey to Thessaloniki, the Prime Minister was directed by Regent Alexander to return to Belgrade without delay. In his absence, the Serbian cabinet convened to adopt measures to equip diplomats with arguments to defend the royal government's position.However, the little kingdom's response came as no surprise, as the terms of the Austro-Hungarian note had been designed from the outset by the Ballhausplatz designers to be unacceptable to the Belgrade government.
Partial text of the Serbian response of July 25, 1914
The following is a partial translation of the Serbian response of July 25, 1914, as recorded by the diplomat and writer Gabriel Hanotaux in Histoire illustrée de la guerre de 1914, Volume 2:The Serbian government’s response to Austro-Hungarian demands sought to address each point comprehensively, blending firm commitments with an adherence to constitutional principles. Serbia began by pledging to introduce legal reforms targeting anti-Austrian sentiments. Specifically, the government agreed:
Additionally, it committed to amending Article 22 of the Constitution to allow for the confiscation of such publications, a measure currently prohibited by constitutional constraints.
Regarding the dissolution of subversive organizations, Serbia remarked that it had no evidence of wrongdoing by these groups but nonetheless declared:
The Serbian government further committed to purging anti-Austrian materials from its public education system. However, it noted that:
On the matter of dismissing military personnel implicated in anti-Austro-Hungarian activities, Serbia promised compliance contingent on evidence from Vienna. It stated:
Serbia expressed a willingness to collaborate with Austria-Hungary on investigations but noted its reservations about the scope of the demand. It acknowledged its duty to investigate individuals involved in the June 28 assassination plot and stated:
However, it resisted allowing foreign agents to participate in the process, citing constitutional and legal barriers.
Immediate actions were highlighted, including the arrest of Commander Vojislav Tankosić. Regarding Milan Ciganović, Serbia explained that he had not yet been located and requested Vienna to “provide evidence of guilt collected in the Sarajevo investigation to facilitate further inquiries.”
Additionally, Serbia committed to “reinforce and expand measures to prevent the illegal trafficking of arms and explosives across the border” and promised to investigate and punish any border officials who neglected their duties, enabling the perpetrators to cross into Austria-Hungary.
Addressing Austro-Hungary’s concerns over hostile rhetoric, Serbia offered to provide clarifications for statements attributed to its officials, stating:
Finally, Serbia emphasized its preference for a peaceful resolution of any outstanding issues, expressing readiness to refer the matter to international arbitration. It concluded:
Through its response, Serbia sought to balance addressing Austro-Hungarian grievances with safeguarding its sovereignty and legal integrity.
Serbian response: Partial compliance with Austro-Hungarian demands
Influences exerted by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Sazonov resulted in the Serbian response addressing the majority of Austria-Hungary's demands, particularly those that Belgrade could reasonably accept. Concurrently, the Serbian government sought clarification on the arguments presented by Vienna.The Serbian response was written primarily by the Minister of Internal Affairs, Stojan Protić, with much input from the Cabinet. It was meticulously calculated, underscoring the alteration in diplomatic strategy towards Austria-Hungary after the resolution of the Bosnian crisis. Its creators underscored the absence of involvement by the Serbian government in the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, expressed remorse over the involvement of Bosnian Serbs in the crime, and pledged action against Serbian nationals engaged in anti-Austrian propaganda.
Nevertheless, Serbia declined to permit Austrian law enforcement officials to operate within its borders. This decision was made following consultations with the Russian chargé d'affaires in Belgrade and subsequent explicit support from the Russian foreign minister. As a result of this refusal, diplomatic relations between the two countries were effectively terminated.
In practice, Serbia's apparent capitulation was rendered meaningless by the skillful wording of its response, which effectively rejected Austrian demands. This, however, deceived Kaiser Wilhelm II, who declared the day after Serbia's reply that "all grounds for war have disappeared."
The Serbian response, described by the Austrian note's author, Baron Musulin, as "the most brilliant exercise in diplomatic virtuosity," prompted Austro-Hungarian ambassador Wladimir Giesl von Gieslingen to sever diplomatic ties with Serbia just minutes after receiving the note.
The Austro-Serbian breakup
On the morning of Saturday, July 25, the Serbian cabinet convened to draft the government's response to the Austro-Hungarian note, which had been delivered the previous day and was set to expire that evening. That evening, shortly before 6 p.m., just minutes before the deadline, Serbian Prime Minister Nikola Pašić delivered the response to Wladimir Giesl, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Belgrade. Upon receiving the Serbian note, the ambassador promptly reviewed it and informed the Serbian Prime Minister of the severance of diplomatic relations between the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Kingdom of Serbia.In anticipation of the impending conflict, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador departed Belgrade at 6 p.m. On July 28, Emperor Franz Joseph formally declared war on the Kingdom of Serbia on behalf of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
European reactions: July 23–28
Immediately following the distribution of the Austro-Hungarian note to Belgrade, European powers initiated discussions despite the constrained timeframe available to Serbia for coordinating with its allies. These consultations, coupled with the inflexible timeline established by the Central Powers, further reinforced French and Russian suspicions of Austro-German collusion in devising a response to the assassination of the Austro-Hungarian heir.Russia was the inaugural major power to offer a response. Despite an initially indignant reaction from Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Sazonov, the Russian Council of Ministers, soon joined by their French and British counterparts, proposed requesting an extension of the deadline for Serbia's reply. Concurrently, Russia initiated a partial mobilization of its armed forces, a decision that was publicly disclosed on July 28. In addition, economic countermeasures were implemented, including the repatriation of Russian assets from Germany and Austria-Hungary. These actions provoked the German Empire, whose diplomats were adamant in their assertion to their European counterparts that the Austro-Serbian conflict was a matter confined to the local and bilateral levels. Russia's response, though robust, was hindered by Austro-Hungarian diplomatic maneuvering. The timing of the note's delivery to Belgrade temporarily obstructed effective coordination between Russia and its French allies, as French leaders were en route back to France following a state visit to Russia. Nevertheless, French President Raymond Poincaré, a key figure in French diplomacy, conveyed that France would advise Russia to exercise moderation—on the condition that Germany exert similar restraint on its ally.
In the United Kingdom, the response was characterized by a certain degree of restraint and measured diplomacy. The British government put forth a proposal for mediation by the four major powers to facilitate conciliation between Serbia and Austria-Hungary following Belgrade's occupation by Austro-Hungarian forces. Prime Minister Edward Grey asserted that Britain should play an active role in addressing the crisis, particularly in the event of a renewed Balkan war involving Austria-Hungary directly. However, by July 27, the Austro-Hungarian leadership underestimated the extent of Russian support for Serbia and misinterpreted Britain's position.
The responses from Russia and Britain were perceived as deceptive by Austro-Hungarian officials, who misjudged both the extent of Russian backing for Serbia and the implications of the British declaration.
Ultimately, the German government was made aware of the precise content of the Serbian note, albeit somewhat belatedly. The German government received a copy of the Serbian reply to the ultimatum at approximately midday on July 27. Subsequently, Gottlieb von Jagow, influenced by Wilhelm II's admiration for the quality of the Serbian reply, proposed that the Dual Monarchy restrict its military operations to a coup de main, with the objective of occupying Belgrade and defending this conquest. Additionally, the German Emperor advised the Dual Monarchy's military not to pursue Serbian troops following the occupation of Belgrade. The Germans viewed the capture of the Serbian capital as a means of exerting influence over the course of peace negotiations between the Dual Monarchy and Serbia. German ministers endorsed this strategy, aiming to contain the crisis through diplomatic exchanges between Wilhelm II and Nicholas II.
Declaration of war on Serbia: July 27–28
On July 27, Austrian Foreign Minister Leopold Berchtold transmitted a missive to Emperor Franz Joseph containing erroneous information. This information suggested that the Serbian army had launched an offensive against Imperial forces, resulting in casualties. Berchtold leveraged this claim to justify the preparation of a war declaration telegram against Serbia, which he planned to transmit the following day unless the emperor objected. He expressed concern that the Triple Entente might broker a peaceful resolution if war were not declared immediately."Your Majesty,
I have the honor to submit to Your Majesty, attached herewith, a draft telegram addressed to the Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs containing a declaration of war against Serbia. I very humbly suggest that Your Majesty authorize me to dispatch this telegram tomorrow morning and to simultaneously arrange for the official publication of the war declaration in Vienna and Budapest.
Considering the Serbian government's response note, which was very cleverly drafted and handed over on March 28 by Mr. Pašić to the Imperial and Royal envoy, Baron Giesl, I find it lacking in substance though conciliatory in tone. I believe it is not impossible for the powers of the Triple Entente to still attempt a peaceful resolution of the conflict unless a decisive situation is created through the war declaration. According to a report from the 4th Army Corps Command, Serbian troops fired yesterday on our forces from boats on the Danube near Temes-Kubin, resulting in casualties.
The response to the gunfire led to a larger skirmish. Hostilities are thus effectively underway, making it all the more necessary to ensure that our army, from the perspective of international law, has the freedom of movement that only becomes available when a state of war is declared.
The notification of the state of war to neutral powers would be sent, with Your Majesty's supreme approval, concurrently with the declaration to their local representatives. I must note that His Imperial and Royal Highness, Archduke Friedrich, Commander-in-Chief of the Balkan Armed Forces, as well as the Chief of the General Staff, have opposed the issuance of the war declaration. Nonetheless, we have decided not to oppose the declaration being made tomorrow morning. With the utmost reverence,
Vienna, July 27, 1914. Berchtold."
The text of the telegram and the dispatches sent to embassies on July 28, 1914, is as follows:
"The Royal Government of Serbia, not having responded satisfactorily to the note that was delivered to it by the Minister of Austria-Hungary in Belgrade on July 23, 1914, the Imperial and Royal Government finds itself compelled to ensure the safeguarding of its rights and interests by its means and to resort to the force of arms for this purpose, particularly since Serbian troops have already attacked an Imperial and Royal Army detachment near Temes-Kubin. ''Austria-Hungary therefore considers itself, from this moment, to be in a state of war with Serbia.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary. Count Berchtold."
The purported assault at Temes-Kubin by the Serbian military, which was presented as a rationale for initiating hostilities and securing the Emperor's approval, was ultimately revealed to be a mere Austro-Hungarian operation aimed at capturing two Serbian steamboats. This operation resulted in no deaths or injuries. This event was no longer mentioned in the text published in the official gazette on July 28, 1914, at 4:25 a.m., which was subsequently picked up by press agencies.
"Vienna, July 28.
The Austro-Hungarian government has officially notified Serbia of the declaration of war.
The Official Gazette, in a special edition, publishes the text of the declaration as follows:
The Royal Government of Serbia, not having responded satisfactorily to the note that was delivered to it by the Minister of Austria-Hungary in Belgrade on July 23, 1914, the Imperial and Royal Government finds itself compelled to ensure the safeguarding of its rights and interests by its means and to resort to the force of arms for this purpose.
Austria-Hungary therefore considers itself, from this moment, to be in a state of war with Serbia.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary. Count Berchtold."''