Iraq Study Group Report


The Iraq Study Group Report: The Way Forward – A New Approach is the report of the Iraq Study Group, as mandated by the United States Congress. It is an assessment of the state of the war in Iraq as of December 6, 2006, when the ISG released the report to the public on the Internet and as a published book. The report was seen as crucial by Bush, who declared: "And truth of the matter is, a lot of reports in Washington are never read by anybody. To show you how important this one is, I read it, and read it."
According to the Executive Summary of the report, page 16, as quoted, "The Iraqi government should accelerate assuming responsibility
for Iraqi security by increasing the number and quality of Iraqi Army brigades. While this process is under way, and to facilitate it, the United States should significantly increase the number of U.S. military personnel, including combat troops, imbedded in and supporting Iraqi Army units. As these actions proceed, U.S. combat forces could begin to move out of Iraq.... The situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating." The report recommends that the U.S. should eventually end combat operations in Iraq and help in training Iraqi troops. It does not, however, endorse a complete removal of troops from Iraq by a specific date.
A Portable Document Format version of the Iraq Study Group's final official report was made available on the website of the U. S. Institute of Peace. The Iraq Study Group Report sold 35,000 copies during the week ending 10 December 2006, according to Nielsen BookScan.

Scope and task

The U.S. government formed the Research Group under the auspices of bipartisanship due to growing concern from officials about hostilities in Iraq and possible civil war. Members of the Study Group and staff spoke with officials from various governments, seeking their views regarding the state of Iraq.
As a matter of political expediency, the group did not assign blame or causality for the state of Iraq's security, by focus on the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the Occupation of Iraq, or subsequent actions taken by the U.S. Military. It researched and outlined problems in Iraq, how such problems relate to each other, and what steps could be taken to fix the problems.

Pre-release expectations

The public expected the ISG to present two overall, alternative policies in their report. The first option, "Redeploy and Contain," would call for the phased withdrawal of U.S. troops to bases near Iraq where they could be redeployed against new threats in the region. Stability First would call for maintaining a presence in Baghdad and encouraging insurgents to enter the political arena, while asking Iran and Syria, Iraq's neighbors, for help ending the fighting.
According to The New York Times, the report would call for a gradual pullback of American forces from Iraq beginning in 2007.
The now defunct New York Sun reported that an expert adviser to the Iraq Study Group expected the panel to recommend that the Bush administration pressure Israel to make concessions so as to entice Syria and Iran to a regional conference on Iraq.

Contents

The final report has 79 separate policy recommendations in its 160 pages. Its central points had for the most part been reported on before its release. The report deals with domestic issues such as budget funding and economic processes, military issues including bringing U.S. troops out of Iraq and how to integrate more of them into Iraqi army units, the foreign political issues of nurturing an effective and unified Iraqi government, and diplomatic issues such as calling for direct talks with Iran and Syria.
The report begins by laying out the difficulties surrounding the Iraq war and the current U.S. position. It warns that its policy recommendations are not failsafe, but that the deteriorating situation in Iraq could lead to political and humanitarian consequences if not dealt with immediately.

Military concerns

The report contains many recommendations concerning the continued usage of military forces to achieve the goals of the United States. Only five pages of the report address U.S. troop levels, however: "More than 30 pages of the report consist of biographies of commission members and lists of people they interviewed; we counted just five pages devoted to the matter of U.S. troop levels in Iraq...." Increasing those levels was not considered in depth as it was not considered a viable option. Panel members say they were not given a mandate to consider increasing the number of American troops in Iraq because their military briefers dismissed out of hand the premise that it was possible to increase the number of American troops in Iraq, on grounds that not enough were available. The report recommends instead envisaging the removal of all U.S. troops from Iraq by 2008.
In the section in which the report assesses "the Current Situation in Iraq," in considering "Security", it states:
Attacks against U.S., Coalition, and Iraqi security forces are persistent and growing. October 2006 was the deadliest month for U.S. forces since January 2005, with 102 Americans killed. Total attacks in October 2006 averaged 180 per day, up from 70 per day in January 2006. Daily attacks against Iraqi security forces in October were more than double the level in January. Attacks against civilians in October were four times higher than in January. Some 3,000 Iraqi civilians are killed every month.

In the same chapter, discussing "U.S., Coalition, and Iraqi Forces," the report suggests several causes for these consequences, chiefly the difficulties facing "the Multi-National Forces–Iraq under U.S. command, working in concert with Iraq's security forces," in
"confronting this violence." In its subsection on the "Iraqi Forces," the report observes that while "The Iraqi Army is making fitful progress toward becoming a reliable and disciplined fighting force loyal to the national government," some "significant questions remain about the ethnic composition and loyalties of some Iraqi units—specifically, whether they will carry out missions on behalf of national goals instead of a sectarian agenda", detailing these problems. The Report observes, for example, a significant gap in funding for the Iraq defense forces: "The entire appropriation for Iraqi defense forces for FY 2006 is less than the United States currently spends in Iraq every two weeks". It observes that the Iraqi Army "is also confronted by several other challenges": the "units" of the Iraqi Army lack adequate "leadership," "equipment," "personnel," "logistics and support," including "the ability to sustain their operations," "the capability to transport supplies and troops and the capacity to provide their own indirect fire support, technical intelligence, and medical evacuation." The Iraq Study Group predicts that the Iraqi Army "will depend on the United States for logistics and support through at least 2007."

Diplomatic concerns

The report also presents the "goals of the diplomatic offensive as it relates to the regional players":

Recommendation 2: The goals of the diplomatic offensive as it relates to regional players should be to:
  1. Support the unity and territorial integrity of Iraq.
  2. Stop destabilizing interventions and actions by Iraq's neighbors.
  3. Secure Iraq's borders, including the use of joint patrols with neighboring countries.
  4. Prevent the expansion of the instability and conflict beyond Iraq's borders.
  5. Promote economic assistance, commerce, trade, political support, and, if possible, military assistance for the Iraqi government from non-neighboring Muslim nations.
  6. Energize countries to support national political reconciliation in Iraq.
  7. Validate Iraq's legitimacy by resuming diplomatic relations, where appropriate, and reestablishing embassies in Baghdad.
  8. Assist Iraq in establishing active working embassies in key capitals in the region.
  9. Help Iraq reach a mutually acceptable agreement on Kirkuk.
  10. Assist the Iraqi government in achieving certain security, political, and economic milestones, including better performance on issues such as national reconciliation, equitable distribution of oil revenues, and the dismantling of militias.
In this report, however, the goals of the United States take precedence over the interests of the population of Iraq:
Recommendation 41: The United States must make it clear to the Iraqi government that the United States could carry out its plans, including planned redeployments, even if Iraq does not implement its planned changes. America's other security needs and the future of our military cannot be made hostage to the actions or inactions of the Iraqi government.

Economic concerns

The report focuses heavily on the oil industry in Iraq.
For example, according to Recommendation 62 in part:
As soon as possible, the U.S. government should provided technical assistance to the Iraqi government to prepare a draft oil law that defines the rights of regional and local governments and creates a fiscal and legal framework for investment. help draft an oil law that creates a fiscal and legal framework for investment.

In conjunction with the International Monetary Fund, the U.S. government should press Iraq to continue reducing subsidies in the energy sector, instead of providing grant assistance. Until Iraqis pay market prices for oil products, drastic fuel shortages will remain.

Recommendation 63 says in part that
The United States should encourage investment in Iraq's oil sector by the international community and by international energy companies.

The United states should assist Iraqi leaders to reorganize the national oil industry as a commercial enterprise, in order to enhance efficiency, transparency, and accountability.

Their report also notes that corruption may be more responsible for breakdowns in the oil sector than the insurgency itself:
Corruption is also debilitating. Experts estimate that 150,000 to 200,000—and perhaps as many as 500,000—barrels of oil per day are being stolen.