Gaspar Polanco
Gaspar Polanco Borbón was a Dominican politician and military commander. A leader of the Dominican Restoration War, he is regarded as one of the most notable military figures in the history of the Dominican Republic.
Early life
Little is known so far about his personal background. Not even his exact year and place of birth are known, although it is presumed that it occurred in Guayubín or in the Corral Viejo area of that municipality, in 1816. His father, Valentín Polanco, was a resident cattle breeder and tobacco grower in Guayubín, from where it was easy to export to neighboring Haiti. Border trade had resumed at a certain point after Dominican independence, although there was no armistice between the two countries. Gaspar, the most capable of the three brothers, maintained the family patrimony, managing to combine his activities as a regional military leader with the administration of his livestock herd.As was normal after Independence, Polanco joined military tasks later in conflict. It is likely that he participated in Dominican War of Independence, but he only began to stand out as a cavalry colonel in the Battle of Sabana Larga, the latter the epilogue of the Haitian aggressions, in January 1856. The military skills exhibited in these battles and his adhesion to Pedro Santana after the Cibaeño Revolution facilitated his promotion to general in 1859. From his position as head of the La Peñuela section, he made himself felt as one of the preponderant figures in the northern border area. and stood out for its ability to recruit contingents of peasants for war campaigns, a key function of local representatives of the public administration.
War against Spain
Early uprisings
While he remained a soldier in the reserves on the Northwest Line, in February 1863 anti-annexation uprisings broke out in Guayubín and other towns in the area, with repercussions in Santiago, where an unsuccessful attempt was made to expand the rebellion. In a few days of operations, the Spanish and annexationist Creole troops managed to quell the attempt. One of the reasons this happened was that many reserve officers still remained loyal to the Spanish regime. Among the Dominican soldiers who at that time did not support the liberation action was Gaspar Polanco, despite the fact that his older brother, Juan Antonio, was among the leaders. It has been stated that one of the causes of the failure lay in Polanco's loyalty to Spain, due to its influence in the northern border region.It is possible, however, that as early as February 1863, Polanco was predisposed to sedition, but decided not to join it. A testimony from the time indicates that he came to the conclusion that it was in his best interest to intercede for his brother's life, which leaves it implicit that he considered that the conditions for success had not yet matured. Some Spanish officials from that moment suspected that he was waiting for the right opportunity to join the rebel side. Even so, there is no doubt that he then contributed to the failure of the uprising, since he led the main Creole troops in the service of the government. It is not known if Polanco participated in the conspiratorial operations that preceded the outbreak of the Grito de Capotillo on August 16, 1863. At least he was not among the initial leaders who in a few days managed to defeat the Spanish garrisons in almost all the towns of the Northwest Line. However, there is no doubt that he was inclined to revolt, as part of a broad consensus that had formed in the region as a result of the measures of the Spanish administration in Cibao, commanded by General Buceta and Colonel Campillo.
Discontent was spreading between Santiago and the border, because the anti-popular provisions mentioned above, which had stimulated the February uprising, had not been repealed. On the other hand, the Spanish military leaders made the mistake of shooting several of the participants in the border and Santiago actions, after they had promised to respect the lives of all the prisoners. After the February rebellion, terror spread along the Northwest Line, which had the inevitable effect of fueling the anti-annexation spirit again. Polanco joined the rebellion around August 20, a few days after it began, when Benito Monción and Pedro Antonio Pimentel were pursuing Buceta to the death.
Although the insurrection was already massive, the incorporation of Polanco gave it more certain perspectives. From the fact that he joined in Esperanza, halfway between Guayubín and Santiago, it is inferred that he decided to prepare the conditions in that region, until then unrelated to the development of the fighting. Proof of this was that more than 300 men joined the front, a considerable number at an early stage of the war. This contingent began to play a primary role in the offensive launched against Santiago, after the various corps that had operated in the space between Sabaneta, Guayubín, Monte Cristi and Dajabón were organized. At the head of the troops, quickly reinforced with new recruits, Polanco defeated in La Barranquita de Guayacanes the contingent sent from Santiago under the command of Commander Florentino Martínez in order to assist Colonel Manuel Buceta. The withdrawal of the defeated opened the way for the insurgents towards the capital of Cibao.
Head of the Restoration Army
A few days after having joined the national cause, Polanco was recognized as the top commander of the national army, the formless troops of the Mambises, for the simple fact that he was the only one who had held the rank of general in the Republic. It seems that there were no objections to this decision, which highlighted the meaning of the rebellion to return to the condition that existed before March 1861. Years later, in an important writing dictated to Mariano Antonio Cestero, Benito Monción recognized that until the appointment of Polanco in the leadership, the different bodies that operated on Monte Cristi, Guayubín and Dajabón lacked a unified command. From that moment it was up to Polanco to direct the actions that culminated in the taking of Santiago and the pursuit of the Spanish troops to Puerto Plata days later. The successes in the operations prove that the appointment of the chief transcended the formality of the most senior general, and had gone to someone who began to show impeccable expertise in conducting the maneuvers.In those days, Polanco became the preponderant figure of the Dominican Restoration War, despite not being elected president of the Republic. Dr. Alcides García Lluberes, in his passionate but lucid article General Gaspar Polanco, full of empathy for Polanco, was the first to review the widely accepted criterion that Gregorio Luperón had been the first sword of the Restoration. García Lluberes highlighted that Polanco was responsible for leading the beginning of the war, embodied in the taking of Santiago, and also its triumphant end, culminating months later in the unemployment of the country. Luperón's vision of preponderance is explained by the exceptional historical awareness of the future leader of the Blue Party, expressed in the three volumes of his Autobiographical Notes and Historical Notes. If these texts are carefully studied, the primacy of Polanco is unquestionably established, both in the military aspect and in the quality of the political leadership of the national feat, invalidating the claims of preeminence of Luperón, who, although without being untrue, exaggerated his own merits in order to aspire to glory.
Polanco, beyond all doubt, showed the supreme gifts that led the Dominicans to victory, especially when it was debated whether the insurrection in Cibao would be consolidated. But it was above all in the presidency of the Republic where he fully expressed his ability to lead the national war. Although Polanco, certainly, as historians such as Manuel Rodríguez Objío and García Lluberes have highlighted, had the main military role in the Restoration as general in chief, it does not mean that he was in a situation of absolute superiority with respect to other commanders. Polanco did not have an undisputed ascendancy in the patriotic ranks as Santana had had during the wars with Haiti. This is explained because the nature of the restorative war prevented the production of an effective hierarchy of command. On each front, a leadership was created that acted independently of the group, establishing its own combat plans, its command and operations procedures and supply lines. The patriot troops lacked the compactness typical of modern armies. Rather, they acted as informal hosts, deployed on imprecise fronts, in accordance with precepts adopted by their leaders. Therefore, upon the suggestion of Vice President, Matías Ramón Mella,, guerrilla warfare constituted, for this purpose, the main war method of the patriots, the only resource to confront a much larger army, better trained and with incomparably superior weapons.
Considering these events, it is understandable that throughout the war several figures stood out who played transcendent roles on their respective fronts, to mention a few: Benito Monción and Pedro Antonio Pimentel in the northwest, Polanco himself in Puerto Plata, Luperón in the initial moments of invasion to the east and south, Eusebio Manzueta and Antonio Guzmán in the east and Pedro Florentino and José María Cabral in the south. José Antonio Salcedo, appointed president of the Republic on September 14, 1863, also stood out, who, despite lacking merit for such a position and having committed serious military errors, rose to the status of an intrepid warrior who was often in the front row at the critical fronts of operations. Other leaders shone in major actions, among them: José Cabrera, Federico de Jesús García, Juan Antonio Polanco, Santiago Rodríguez Masagó, Manuel Rodríguez Objío, Emilio Benito Martínez, Pedro Pablo Salcedo, Juan de Jesús Salcedo, Marcos Evangelista Adón and many others.
This concludes that, certainly, Polanco was the first sword, but more for the fact that he held the rank of general in chief than for his actions themselves, since leaders of other fronts performed functions of extraordinary weight. It was intransigent nationalism, as already mentioned, that allowed Polanco to be placed at the crest of the gallery of heroes who led the restoration feat. Thanks to that attitude, it was his responsibility to stop the advance of the positions of those in favor of an agreement with Spain or of bringing back Buenaventura Báez, both ideas outlined by President José Antonio Salcedo. It was his national, popular and democratic attitude that allowed the general in chief, in his capacity as president, to bring the actions to their climax, to the point that the Spanish leadership had to renounce continuing the operations and limited itself to concentrating the troops in six or seven fortified points on the coast.