Democratic centralism

Democratic centralism is a Leninist principle adopted by communist states and their ruling communist parties. It has also been adopted as the organizational principle of non-ruling communist parties, transmission belt organizations, and other units operating within communist state systems, as well as by some non-communist organizations. Democratic centralism combines structured participation and consultation within a unified system of organs, so that decisions are debated and adopted within designated organs and then implemented uniformly throughout the organization.
As a system, democratic centralism is associated with a unified, pyramid-like structure of organs, with a supreme organ at the apex and lower-level organs beneath it. Democratic centralism practices both vertical and horizontal accountability, and calls this dual subordination. Vertically, organs are accountable to their electors and are expected to report to and be supervised by higher-level organs. Decisions adopted at higher levels are binding on subordinate organs and members. Horizontal accountability entails that organs are accountable to the leading organ at their corresponding level. Democratic centralist systems typically rely on collective leadership, institutionalized cadre systems, and regulated consultation to formulate policy, while regulatory enforcement mechanisms, such as party-control organs, are tasked with safeguarding rules, party discipline, organizational unity, compliance with adopted decisions, and combatting corruption.
Democratic centralism is applied across multiple domains of governance, including party organization, state administration, mass organizations, and economic management. In communist states, the enactment of the leading role of the party principle confers on the communist party leadership in coordinating the unified state apparatus through cadre appointments, political guidance, and discipline, while formally locating unified state power in the system of state organs of power headed by the supreme state organ of power. It is also employed in economic planning, where central decisions, such as five-year plans and priority objectives, are formulated by higher organs and implemented downward through administrative and enterprise hierarchies, with lower levels contributing information and proposals within controlled channels. The balance between participation and command, democracy and centralism, has varied across parties, states, and historical periods, and has been a persistent subject of both official interpretation and scholarly critique.

Foundation

Historical origins

The concept of democratic centralism was conceived by Bolshevik leader Vladimir Lenin. Lenin argued that democratic centralism entailed the "dialectical unity" of democracy and centralism. Democratic centralism postulates that decisions must be made through free and open debate. Once the debate has reached a decision, it is binding on all participants, and everyone, even those opposing it, must implement it uniformly. It was first adopted as the organizational principle of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party at the Tampere conference of 1905. The resolution defined the term as follows: "Recognising that the principle of democratic centralism is beyond dispute, the conference regards it as essential to establish a broad electoral principle whilst allowing the elected central organs full power in ideological and practical leadership, together with their revocability and with the widest publicity and strictest accountability of their actions." However, the concept was never considered to be exclusive to the party alone. In 1913, Lenin called for implementing it in the state as well, "democratic centralism not only does not exclude local self-government, with autonomy of regions which are distinct in terms of special economic conditions and way of life, of a particular national make-up of the population, and so on, on the contrary, it insistently demands both the one and the other." The 10th Congress of the Russian Communist Party, held on 8–16 March 1921, reaffirmed democratic centralism by banning all factions within the Party. While the ban on faction was adopted as a temporary measure, it became a formal rule that, in some cases, outlawed the very notion of an opposition within party ranks.
The 2nd World Congress of the Communist International, an organization tasked with leading the international communist movement, in 1920, adopted the document, "Conditions of Admission to the Communist International". It stated that parties had to adopt democratic centralism as their organizational principle to be admitted into the Comintern: "Parties belonging to the Communist International must be structured according to the principle of democratic centralism. In the present epoch of sharpened civil war, a communist party can carry out its duty only if it is organised in the most centralised way, if iron discipline bordering on military discipline reigns in it, and if its party centre is a powerful, authoritative organ with the widest competences, and enjoys the general trust of the party." The emphasis was on the centralism in democratic centralism, with the Comintern stating it meant "iron discipline, bordering on military discipline". However, the same congress also defined "the main principle of democratic centralism" as "the higher cell being elected by the lower cell, the absolute binding force of all directions of a higher cell for a cell subordinate to it, and the existence of a commanding party centre undisputed for all leaders in party life."

Theoretical conception

The terms democracy and centralism in democratic centralism have a dialectical relationship in Marxist−Leninist thinking. Lenin originally conceived democratic centralism as the "universal and full freedom to criticise, so long as this does not disturb the unity of a definite action; it rules out all criticism which disrupts or makes difficult the unity of an action decided on by the Party." He also believed democratic centralism established guarantees for the rights of all minorities and loyal opposition factions within the Party. He argued that democratic centralism granted autonomy to every lower-level organ from higher organs. It also codified that all positions within the party were electable, accountable to the Party membership, and subject to recall. Such a system, proponents believe, will safeguard against party splits and ideological conflict while ensuring that intra-party conflicts can be resolved consistently with strict organizational unity.
Soviet scholars Nikolay Moiseenko and Mikhail Popov defined democracy, in its application to enterprise management, as "the all-round development of the initiative of the workers, their involvement in the administration of the state". However, they stressed that this democracy could only function within the institutional bounds of socialist property and a planned economy. Viktor Afanasyev, a long-standing member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and an editor-in-chief of Pravda, noted that the relationship between democracy and centralism changed in accordance with the situation and institution it was practiced in. For example, centralism is far greater than democracy in the Soviet armed forces, but in the administration of economic enterprises, more democracy is necessary. Western scholars and commentators commonly contend, according to historian Michael Waller, that centralism had predominated over democracy in the application of democratic centralism in communist states and in their ruling communist parties.
Democracy and freedom, according to Mao Zedong, are relative, rather than absolute, concepts, whose existence and development are fundamentally conditioned by specific historical circumstances. Democracy operates as a correlate to centralism, and freedom is correlative with discipline. These pairings represent dialectical opposites within a singular entity; they are simultaneously contradictory and united. Mao thus argued that neither element should be unilaterally emphasized to the exclusion of its counterpart. From a communist perspective, both freedom and discipline, as well as democracy and centralism, are considered essential for successful governance. The cohesive unity of these pairs—democracy with centralism, and freedom with discipline—constitutes the principle of democratic centralism.
Chinese political scientist Wang Guixiu contends that centralism in democratic centralism refers to the state apparatus, and that democracy in this sense serves to define and legitimize the state in question. This means that centralism represents a correct amount of centralization of state power; it must be qualified by democracy to be genuinely democratic centralism. Without democracy, Wang argues, centralization is nothing more than dictatorship. The essence of democratic centralism, from this perspective, is the fundamental focus on creating a centralized system based on democracy. Scholar Yang Guangbin summarizes this to mean that "democratic centralism is centralism in democracy, not centralism outside democracy. That is to say, the vitality of democratic centralism comes from democracy."

Systemic features

Unified system of organs

Democratic centralism entails establishing a pyramid-like structure with a single supreme organ at the top and lower-level organs beneath it. This structure must be organized on unified lines for democratic centralism to be practiced properly, and this applies to all entities, whether the communist party, the communist state, transmission belt organizations, or any other unit that practices democratic centralism. The unified power structure informs on the actual structure of the given entity, and the relationship between the organs. Democratic centralism turns the highest organs into superior organs and creates a system in which policies adopted by higher-level organs must be implemented downward by lower-level units. Popular sovereignty in democratic centralism means that the powers of the leaders of the state, party, and other entities come from the people or the members of the organization in question. The unified structure is the tool to translate this sovereignty undiluted vertically from bottom to top. Democratic centralism also informs on the power relationship in this structure, and the superiority of decisions made by superior organs.
The pyramid structure ensures a unified vertical chain of command from the bottom to the top, and from the top to the bottom. Horizontal contact between organs of the unified pyramid structure can occur, but is rare. While initiatives, feedback, and proposals can move from bottom to top, this seldom occurs in these structures. Instead, the centralization of power in a central organ is often legitimized at the expense of lower-level organs. However, to ensure sound central decision-making, these structures try to move information vertically. Each level of the pyramid is headed by a collective leadership headed by a single leader.
File:National Assembly of Vietnam.jpg|thumb|In the state, the unified system of state organs is headed by the supreme state organ of power. Depicted in this picture is the National Assembly Building of Vietnam, which is the seat of Vietnam's supreme state organ of power, the National Assembly of Vietnam.
In the state, democratic centralism relies on the unified power of the supreme state organ of power, which heads the unified state apparatus. The SSOP establishes inferior state organs and decides the division of labour between them, which is formalised in the communist state constitution. This system has its origins in the October Revolution, which established the world's first SSOP and, by extension, the world's first communist state, in the form of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. One of the first decrees instituted by the new communist state, titled "All Power to the Soviets", on 8 November 1917, conferred all state powers on the SSOP. Furthermore, since the SSOP held the unified powers of the state, it could only delegate its state powers to other state organs. Meaning that the powers held by the supreme executive and administrative organ or lower-level state organs of power are bequeathed to them by the SSOP.
The Soviet system was transmitted to the rest of the communist world. For example, when China adopted its 1954 constitution, Vice Chairman Liu Shaoqi told the 1st Session of the 1st National People's Congress, "We have centralized and unified the People's Congress thus demonstrating our democratic centralism." This system, he argued, would empower the Chinese people since it both allowed for popular participation in the state structure, while also creating an institutional structure capable of establishing a unity of political will. The 1954 Chinese constitution also proclaimed in its second article that the SSOP, lower-level state organs of power, and state organs subordinate to the state organs of power must implement democratic centralism. This article stressed vertical accountability, requiring lower-level state organs of power to report to and be supervised by higher ones.
By having superior and inferior organs, the communist state system of unified power actively constitutes a distinct model of political organization, contrasting with the liberal democratic principles of separation of powers of presidential systems and the fusion of power of parliamentary systems. It institutes a system of vertical and horizontal accountability called dual subordination, meaning that organs are accountable to their electors and to the organ next in line in the hierarchy above. It also entails that inferior organs are accountable to the leading organ at the corresponding level of governance. According to the state constitution, all organs that are created and accountable to the state organs of power, such as the executive and administrative organ, the judicial organ, and the procuratorial organ, are deemed inferior. The present-day constitution of China further clarifies democratic centralism by stipulating that the unified power of the SSOP and the lower-level state organs of power, and how inferior state organs of power are created, supervised, and accountable to them. It also clarified that local executive organs are accountable to higher ones, but has also codified a level of inbuilt autonomy: "of giving full play to local initiatives and enthusiasm under the unified leadership" of central organs. These stipulations are not uncommon in communist state law, and some states went further. The 1977 Soviet constitution defined state democratic centralism as follows:

All state officials can be recalled;
All lower-level state organs of power are subordinate to and must report to higher state organs of power;
All inferior organs are subordinate to the relevant state organ of power;
All decisions made by higher state organs of power were binding on the lower ones;
All decisions of the SSOP as the apex state organ of power, meaning it is the highest organ of the state, are binding on the state as a whole.

Marxism–Leninism was originally opposed to federalism in any form. Lenin argued that federalism and decentralisation hindered the development of capitalism since it required the utmost centralisation of the state as humanly possible. Since he believed it was in the self-interest of the proletariat to abolish capitalism, he also believed they actively sought to strengthen centralisation within the state. As such, Lenin considered centralisation a milestone in historical progress that moved society from the state formation conceived in the Middle Ages and accelerated the route to a socialist future. And the only way to reach socialism, Lenin believed, was through a centralised state structure. Critically, democratic centralism needed to ensure the maximisation of centralism. However, if federalism were ever to be adopted, Lenin reasoned that it could only be a means for the full realisation of democratic centralism. Despite Lenin's objection, the Russian SFSR and later the Soviet Union were established as federal states. The federal communist states were federations in which the federal organs could make binding decisions on their federalised subjects, and had extensive control over their territories. For example, the 1977 Soviet constitution stated that the Soviet Union was a socialist federal republic with a unified system of state organs of power that formulated and adopted policies grounded in the unity of the Soviet people.
The Yugoslav reconceptualisation of democratic centralism in their 1974 Yugoslav constitution reduced the scope of democratic centralism at the federal level to specific areas: the overall strategy for developing socialism, the development of the system of social relations, the protection of the communist state system, and national security. However, this democratic centralism, unlike in other communist states, would not be based on majority decision-making. Instead, the republics and the autonomous provinces were treated as equal subjects, and to practice the Yugoslav policy of equality between nations and nationalities, one had to gain consensus through negotiations. In other areas, the state replaced democratic centralism with the socialist self-management principles of self-management agreements, the principle of social negotiations in a society that defends the pluralism of self-managing interests, and the principle of income. Self-management agreements were considered free agreements between equal subjects. These agreements were reached through negotiations among different interests among working people and self-managing interests that directly confronted one another. The principle of income delineated the right to the results of labour and its distribution.
The communist party is structured similarly, and its leading organs are the party congress and the central committee it elects. Depending on statutory design, the congress is also empowered to elect a control commission, as in the case of Chinese Communist Party, an auditing commission, as was the case in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, a statutory organ, as was the case in the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, and the party leader, as is presently the case in the Workers' Party of Korea. The congress commonly convenes only once every fifth year, and the Central Committee leads the party when it's not in session. The Central Committee is organised into two lines: the political line, represented by the plenary session of the Central Committee, and the executive line is represented by the apparatus and is responsible for implementing the decisions of the party congress, the Central Committee's political line, and the central leading organs. Since the Central Committee's political line convenes infrequently for plenary sessions; in China, it typically meets no more than once a year. Therefore, at its first plenary session of a new electoral term, the Central Committee elects its central leading organs and the general secretary, the party leader. This system is mirrored at lower levels. The relationship between these organs is regulated by how democratic centralism is defined in the party statute. Most definitions of democratic centralism have been heavily influenced by the definition adopted by the 17th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party in 1934. The Soviet party definition, which remained unchanged for most of its existence, stated:

All organs, from the lowest to the highest level, are electable;
All organs report and are accountable by their respective party organisation;
All members are required to work under party discipline and abide by majority decisions;
All decisions made by the highest organs are binding on lower-level organs and members.

The party creates primary party organisations and party member groups within existing organisations, such as factories, schools, military units, and transmission belt organisations. In these cases, the activities of the party organisation only relate to the institution in which it is organised. Its members are drawn from that institution and only relate to that party organisation. The party organisation engages in intra-organisational communication, but it communicates only with party organisations at higher levels. It does not communicate horizontally with other party organisations at the same level, as that would breach democratic centralism. In larger primary party organisations, it will be divided into sub-units. These sub-units are also not commonly allowed to communicate horizontally with other units of the same organisation. These units elect delegates to delegate meetings that, in turn, elect a committee that runs the organisation.
Transmission belt mass organisations are also organised on the basis of democratic centralism. These organisations are tied directly to the party and state, but also create a unified pyramid structure on democratic centralist lines. For example, the charter of the Lao Federation of Trade Unions states, "lower levels must follow the higher levels. Every level of the LFTU must follow and execute according to the rules and regulations of the Central Committee level each level must report to and be responsible to its own level, towards higher levels and its constituents".