Cosmological argument


In the philosophy of religion, a cosmological argument is an argument for the existence of God based upon observational and factual statements concerning the universe typically in the context of causation, change, contingency or finitude. In referring to reason and observation alone for its premises, and precluding revelation, this category of argument falls within the domain of natural theology. A cosmological argument can also sometimes be referred to as an argument from universal causation, an argument from first cause, the causal argument or the prime mover argument.
The concept of causation is a principal underpinning idea in all cosmological arguments, particularly in affirming the necessity for a First Cause. The latter is typically determined in philosophical analysis to be God, as identified within classical conceptions of theism.
The origins of the argument date back to at least Aristotle, developed subsequently within the scholarly traditions of Neoplatonism and early Christianity, and later under medieval Islamic scholasticism through the 9th to 12th centuries. It would eventually be re-introduced to Christian theology in the 13th century by Thomas Aquinas. In the 18th century, it would become associated with the principle of sufficient reason formulated by Gottfried Leibniz and Samuel Clarke, itself an exposition of the Parmenidean causal principle that "nothing comes from nothing".
Contemporary defenders of cosmological arguments include William Lane Craig, Robert Koons, John Lennox, Stephen Meyer, and Alexander Pruss.

History

Classical philosophy

and Aristotle both posited first cause arguments, though each had certain notable caveats. In The Laws, Plato posited that all movement in the world and the Cosmos was "imparted motion". This required a "self-originated motion" to set it in motion and to maintain it. In Timaeus, Plato posited a "demiurge" of supreme wisdom and intelligence as the creator of the Cosmos.
Aristotle argued against the idea of a first cause, often confused with the idea of a "prime mover" or "unmoved mover", in his Physics and Metaphysics. Aristotle argued in favor of the idea of several unmoved movers, one powering each celestial sphere, which he believed lived beyond the sphere of the fixed stars, and explained why motion in the universe had continued for an infinite period of time. Aristotle argued that the atomists' assertion of a non-eternal universe would require an uncaused first causein his terminology, an efficient first causean idea he considered a nonsensical flaw in the atomists' reasoning.
Like Plato, Aristotle believed in an eternal cosmos with no beginning and no end. In what he called "first philosophy" or metaphysics, Aristotle did intend a theological correspondence between the prime mover and a deity; functionally, however, he provided an explanation for the apparent motion of the "fixed stars". According to his theses, immaterial unmoved movers are eternal unchangeable beings that constantly think about thinking, but being immaterial, they are incapable of interacting with the cosmos and have no knowledge of what transpires therein. From an "aspiration or desire", the celestial spheres, imitate that purely intellectual activity as best they can, by uniform circular motion. The unmoved movers inspiring the planetary spheres are no different in kind from the prime mover, they merely suffer a dependency of relation to the prime mover. Correspondingly, the motions of the planets are subordinate to the motion inspired by the prime mover in the sphere of fixed stars. Aristotle's natural theology admitted no creation or capriciousness from the immortal pantheon, but maintained a defense against dangerous charges of impiety.

Late antiquity to the Islamic Golden Age

, a third-century Platonist, taught that the One transcendent absolute caused the universe to exist simply as a consequence of its existence. His disciple Proclus stated, "The One is God". In the 6th century, Syriac Christian neo-Platonist John Philoponus examined the contradiction between Greek pagan adherences to the concept of a past-eternal world and Aristotelian rejection of the existence of actual infinities. Thereupon, he formulated arguments in defense of temporal finitism, which underpinned his arguments for the existence of God. Philosopher Steven M. Duncan notes that Philoponus's ideas eventually received their fullest articulation "at the hands of Muslim and Jewish exponents of kalam", or medieval Islamic scholasticism.
In the 11th century, Islamic philosopher Avicenna inquired into the question of being, in which he distinguished between essence and existence. He argued that the fact of existence could not be inferred from or accounted for by the essence of existing things, and that form and matter by themselves could not originate and interact with the movement of the universe or the progressive actualization of existing things. Thus, he reasoned that existence must be due to an agent cause that necessitates, imparts, gives, or adds existence to an essence. To do so, the cause must coexist with its effect and be an existing thing.

Medieval Christian theology

adapted and enhanced the argument he found in his reading of Aristotle, Avicenna and Maimonides to formulate one of the most influential versions of the cosmological argument. His conception of the first cause was the idea that the universe must be caused by something that is itself uncaused, which he claimed is 'that which we call God':
Importantly, Aquinas's Five Ways, given the second question of his Summa Theologica, are not the entirety of Aquinas's demonstration that the Christian God exists. The Five Ways form only the beginning of Aquinas's Treatise on the Divine Nature.

General principles

The infinite regress

A regress is a series of related elements, arranged in some type of sequence of succession, examined in backwards succession from a fixed point of reference. Depending on the type of regress, this retrograde examination may take the form of recursive analysis, in which the elements in a series are studied as products of prior, often simpler, elements. If there is no 'last member' in a regress it becomes an infinite regress, continuing in perpetuity. In the context of the cosmological argument the term 'regress' usually refers to causal regress, in which the series is a chain of cause and effect, with each element in the series arising from causal activity of the prior member. Some variants of the argument may also refer to temporal regress, wherein the elements are past events arranged in a temporal sequence.
An infinite regress argument attempts to establish the falsity of a proposition by showing that it entails an infinite regress that is vicious. The cosmological argument is a type of positive infinite regress argument given that it defends a proposition by arguing that its negation would lead to a vicious regress. An infinite regress may be vicious due to various reasons:
  • Impossibility: Thought experiments such as Hilbert's Hotel are cited to demonstrate the metaphysical impossibility of actual infinities existing in reality. Accordingly, it may be argued that an infinite causal or temporal regress cannot occur in the real world.
  • Implausibility: The regress contradicts empirical evidence or basic principles such as Occam's razor.
  • Explanatory failure: A failure of explanatory goals resulting in an infinite regress of explanations. This may arise in the case of logical fallacies such as begging the question or from an attempt to investigate causes concerning origins or fundamental principles.

    Accidental and essential ordering of causes

Aquinas refers to the distinction found in Aristotle's Physics that a series of causes may either be accidental or essential, though the designation of this terminology would follow later under John Duns Scotus at the turn of the 14th century.
In an accidentally ordered series of causes, earlier members need not continue exerting causal activity for the series to continue. For example, in a generational line, ancestors need no longer exist for their offspring to continue the sequence of descent. In an essential series, prior members must maintain causal interrelationship for the series to continue: If a hand grips a stick that moves a rock along the ground, the rock would stop motion once the hand or stick ceases to exist.
Based upon this distinction Frederick Copleston characterises two types of causation: Causes in fieri, which cause an effect's becoming, or coming into existence, and causes in esse, which causally sustain an effect, in being, once it exists.
Two specific properties of an essentially ordered series have significance in the context of the cosmological argument:
  • A first cause is essential: Later members exercise no independent causal power in continuing the series. In the example illustrated above, the rock derives its causal power essentially from the stick, which derives its causal power essentially from the hand.
  • All members in the causal series must exist simultaneously in time, or timelessly.
Thomistic philosopher, R. P. Phillips comments on the characteristics of essential ordering:

Versions of the argument

Aquinas's argument from contingency

In the scholastic era, Aquinas formulated the "argument from contingency", following Aristotle, in claiming that there must be something to explain the existence of the universe. Since the universe could, under different circumstances, conceivably not exist its existence must have a cause. This cause cannot be embodied in another contingent thing, but something that exists by necessity. It is a form of argument from universal causation, therefore compatible with the conception of a universe that has no beginning in time. In other words, according to Aquinas, even if the universe has always existed, it still owes its continuing existence to an uncaused cause, he states: "... and this we understand to be God."
Aquinas's argument from contingency is formulated as the Third Way in the Summa Theologica. It may be expressed as follows:
  1. There exist contingent things, for which non-existence is possible.
  2. It is impossible for contingent things to always exist, so at some time they did not exist.
  3. Therefore, if all things are contingent, then nothing would exist now.
  4. There exists something rather than nothing.
He concludes thereupon that contingent beings are an insufficient explanation for the existence of other contingent beings. Furthermore, that there must exist a necessary being, whose non-existence is impossible, to explain the origination of all contingent beings.
  1. Therefore, there exists a necessary being.
  2. It is possible that a necessary being has a cause of its necessity in another necessary being.
  3. The derivation of necessity between beings cannot regress to infinity.
  4. Therefore, there exists a being that is necessary of itself, from which all necessity derives.
  5. That being is whom everyone calls God.