Consociationalism
Consociationalism is a form of democratic power sharing. Political scientists define a consociational state as one which has major internal divisions along ethnic, religious, or linguistic lines, but which remains stable due to consultation among the elites of these groups. Consociational states are often contrasted with states with majoritarian electoral systems.
The goals of consociationalism are governmental stability, the survival of the power-sharing arrangements, the survival of democracy, and the avoidance of violence. When consociationalism is organised along religious confessional lines, as in Lebanon, it is known as confessionalism. Consociationalism is sometimes seen as analogous to corporatism, and some scholars consider consociationalism a form of corporatism. Others claim that economic corporatism was designed to regulate class conflict, while consociationalism developed on the basis of reconciling societal fragmentation along ethnic and religious lines.
Concurrent majority can be a precursor to consociationalism. A consociational democracy differs from consensus democracy, in that consociational democracy represents a consensus of representatives with minority veto, while consensus democracy requires consensus across the electorate. The idea has received significant criticism in its applicability to democratic political systems, especially with regard to power-sharing.
Origins
Consociation was first discussed in the 17th century New England Confederation. It described the interassociation and cooperation of the participant self-governing Congregational churches of the various colonial townships of the Massachusetts Bay Colony. These were empowered in the civil legislature and magistracy. It was debated at length in the Boston Synod of 1662. This was when the Episcopalian Act of Uniformity 1662 was being introduced in England. Consociationalism was originally discussed in academic terms by the political scientist Arend Lijphart. However, Lijphart has stated that he "merely discovered what political practitioners had repeatedly - and independently of both academic experts and one another - invented years earlier". Theoretically, consociationalism was inducted from Lijphart's observations of political accommodation in the Netherlands, after which Lijphart argued for a generalizable consociational approach to ethnic conflict regulation.The Netherlands, as a consociational state, was between 1857 and 1967 divided into four non-territorial pillars: Calvinist, Catholic, socialist, and general, although until 1917 there was a plurality electoral system rather than a proportional one. In their heyday, each comprised tightly organised groups, schools, universities, hospitals and newspapers, all divided along a Balkanised social structure. The theory, according to Lijphart, focuses on the role of social elites, their agreement and co-operation, as the key to a stable democracy. Based on this initial study of consociational democracy, John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary trace consociationalism back to 1917, when it was first employed in the Netherlands, while Gerhard Lehmbruch suggests "precursors" of consociationalism as early as the 1555 Peace of Augsburg.
State-building
While Lijphart's initial theory drew primarily from Western European democracies in its formulation of consociationalism, it has gained immense traction in post-conflict state-building contexts in the past decades. This development has been reflected in the expansion of the favourable conditions to external factors in the literature as well. Rather than internally constructed by state elites, these recent examples have been characterised by external facilitation, and at times imposition, through international actors. In the process, consociational arrangements have frequently been used to transform immediate violent conflict and solidify peace settlements in extremely fragile contexts of deeply divided societies.The volatile environments in which these recent examples have been implemented have exhibited the need for external interference not only for their initial implementation but also for their continued existence. As such, a range of international actors have assumed mediating and supporting roles to preserve power-sharing agreements in targeted states. Most prominently in Bosnia-Herzegovina, this has involved an "international regulating body" in the form of a High Representative who in one period frequently intervened in the domestic political affairs of the state to implement legislation on which domestic elites were reluctant to come to an agreement.
While the current results of consociational arrangements implemented in post-conflict state-building endeavours have been mixed, scholars such as O'Leary and McGarry maintain that they have often proven to be the most practical approach to ending immediate conflict and creating the necessary stability for peace-building to take place. Its utility has been seen in its transformative aspect, flexibility, and "realist" approach to existing identity formations that are difficult to incorporate in a majoritarian system.
Characteristics
Lijphart identifies four key characteristics of consociational democracies:| Name | Explanation |
| Grand coalition | Elites of each pillar come together to rule in the interests of society because they recognize the dangers of non-cooperation. |
| Mutual veto | Consensus among the groups is required to confirm the majority rule. Mutuality means that the minority is unlikely to successfully block the majority. If one group blocks another on some matter, the latter are likely to block the former in return. |
| Proportionality | Representation is based on population. If one pillar accounts for 30% of the overall society, then they occupy 30% of the positions on the police force, in civil service, and in other national and civic segments of society. |
| Segmental autonomy | Creates a sense of individuality and allows for different culturally-based community laws. |
Consociational policies often have these characteristics:
- Coalition cabinets, where executive power is shared between parties, not concentrated in one. Many of these cabinets are oversized, meaning they include parties not necessary for a parliamentary majority;
- Balance of power between executive and legislative;
- Decentralized and federal government, where minorities have considerable independence;
- Incongruent bicameralism, where it is very difficult for one party to gain a majority in both houses. Normally one chamber represents regional interests and the other national interests;
- Proportional representation, to allow minorities to gain representation too;
- Organized and corporatist interest groups, which represent minorities;
- A rigid constitution, which prevents government from changing the constitution without consent of minorities;
- Judicial review, which allows minorities to go to the courts to seek redress against laws that they see as unjust;
- Elements of direct democracy, which allow minorities to enact or prevent legislation;
- Proportional employment in the public sector;
- A neutral head of state, either a monarch with only ceremonial duties, or an indirectly elected president, who gives up his or her party affiliation after being elected;
- Referendums are only used to allow minorities to block legislation: this means that they must be a citizen's initiative and that there is no compulsory voting.
- Equality between ministers in cabinet, the prime minister is only primus inter pares;
- An independent central bank, where experts and not politicians set out monetary policies.
Favourable conditions
- Segmental isolation of ethnic communities
- A multiple balance of power
- The presence of external threats common to all communities
- Overarching loyalties to the state
- A tradition of elite accommodation
- Socioeconomic equality
- A small population size, reducing the policy load
- A moderate multi-party system with segmental parties