Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, was a United States Supreme Court decision regarding school prayer. It was the first major school prayer case decided by the Rehnquist Court. It held that schools may not sponsor clerics to conduct even non-denominational prayer. The Court followed a broad interpretation of the Establishment Clause that had been standard for decades at the nation's highest court, a reaffirmation of the principles of such landmark cases as Engel v. Vitale and Abington v. Schempp.
Background
Robert E. Lee was the principal of Nathan Bishop Middle School in Providence, Rhode Island. He invited a rabbi to deliver a prayer at the 1989 graduation ceremony, but the parents of student Deborah Weisman requested a temporary injunction to bar the rabbi from speaking. The question being reviewed was whether or not this was constitutional. The Rhode Island district court denied the Weismans' motion. The family did attend the graduation ceremony, and the rabbi did deliver the benediction. The Weismans continued their litigation after the graduation and won a victory at the First Circuit Court of Appeals. The school district appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, arguing that the prayer was nonsectarian and was doubly voluntary: Deborah was free not to stand for the prayer and because participation in the ceremony itself was not required. Arguments were heard on November 6, 1991. JusticeAnthony Kennedy had been critical of the Court's decisions on school prayer, and many court watchers thought that he would provide the crucial fifth vote to reverse the lower court's ruling and deal a major blow to the twin separationist pillars of Engel and Abington.'''
Decision
The 5–4 decision was announced on June 24, 1992. It was somewhat surprising as a victory for the Weismans and a defeat for the school district. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion, which maintained previous Supreme Court precedents sharply limiting the place of religion within the nation's public schools—far from joining those who favored curtailing restrictions on school prayers. The Blackmun papers reveal that Kennedy switched his vote during the deliberations, as he also did in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, saying that his draft majority opinion upholding the prayer exercise "looked quite wrong." Instead, Kennedy wrote an opinion that repudiated the school district's main arguments. He found fault with Principal Lee's decision to give the rabbi who was planning to offer the graduation invocation a pamphlet on composing prayers for civic occasions: Kennedy also noted that the nonsectarian nature of the prayer was no defense, as the Establishment Clause forbade coerced prayers in public schools, not just those representing a specific religious tradition. He addressed the State's contention that attendance was voluntary at the graduation exercises: Finally, Kennedy formulated what is now known as the coercion test in answering the argument that participation in the prayer was voluntary:
Concurring opinions
Justice Blackmun's concurrence stressed that "our decisions have gone beyond prohibiting coercion, however, because the Court has recognized that 'the fullest possible scope of religious liberty,' entails more than freedom from coercion." Blackmun emphasized that the government was without power to place its imprimatur on any religious activity, even if no one was compelled to participate in a state-sponsored religious exercise, directly or indirectly. Justice Souter devoted his concurring opinion to a historical analysis, rebutting the contention that the government could endorse nonsectarian prayers. He cited the writings of James Madison and pointed to the changing versions of the First Amendment that the First Congress considered, as opposed to the version which was eventually adopted. Souter, too, took issue with the school district's defense of non-coercive religious exercises, dismissing the position as without precedential authority.
Dissenting opinion
Justice Scalia's dissent argued against the coercion test: Scalia pointed to several historical examples of calling on divine guidance by American Presidents, including Washington's proclamation of the Thanksgiving holiday in 1789 and the inaugural addresses of both Madison and Thomas Jefferson. He disputed the Court's contention that attendance at high schoolgraduation ceremonies was effectively required as part of social norms, and also the conclusion that students were subtly coerced to stand for the rabbi's invocation. In Scalia's view, only official penalties for refusing to support or adhere to a particular religion created an Establishment Clause violation.
Subsequent developments
The coercion test is now used to determine the constitutionality of certain government actions under the Establishment Clause, along with the Lemon test and Justice O'Connor's "endorsement or disapproval" test. The test "seeks to determine whether the state has applied coercive pressure on an individual to support or participate in religion." A broad reading of the Establishment Clause won out, but it seems to have its greatest current application in a public school context. The Court has ruled against the separationist position in several key funding cases since Lee, including the school voucher case Zelman v. Simmons-Harris. However, a majority of the Court continues to maintain a strict ban on most forms of state-sponsored religious exercises in schools themselves, as evidenced by the 6–3 ruling in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, which struck down student-led prayers before public school football games.
