Administrative policies of Ali
Administrative policies of Ali ibn Abi Talib highlights the policies of Ali, the son-in-law and cousin of the Islamic prophet Muhammad. Ali is recognized as the first Shia imam and the fourth Rashidun caliph. He was acclaimed as the caliph in 656 CE after the assassination of his predecessor Uthman, who was killed by Egyptian rebels amidst widespread accusations of nepotism, injustice, and corruption. Ali undertook radical changes upon accession and his strictly egalitarian policies garnered him the support of underprivileged groups while alienating the powerful Quraysh tribe, some of whom revolted against Ali under the pretext of revenge for Uthman in the Battle of the Camel and the protracted Battle of Siffin. The latter fight ended in arbitration and led to the creation of the Kharijites, a member of whom is thought to be responsible for the assassination of Ali in 661. For some, the brief caliphate of Ali was characterized by his honesty, his unbending devotion to Islam, his equal treatment of the supporters, and his magnanimity towards his defeated enemies, while others criticize his policies for idealism and lack of political expediency.
File:Mohammad adil rais-Rashidun Caliphate-different phases.gif|thumb|right|300px|Territories of the Rashidun empire under the four caliphs. The divided phase corresponds to the caliphate of Ali.
Justice
The Islamicist Laura Veccia Vaglieri describes Ali as deeply devoted to the cause of Islam, and her view is echoed by some others. The brief caliphate of Ali was thus characterized by his strict justice, as suggested by some authors, including Reza Shah-Kazemi, Wilferd Madelung, Moojan Momen, Mahmoud M. Ayoub, John Esposito, and Hassan Abbas, among others. In his inaugural speech, Ali rebuked Muslims for straying from the straight path after Muhammad, and stressed the need to bring forth the virtuous and send back the unworthy. He also promised there to repossess the public lands gifted by Uthman during his caliphate.Intent on restoring his vision of the prophetic governance, Ali thus undertook radical policies during his caliphate, which the Shia scholar Muhammad H. Tabatabai describes as "revolutionary." The caliph immediately dismissed nearly all the governors who had served Uthman, explaining that the likes of those men should not be appointed to any office. He replaced them with men whom he considered pious, largely from the Ansar and the Banu Hashim. Ali also distributed the treasury funds equally among Muslims, apparently following the practice of Muhammad. He is said to have shown zero tolerance for corruption, as apparent from his instructions for his commander Malik al-Ashtar, and also from his letters of admonition to his official Ziyad ibn Abihi, and his cousin Ibn Abbas.
Modern views
It was perhaps these radical policies of Ali which compelled the disgruntled to revolt under the pretext of revenge for Uthman, notable among them Mu'awiya, the former governor of Syria under Uthman. Veccia Vaglieri thus criticizes Ali for his "excessive rigorism," adding that he lacked political flexibility. Madelung similarly views the above policies of Ali as an indication of his political naivety and his unwillingness to compromise his principles for political expediency. Mahmoud M. Ayoub says that Ali was not politically naive but idealistic, adding that the uncompromising uprightness of Ali and his strictly egalitarian policies alienated the Arabs and the powerful Quraysh tribe, in particular. Both authors, however, concede that these qualities of Ali also turned him into a paragon of Islamic virtues for his followers. In his defense, Tabatabai and Ayoub propound that Ali ruled with righteousness rather than political expediency.Yet Ayoub also suggests that political flexibility was a quality of Muhammad, though this is rejected by Tabatabai, who asserts that Islam never allows for compromising on a just cause, quoting verse 68:9, "They wish that thou might compromise and that they might compromise." To support his view, Tabatabai notes that Muhammad repeatedly rejected calls for peace from his enemies in return for leaving their gods alone. In this vein, Shah-Kazemi writes that Muhammad indeed appointed some of his erstwhile enemies to leadership positions, but only to give them an opportunity to redeem themselves after accepting Islam, without compromising his principles. In contrast, confirming those whom Ali dismissed would have been tantamount to overlooking their corruption and undermining the moral basis of his caliphate. Alternatively, Ali Bahramian proposes that replacing the governors was the only available course of action for Ali, both on principle and in practice. He writes that injustice was the main grievance of the provincial rebels and they would have turned against Ali had he confirmed Uthman's governors. This is echoed by Shah-Kazemi, who adds that the equal distribution of the state wealth by Ali was a necessary change to address the inevitable societal impacts of the gross inequalities created under Umar and Uthman.
Religious authority
Ali viewed himself not only as the temporal leader of the Muslim community but also as its exclusive religious authority. This is evident in his inaugural speech as the caliph, writes Madelung, while the historian Hugh N. Kennedy adds that Ali saw the ruler as a charismatic figure who guides the Islamic community. Ali thus laid claim to the religious authority to interpret the Quran and Sunnah, and particularly the esoteric message of the script. He is reported by al-Tabari to have said, "We fought against them on the exoteric content of the revelation and today we are fighting them for its esoteric message." This claim of Ali distinguished him from his predecessors who have been viewed as merely the administrators of the divine law.In return, some supporters of Ali indeed held him as their divinely-guided leader who demanded the same type of loyalty that Muhammad did. These felt an absolute and all-encompassing bond of spiritual loyalty to Ali that transcended politics. The existence of this group is evidenced by Sunni and Shia reports from the Battle of Siffin and some literary works dating to the First Fitna. Indeed, when the Kharijites broke with Ali after this battle, some forty-thousand of his supporters offered him a second and pledged to be friends to the friends of Ali and enemies to his enemies. The ranks of these devoted supporters likely included the Ansar and the tribes from southern Arabia. These supporters may have justified their absolute loyalty to Ali on the basis of his merits, precedent in Islam, his kinship with Muhammad, and also the announcement by the latter at the Ghadir Khumm shortly before his death in 632. It is also probable that many of these supporters viewed Ali as the legatee of Muhammad and thus his rightful successor after his death, as evidenced in the poetry from the period. The word also appears in Malik's address at the inauguration of Ali in Tarikh al-Ya'qubi. There is, however, a report by the Sunni historian al-Tabari that links the notion of Ali as the of Muhammad to the legendary figure of Abd-Allah ibn Saba. In turn, such a link is rejected by the Islamicist Maria M. Dakake, who believes that the term was widely used among the supporters of Ali by the time of the Battle of Siffin. Her view is close to that offered by Husain M. Jafri, another expert. At the same time, the Shia representation of Abu Bakr and Umar as usurpers of Ali's rights is absent in the historical discourse from that period.
Fiscal policies
Ali opposed centralized control over provincial revenues. He also equally distributed the taxes and booty amongst Muslims, following the precedent of Muhammad. Ayoub and Jafri write that Ali distributed the content of the treasury of Kufa every Friday. This practice may indicate the egalitarian views of Ali, who thus attempted to unravel the social order established under his predecessors: Umar distributed the state revenues according to perceived Islamic merit and precedence, which nevertheless led to class differences in the Islamic community, placing the Quraysh above the rest of Arabs, and Arabs above non-Arabs. Umar apparently later came to regret this system, which replaced the Quranic principle of equality among the faithful. In turn, Uthman was widely accused of nepotism and corruption. During his caliphate, the tribal elites returned to power at the cost of the early Muslims.The departure of Ali from the status quo on the distribution of revenues particularly appealed to the late immigrants to Iraq, among whom were the non-Arab converts in Kufa, for whom Ali championed a universalist vision of Islam which offered them equal rights. More generally, the egalitarian policies of Ali earned him the support of nearly all underprivileged groups, including the Ansar, who were sidelined after Muhammad by the Qurayshite leadership, and the , who sought pious Islamic leadership. This latter group of early Muslims were interested in restoring the social order of Umar and saw Ali as their best hope for achieving that. In contrast, Talha and Zubayr were both Qurayshite companions of Muhammad who had amassed immense wealth under Uthman. They both revolted against Ali after the caliph refused to grant them favors. Some other figures among the Quraysh also turned against Ali for the same reason, write Ayoub and John McHugo. Ali is said to have even rejected a request by his brother Aqil for public funds, whereas Mu'awiya readily offered all of them bribes. By comparison, Ali continued to pay the Kharijites their shares from the treasury after they rose against him. Regarding taxation, Ali instructed his officials to collect payments on a voluntary basis and without harassment, and to prioritize the poor when distributing the funds. Ali was concerned with agriculture, suggests Ann Lambton, and instructed Malik al-Ashtar in a letter to pay more attention to land development than short-term taxation.