Third Anglo-Afghan War
The Third Anglo-Afghan War, also known as the Third Afghan War, the British-Afghan War of 1919, and in Afghanistan as the War of Liberation, was a short war which began on 3 May and ended on 8 August 1919. The new Emir of the Emirate of Afghanistan Amanullah Khan declared the holy war of Jihad against the British in the hope to proclaim full independence, as well as to strengthen his own legitimacy. Amanullah's forces invaded British India on three fronts taking advantage of the unrest in India, in an effort to seize the old Afghan provinces west of the River Indus.
Initial victories saw the Afghans invade across the border, defeating the British and occupying Bagh. The British retaliated, leading a counterattack that routed the Afghans. Conflict continued in Kurram, which saw the British overwhelmed. Taking their own initiative, the British seized Spin Boldak in the south, while an Afghan offensive in Thal was contained, with the British occupying Dacca in turn by the end of May. The Royal Air Force were also used in bombing and strafing attacks on the frontier tribes as well as targets within Afghanistan, including Kabul and Jalalabad. Although small in scale, it was a contributing force for Amanullah to call for an armistice in June.
The Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1919 was signed on 8 August which resulted in the Afghans re-gaining dejure control of foreign affairs from Britain, and the Afghans recognizing the Durand Line as the international border between India and Afghanistan. The conflict however, incited numerous uprisings in Waziristan that lasted until the end of the British Raj.
Background
The root cause of the Third Anglo-Afghan War took hold long before fighting commenced. For the British in India, Afghanistan was seen as a threat. The British worried about Russian intentions, concerned that an invasion of India could be launched by Tsarist forces through Afghanistan. This period became known as the Great Game. In an effort to negate this threat, the British made numerous attempts at imposing their will upon Kabul, and over the course of the 19th century fought two wars: the First Anglo-Afghan War and the Second Anglo-Afghan War.The end of the Second Afghan War in 1880, marked the beginning of almost 40 years of good relations between Britain and Afghanistan, under the leadership of Abdur Rahman Khan and Habibullah Khan, during which time the British attempted to manage Afghan foreign policy through the payment of a large subsidy. While the country ostensibly remained independent, under the Treaty of Gandamak it accepted that in external matters it would "...have no windows looking on the outside world, except towards India". Though in reality, this was not enforced, and Afghanistan continued diplomatic interactions with other nations outside of British approval.
In 1901, the death of Emir Abdur Rahman Khan led indirectly to the war that began 18 years later. His successor, Habibullah, was a pragmatic leader who sided with Britain or Russia depending on Afghan interests. Despite considerable resentment over not being consulted on the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, Afghanistan remained neutral during the First World War, resisting increasing pressure from the Ottoman Empire, which entered the conflict on the side of the Central Powers; the Ottoman sultan called for a holy war against the Allies.
Despite remaining neutral in the conflict, Habibullah did in fact accept a Turkish-German mission in Kabul and military assistance from the Central Powers as he attempted to play both sides of the conflict for the best deal. Through continual prevarication, he resisted numerous requests for assistance from the Central Powers, but failed to keep in check troublesome tribal leaders, intent on undermining British rule in India, as Turkish agents attempted to foment trouble along the frontier. The British had long seen Afghanistan as the only capable state of invading India, which remained a serious threat. The departure of a large part of the British Indian Army to fight overseas and news of British defeats at the hands of the Ottomans aided Ottoman agents in their efforts at sedition, and in 1915 there was unrest amongst the Mohmands and then the Mahsuds. Notwithstanding these outbreaks, the frontier generally remained settled at a time when Britain could ill afford trouble.
The Turko-German mission left Kabul in 1916. By that time, however, it had successfully convinced Habibullah that Afghanistan was an independent nation and that it should be beholden to no one. With the end of the First World War, Habibullah sought to obtain rewards from the British government for his assistance during the war. Looking for British recognition of Afghanistan's independence in foreign affairs, he demanded a seat at the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919. This request was denied by the viceroy, Frederic Thesiger, 1st Viscount Chelmsford, on the grounds that attendance at the conference was confined to the belligerents. Further negotiations were scheduled, but before they could begin Habibullah was assassinated on 19 February 1919.
This resulted in a power struggle as Habibullah's brother Nasrullah Khan proclaimed himself as Habibullah's successor, while in Kabul, Amanullah, Habibullah's third son, had also proclaimed himself amir. The Afghan army suspected Amanullah's complicity in the death of his father. Needing a way of cementing his power, upon seizing the throne in April 1919, Amanullah posed as a supporter of democratic ideals, promising governmental reforms. He stated that there should be no forced labour, tyranny, or oppression, and that Afghanistan should be free and independent and no longer bound by the Treaty of Gandamak.
Amanullah had his uncle Nasrullah arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment for Habibullah's murder. Nasrullah had been the leader of a more conservative element in Afghanistan, and his treatment rendered Amanullah's position as Amir somewhat tenuous. By April 1919, Amanullah realised that if he could not find a way to placate the conservatives, he would be unlikely to maintain his hold on power. Looking for a diversion from the internal strife in the Afghan court and sensing advantage in the rising civil unrest in India following the Amritsar massacre, Amanullah decided to invade British India. Lee states that Afghan historians typically represent the Third Anglo-Afghan War as a war of independence, while in reality, it was a Jihad. Upon his accession, Amanullah had already declared Afghanistan independent, and the British were incapable of stopping it. Additionally, Mahmud Tarzi, Amanullah's father-in-law, was appointed foreign minister in provocation to the British prohibition that barred Afghanistan from establishing direct relations with foreign states. Recent research suggests that Amanullah launched the war to safeguard Afghanistan's independence after it was unofficially "secured" following World War I.
Afghan forces
In 1919, the Afghan regular army was not a very formidable force, and was only able to muster some 50,000 men. These men were organised into 21 cavalry regiments and 75 infantry battalions, with about 280 modern artillery pieces, organised into 70 batteries, in support. In addition to this, however, in a boost to the army's strength, the Afghan command could call upon the loyalty of up to 80,000 frontier tribesmen and an indeterminate number of deserters from local militia units under British command. In reality, the Afghan regular army was not ready for war. As in past years, the upper levels of the officer corps were riddled with political intrigue. In his book on the campaign, Lieutenant-General George Molesworth gave the following evaluation of the Amir's army:
Afghan regular units...were ill-trained, ill-paid, and probably under strength. The cavalry was little better than indifferent infantry mounted on equally indifferent ponies. Rifles varied between modern German, Turkish and British types, to obsolete Martinis and Snyders. Few infantry units had bayonets. Artillery was ponydrawn, or pack, and included modern 10 cm Krupp howitzers, 75 mm Krupp mountain guns and ancient 7 pounder weapons. There were a few, very old, four-barrel Gardiner machine guns. Ammunition was in short supply and distribution must have been very difficult. For the artillery much black powder was used, both as a propellent and bursting charge for shells. The Kabul arsenal workshops were elementary and mainly staffed by Sikh artificers with much ingenuity but little real skill. There was no organised transport and arrangements for supply were rudimentary.
In support of the regulars, the Afghan command expected to call out the tribes, which could gather up to 20,000 or 30,000 Afridi fighters in the Khyber region alone. In stark contrast to the regulars, the tribal lashkars were probably the best troops that the Afghans had, being of excellent fighting quality, well armed, mainly with weapons that they had made themselves or stolen from the garrisons and with plenty of ammunition.
British and Indian forces
In meeting this threat, the British could call on a much larger force. In May 1919, the British and British Indian Army, not including frontier militia, totalled eight divisions, as well as five independent brigades of infantry and three of cavalry. However, of this force, the entire North-West Frontier Province had three infantry divisions and two cavalry brigades, although there was also GHQ India's central reserve of one infantry division and one cavalry brigade. From this, they formed a striking force of two infantry divisions and two cavalry brigades for offensive operations on the Kyber front with the possibility of using it also in the Tochi and Kurram areas. One infantry division and a so-called "mounted" brigade were also detailed for operations on the Baluchistan–Zhob front. There were also three frontier brigades as well as a number of frontier militia and irregular corps.Artillery was also in short supply, and the three frontier divisions each had a British field artillery brigade of the Royal Field Artillery with two batteries of 18-pounders and one battery of 4.5-inch howitzers, and an Indian mountain brigade with two batteries of 2.75-inch mountain guns. There were also two batteries of tractor-drawn 6-inch howitzers and two British mountain batteries of the Royal Garrison Artillery, which were reinforced with 3.7-inch mountain howitzers. However, most batteries had only four guns. Finally, there were also 15-pounder guns of the Frontier Garrison Artillery.
File:Handley Page V1500.jpg|thumb|300px|right|A Royal Air Force Handley Page Type O bomber, with its wings folded back
Machine guns, at least on the Khyber front, were old.303 Maxims. The British gained a command and control advantage with their use of motor transport and wireless communications, while armored cars and RAF detachments increased their firepower and reach, the latter being demonstrated to the Afghans by a bombing raid on Kabul itself. They could also direct the fire of the 60-pounders. The RAF squadrons involved were No. 31 Squadron and No. 114 Squadron.
The main problem for the British was discontent among their soldiers. The troops in India were no longer as uncritical as they had been when considering what they were being asked to do. Like other units of the British Army, many of the troops considered the war over and looked forward to being demobilised. The Indian Army had been heavily committed to the First World War and had suffered a large number of casualties. Many of its units still had not returned from overseas, and those that had had begun the process of demobilisation. As such, many regiments had lost almost all of their most experienced men. Likewise, the British Army in India had been gutted. Prior to 1914 there had been 61 British regiments serving in India. However, of these, all but ten had been withdrawn in order to fight in Europe or the Middle East. In their place, units of the Territorial Force, part-time soldiers usually only intended for home defence but who had volunteered for overseas service, had been sent in order to release regular units for the fighting in France. After four years of mundane garrison duty, away from their families and disaffected, most of these men were really only interested in demobilisation and returning to Britain to get on with their lives. They were in no way prepared for a hard-fought campaign on the Indian frontier.