Anti-corruption campaign under Xi Jinping
A far-reaching anti-corruption campaign was launched in China following the conclusion of the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 2012. Initiated by CCP general secretary Xi Jinping, the campaign became the most extensive and systematic anti-corruption effort in the history of CCP governance. The campaign began with the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection conducting investigations into numerous high-ranking CCP and government officials, as well as People's Liberation Army generals and heads of state-owned enterprises and institutions, for violations of discipline and law. Nationwide, disciplinary inspection and supervision departments at all levels of the CCP and government have investigated and punished CCP members and senior officials for violations of discipline and law.
Upon assuming office, Xi Jinping pledged to crack down on both "tigers and flies", referring respectively to high-ranking officials and grassroots civil servants. Most of the officials investigated were dismissed from office and faced charges of bribery and abuse of power, though the severity and nature of the alleged misconduct varied considerably. Administered primarily by the CCDI its Secretary from 2012 to 2017, Wang Qishan, alongside the relevant military and judicial bodies, the campaign has targeted hundreds of senior officials, including dozens of ministerial-level official and senior PLA officers, hundreds of deputy ministerial-level officials, several executives of state-owned enterprises, and five national leaders.
The campaign notably investigated both sitting and former national-level leaders. These included former Politburo Standing Committee member Zhou Yongkang and former Politburo members and Central Military Commission vice chairmen Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong. The campaign also targeted sitting Politburo members such as Chongqing Party secretary Sun Zhengcai in 2017, and CMC vice chairmen He Weidong and Zhang Youxia in 2025 and 2026 respectively. As of 2023, approximately 2.3 million government officials had been prosecuted. The campaign formed a central component of a broader initiative aimed at curbing corruption within the CCP and reinforcing internal unity. It has since become one of the defining features of Xi's political legacy.
Campaign oversight
The agency directly charged with overseeing the campaign is the CCDI, which, at the time of the campaign, was headed by Secretary Wang Qishan, a politician known for his work in the financial sector and one of the seven members of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee. Wang was in charge of the day-to-day execution of the campaign. The CCDI's official mandate is to enforce party discipline, combat malfeasance, and punish party members for committing offenses. The CCDI is an internal agency of the party and therefore does not have judicial authority. In general, the CCDI investigates officials and, when necessary, forwards evidence gathered to judicial organs, such as the Supreme People's Procuratorate, which proceeds to charge the accused with criminal wrongdoing and move the case to trial.While the CCDI formally reports into the Party Congress, nominally the highest representative body of the party which gathers once every five years, and is intended to be an 'independent' agency from a constitutional standpoint, in practice ultimate oversight of the agency falls under the purview of Xi Jinping by virtue of holding the office of General Secretary. Xi, who also directs anti-graft efforts of the military through his holding the office of Chairman of the Central Military Commission. The majority of reporting on the campaign by media sources has highlighted Xi Jinping's direct involvement in managing the campaign, which has become a central hallmark of his term in office. However, formal disciplinary measures meted out to high-ranking officials, such as former Politburo members, must undergo ratification by the sitting Politburo.
The power of anti-corruption is centralized in the CCP Politburo Standing Committee by undermining the original functions of the local Discipline Inspection Commissions. Coordination of anti-corruption efforts in the provinces and state-owned enterprises has been carried out by "central inspection teams", which reports to the Central Leading Group for Inspection Work, which, like the CCDI, was also led by Wang Qishan. The inspection teams are typically 'stationed' for a few months at the organization they were tasked with overseeing, and are in charge of thorough audits into the conduct of officials and organizational practices. The inspection teams send the results of the audits to the CCDI to enact formal investigative procedures such as Shuanggui.
The proposed constitutional changes published on February 25 envision the creation of a new anti-graft state agency that merges the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and various anti-corruption government departments. The thus formed National Supervisory Commission will be the highest supervisory body in the country, and will be a cabinet-level organization outranking courts and the office of the prosecutor.
Chronology
Background
Anti-corruption efforts have been on the agenda of successive Chinese leaders, though the effectiveness of these campaigns has varied. Since economic reforms began in 1978, political corruption in China has grown significantly. The types of offenses vary, though usually they involve trading bribes for political favours, such as local businesses trying to secure large government contracts or subordinates seeking promotions for higher office.At the 18th Party Congress, both outgoing General Secretary Hu Jintao and incoming party leader Xi Jinping repeatedly emphasized that corruption is a threat to the party's survival. Xi made special mention of corruption in his inaugural speech as General Secretary on 15 November 2012. In his first days in office, Xi vowed to crack down on "tigers and flies", that is, high-ranking officials and petty civil servants alike. He also warned his colleagues on the Politburo that corruption would "doom the party and state."
First regional inspections
The first salvos of the campaign were the abrupt sacking of Sichuan Deputy Party Secretary Li Chuncheng, which took place in December 2012, shortly after Xi took office as leader of the CCP. The first batch of central inspection teams was dispatched in the third quarter of 2013 to various Chinese provinces, including Jiangxi, Inner Mongolia, Chongqing, and Hubei. A handful of provincial-level officials were investigated for corruption and removed from office as a result of the first round of inspection work. Of these regions, the inspection team in charge of Jiangxi uncovered far-reaching official corruption in the province, bringing down about a dozen officials, including Lieutenant Governor Yao Mugen. The inspection work in Hubei province also resulted in about a dozen cases, including that of Lieutenant Governor Guo Youming. In Inner Mongolia, head of the party's regional United Front department Wang Suyi was detained.'Encircling' Zhou Yongkang
Meanwhile, in the latter half of 2013, a separate operation began to investigate officials with connections to Zhou Yongkang, former Politburo Standing Committee member and national security chief. Three sectors in which Zhou was known to carry immense influence were targeted for investigation, including the national oil sector, Sichuan province, and security organs. Senior officials, such as former China Petroleum chief executive Jiang Jiemin, senior Sichuan officials Li Chongxi and Guo Yongxiang, and former deputy minister of public security Li Dongsheng, were all dismissed in 2013. Many of Zhou's former secretaries who later received promotions, including Ji Wenlin, Tan Li, Shen Dingcheng, and Li Hualin, were also rounded up for investigation.The fall of Jiang Jiemin – who were seen as a close confidant of Zhou Yongkang and who also held membership on the elite Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party – in September 2013 was seen as an unmistakable sign that the net was closing in on Zhou himself. On 15 December 2013, The New York Times, in a front-page article, confirmed that Zhou Yongkang was the ultimate target of the campaign, and that it would be only a matter of time before the investigation was made public. On 30 January 2014, Caixin, a Chinese website known for its investigative journalism, released a video and an accompanying article entitled "The Three 'White Gloves' of Zhou Bin", detailing allegations about the wrongdoing of Zhou Yongkang's son, without mentioning the senior Zhou directly as a means to skirt censorship rules. Zhou's targeting broke the long-standing convention of "PSC criminal immunity" that had persisted since the end of the Cultural Revolution.
Second regional rounds and Shanxi "political earthquake"
In November 2013, a second round of inspection teams was dispatched. These teams were sent to the provinces of Shanxi, Jilin, Yunnan, Anhui, Hunan and Guangdong, as well as the Xinhua News Agency, the Ministry of Commerce, and the state-owned company overseeing the construction of the Three Gorges Dam. In Guangdong, the inspections resulted in the abrupt downfall of the populist party chief of the provincial capital, Guangzhou, Wan Qingliang. In Yunnan, former provincial party chief Bai Enpei and Vice Governor Shen Peiping were implicated in corruption and detained.In Shanxi, a coal-producing province in central China, the stationed inspection team picked up on a corruption labyrinth that seeped into almost all aspects of governance in the province, particularly the collusion between local politicians and business elites, most of whom ran coal companies. The inspection initially resulted in the dismissal of Deputy Party Secretary Jin Daoming, Vice Governor Du Shanxue, and Ling Zhengce, the brother of the once-powerful chief presidential aide Ling Jihua.
The political drama in Shanxi played out over the third quarter of 2014, as the province experienced a wholesale cleansing of its political establishment with ferocity unseen in post-Mao era China. Between 23 and 29 August 2014, four sitting members of the province's top governing council, the provincial Party Standing Committee, were sacked in quick succession, giving rise to what became known as the "great Shanxi political earthquake". The province's Party Secretary Yuan Chunqing was then abruptly transferred out of office, as the central authorities 'parachuted' then Jilin party chief Wang Rulin to take his place. During the transfer-of-power announcement in the provincial capital Taiyuan, Politburo Standing Committee member Liu Yunshan sat centre stage as party organization officials and provincial politicians ran the motions and exchanged obligatory political declarations to stabilize the province and maintain unwavering loyalty to the party centre.