Amtrak
The National Railroad Passenger Corporation, doing business as Amtrak, is the national passenger railroad company of the United States. It operates intercity rail service in every contiguous U.S. state except for Wyoming and South Dakota as well as in three Canadian provinces. Amtrak is a portmanteau of the words America and track.
Founded in 1971 as a quasi-public corporation to operate many U.S. passenger rail routes, Amtrak receives a combination of state and federal subsidies but is managed as a for-profit organization. The company's headquarters is located one block west of Union Station in Washington, D.C. Amtrak is headed by a Board of Directors, two of whom are the secretary of transportation and chief executive officer of Amtrak, while the other eight members are nominated to serve a term of five years.
Amtrak's network includes over 500 stations along of track. It directly owns approximately of this track and operates an additional of track; the remaining mileage is over rail lines owned by other railroad companies. While most track speeds are limited to or less, several lines have been upgraded to support top speeds of, and parts of the Northeast Corridor support top speeds of.
In fiscal year 2025, Amtrak served 34.5 million passengers and had $2.7 billion in adjusted ticket revenue, with more than 22,100 employees. Nearly 87,000 passengers ride more than 300 Amtrak trains daily. Nearly two-thirds of passengers come from the 10 largest metropolitan areas and 83% of passengers travel on routes shorter than.
History
Private passenger service
In 1916, 98% of all commercial intercity travelers in the United States moved by rail, and the remaining 2% moved by inland waterways. Nearly 42 million passengers used railways as primary transportation. Passenger trains were owned and operated by the same privately owned companies that operated freight trains. As the 20th century progressed, patronage declined in the face of competition from buses, air travel, and the car. New streamlined diesel-powered trains, such as the Pioneer Zephyr, were popular with the traveling public but could not reverse the trend. By 1940, railroads held 67 percent of commercial passenger-miles in the United States. In real terms, passenger-miles had fallen by 40% since 1916, from 42 billion to 25 billion.Traffic surged during World War II, aided by troop movement and gasoline rationing. The railroad's market share surged to 74% in 1945, with a massive 94 billion passenger-miles. After the war, railroads rejuvenated their overworked and neglected passenger fleets with fast and luxurious streamliners. These new trains brought only temporary relief to the overall decline. Even as postwar travel exploded, passenger travel percentages of the overall market share fell to 46% by 1950, and then 32% by 1957. The railroads had lost money on passenger service since the Great Depression, but deficits reached $723 million in 1957. For many railroads, these losses threatened financial viability.
The causes of this decline were heavily debated. The National Highway System and airports, both funded by the government, competed directly with the railroads, which, unlike the airline, bus, and trucking companies, paid for their own infrastructure. American car culture was also on the rise in the post–World War II years. Progressive Era rate regulation limited the railroads' ability to turn a profit. Railroads also faced antiquated work rules and inflexible relationships with trade unions. To take one example, workers continued to receive a day's pay for workdays. Streamliners covered that in two hours.
Matters approached a crisis in the 1960s. Passenger service route-miles fell from in 1958 to in 1970, the last full year of private operation. The diversion of most United States Post Office Department mail from passenger trains to trucks, airplanes, and freight trains in late 1967 deprived those trains of badly needed revenue. In direct response, the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway filed to discontinue 33 of its remaining 39 trains, ending almost all passenger service on one of the largest railroads in the country. The equipment the railroads had ordered after World War II was now 20 years old, worn out, and in need of replacement.
Formation
As passenger service declined, various proposals were brought forward to rescue it. The 1961 Doyle Report proposed that the private railroads pool their services into a single body. Similar proposals were made in 1965 and 1968 but failed to attract support. The federal government passed the High Speed Ground Transportation Act of 1965 to fund pilot programs in the Northeast Corridor, but this did nothing to address passenger deficits. In late 1969, multiple proposals emerged in the United States Congress, including equipment subsidies, route subsidies, and, lastly, a "quasi-public corporation" to take over the operation of intercity passenger trains. Matters were brought to a head on June 21, 1970, when the Penn Central, the largest railroad in the Northeastern United States and teetering on bankruptcy, filed to discontinue 34 of its passenger trains.In October 1970, Congress passed, and President Richard Nixon signed into law, the Rail Passenger Service Act. Proponents of the bill, led by the National Association of Railroad Passengers, sought government funding to ensure the continuation of passenger trains. They conceived the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, a quasi-public corporation that would be managed as a for-profit organization, but which would receive taxpayer funding and assume operation of intercity passenger trains – while many involved in drafting the bill did not believe the NRPC would actually be profitable, this was necessary in order for the White House and more conservative members of Congress to support the bill.
There were several key provisions:
- Any railroad operating intercity passenger service could contract with the NRPC, thereby joining the national system.
- The United States federal government, through the Secretary of Transportation, would own all of the NRPC's issued and outstanding preferred stock.
- Participating railroads bought into the NRPC using a formula based on their recent intercity passenger losses. The purchase price could be satisfied either by cash or rolling stock; in exchange, the railroads received NRPC common stock.
- Any participating railroad was freed of the obligation to operate intercity passenger service after May 1, 1971, except for those services chosen by the Department of Transportation as part of a "basic system" of service and paid for by NRPC using its federal funds.
- Railroads that chose not to join the NRPC system were required to continue operating their existing passenger service until 1975, at which time they could pursue the customary Interstate Commerce Commission approval process for any discontinuance or alteration to the service.
Nearly everyone involved expected the experiment to be short-lived. The Nixon administration and many Washington insiders viewed the NRPC as a politically expedient way for the President and Congress to give passenger trains a "last hurrah" as demanded by the public. They expected the NRPC to quietly disappear as public interest waned. After Fortune magazine exposed the manufactured mismanagement in 1974, Louis W. Menk, chairman of the Burlington Northern Railroad, remarked that the story was undermining the scheme to dismantle Amtrak. Proponents also hoped that government intervention would be brief and that Amtrak would soon be able to support itself. Neither view had proved to be correct; popular support allowed Amtrak to continue in operation longer than critics imagined, while financial results made passenger train service returning to private railroad operations infeasible.
Selection of initial routes
The Rail Passenger Service Act gave the Secretary of Transportation, at that time John A. Volpe, thirty days to produce an initial draft of the endpoints of the routes the NRPC would be required by law to serve for four years. On November 24 Volpe presented his initial draft consisting of 27 routes to Nixon, which he believed would make a $24-million profit by 1975. The Office of Management and Budget believed Volpe and the DOT's analysis was far too optimistic, with director George Shultz arguing to cut the number of routes by around half. Nixon agreed with Shultz, and the public draft presented by Volpe on November 30 consisted of only 16 routes.The initial reaction to this heavily-cut-back proposed system from the public, the press, and congressmen was strongly negative. It made front-page headlines across the country and it was quickly leaked that the DOT had wanted a far larger system than the White House would approve. The ICC produced its own report on December 29, criticising the proposed draft and arguing for the inclusion of 15 additional routes, giving further ammunition to the congressmen who wanted an expanded system. Further wrangling between the DOT and the White House produced the final list of routes on January 28, 1971, adding 5 additional routes to the November 30 draft.
These required routes had only their endpoints specified; the selection of the actual routes to be taken between the endpoints was left to the NRPC, which had just three months to decide them before it was due to start service. Consultants from McKinsey & Company were hired to perform this task, and their results were publicly announced on March 22.
At the same time, the NRPC had hired Lippincott & Margulies to create a brand for it and replace its original working brand name of Railpax. On March 30, L&M's work was presented to the NRPC's board of incorporators, who unanimously agreed on the "headless arrow" logo and on the new brand name "Amtrak", a portmanteau of the words America and trak, the latter itself a sensational spelling of track. The name change was publicly announced less than two weeks before operations began.