64th Fighter Wing


The 64th Fighter Wing was a World War II tactical air control wing of the Twelfth Air Force, operating in the Mediterranean and European theaters. From its initial deployment in North Africa through campaigns in Sicily, Italy, France, and ultimately Germany, the wing advanced and refined close air support of forward ground-based radar control in coordination with Allied aircraft.
As the oldest of the tactical air control wings it played a key role in developing techniques for integrating fighter-bombers with army divisions in a fully coordinated combat strategy. This collaboration between air and ground forces proved critical in the advance to Rome, the invasion of Southern France, and the Ardennes Campaign, where precise fighter-bomber support was a key factor to the Allies success.

Origin

The 64th Fighter Wing was originally formed as the 3rd Air Defense Wing and was part of the Third Air Force, based at Mitchel Field, New York. Eventually being re-designated as the 64th Fighter Wing after the invasion of Sicily, and being assigned to the XII Tactical Air Command, under the Twelfth Air Force.
At the onset of its formation, while still designated as the 3rd Air Defense Wing, the unit was initially tasked with U.S. air defense operations, focusing on communications and radar operations rather than direct aerial combat. It was assembled quickly following the attack on Pearl Harbor, as the United States recognized the inadequacy of its air defenses. General Gordon P. Saville, who had been pioneering the Air Corps' integration of ground-based radar defense systems with the British, played a key role in establishing a national radar defense network. He was also an early promoter of the development of close air support techniques for battlefield operations. Gen. Saville, working in conjunction with the 64th Fighter Wing as part of the First tactical Air Force, would later help to develop many of the close air support maneuvers and standards that would become essential strategies in the war.
As the threat of enemy air attacks on U.S. territory diminished, the wing transitioned into a tactical fighter control role and, under the command of Colonel Robert S. Israel Jr., was deployed to North Africa. Its duties would include coordinating air support, managing fighter deployments, and providing early warning through radar and radio networks. It relied on ground-based Very High Frequency communication and radar systems, including SCR-574 transmitters, SCR-575 DF fixers, and SCR-602 radar stations, while also integrating British Ground Control of Interception stations and RAF COL into its operations. The 82nd Fighter Control Squadron was the forward control unit tasked with bringing this information to the Wing's control center.

WWII: North African and Sicilian Campaigns

In January 1943, the wing deployed to North Africa, entering combat operations in Tunisia. In the early stages of the Allied air battle in North Africa, the coordination between ground-based Signal Aircraft Warning units, Fighter Control Units, and airborne aircraft was still in its infancy. The British had developed much of the technology only a few years earlier, and the U.S. Army Air Corps had just begun implementing it. However, its application in directing air support for advancing infantry on the battlefield had not yet been fully tested. Fighter pilots were initially skeptical of the effectiveness of ground-based radar control. The Wing operated from its main operations headquarters, receiving information relayed by the 82nd Fighter Control Squadron, its forward control unit. Wing controllers frequently attempted to direct pilots to enemy targets. A typical exchange began with a call from the ground: "Hello, 'Red Leader,' do you want a steer?" with the reply often along the lines of, "Hell no, leave us alone and get off the air." Many pilots distrusted the unfamiliar voices breaking in on their radios. However, as they witnessed the effectiveness of ground guidance in locating enemy aircraft, attitudes changed. With real-time tracking, ground controllers could direct fighters on the shortest path to enemy aircraft instead of them roaming blindly in search of the Luftwaffe, conserving fuel and increasing combat effectiveness. This growing trust would develop into the highly efficient control of fighter-bombers that would become so destructive to the enemy in Italy, France and Germany.

Sicily

Following the Axis surrender in North Africa in May 1943, the wing participated in the Sicilian Campaign. On the night of 9 July 1943, a massive Allied fleet carrying thousands of troops and nearly 2,000 ships approached the coast of Sicily. Aboard the headquarters ship, U.S.S. Monrovia, and its three standby counterparts, Wing controllers coordinated fighter and fighter-bomber operations to defend Allied forces and provide air support. Their mission was to establish air superiority, provide reconnaissance for I Armored Corps, and support ground forces.
On 10 July 1943, D-Day for the Sicilian campaign, Col. William O. Darby led an assault near Gela with two of his Ranger battalions. A Wing unit, under Capt. William H. Frazier, landed with them, bringing a British GCI radar and two SCR-602s aiming to establish an operations outpost on the outskirts of Gela. Four miles west of Gela, another of the Wing's units led by Capt. Carl W. Eckhardt landed with elements of the 1st Infantry Division. However, he carried the VHF crystals required to operate the SCR radios with Frazier's detachment, and the enemy held the ground between them and was engaging in a formidable counterattack. It was not until day three, when bombardment from warships and fighter-bombers forced the enemy to retreat that Eckhardt's detachment was able to move into Gela, and deliver the crystals for the control operations to be established. Following this experience, the Wing ensured that radar, fixers, VHF sets, and radios were always loaded together as complete units, preventing component separation in future invasions.
During the Sicilian campaign several fighter groups were placed under the direct control of the Wing including the 27th and 86th Fighter Groups, the 31st, the 33rd, and the 11th Photo Reconnaissance Squadron. Previously ineffective air-ground coordination was improved by embedding two Air Corps liaison officers with each Army division and corps. These officers sent air support requests directly to Wing Headquarters via a dedicated radio network, where requests were assigned to fighter groups. Controlling air operations from Gela was difficult due to Sicily's poor radar coverage and limited GCI sites. Additional radars were deployed to maximize coverage. By the campaign's end, the main operations room had data from ten SCR-602 sets, and two GCI radars placed as close to the front lines as possible to provide early warnings of enemy attacks against ground forces. Despite the logistical and transportation burdens imposed by these field radars, they significantly enhanced operational efficiency.
Coordination between ground and air forces was still developing, making the establishment of effective air cooperation a challenging task. Both sides recognized the value of using fighter-bombers on the front lines, but there were few precedents to follow. Air-ground warfare had to be developed from scratch, with standard procedures created through trial and error. Following the successful invasion of Sicily, Col. Israel was promoted to Brigadier General and assigned to the 62nd Fighter Wing. The new commander of the wing would be Gen. John R. Hawkins, who had previously served as the Chief of Staff of XII Air Support Command. With the increased number of fighter groups placed under its authority, the wing was officially re-designated as the 64th Fighter Wing.

WWII: Italian Campaign

In September 1943, the 64th Fighter Wing assembled at Cape Milazzo in preparation for the invasion of Italy at Salerno. The first Wing personnel landed amid German fire from "88s" and mortars, to set up a British GCI unit, which by the evening of D-Day was operational, providing early warning broadcasts of enemy raids. Meanwhile, aboard two Headquarters ships off the invasion coast, Wing controllers managed fighter coverage over the embattled beachhead and directed aircraft attacking enemy positions. A continuous patrol of 60 to 80 aircraft was maintained, with fighter-bombers completing pre-briefed missions before checking in via VHF for new assignments.
By 25 September 1943, all Wing units had assembled in Italy, following the German retreat northward. The Wing established operations at Frattamaggiore, a small town north of Naples, on October 9. Initially, it was expected to be a temporary location as Allied forces pursued the retreating German army beyond the Volturno River. However, strong German defensive positions in the mountainous terrain at Monte Cassino, and the Garigliano River forced the wing to remain stationed there throughout the winter of 1943–1944. From Frattamaggiore, the wing coordinated daily operations against German positions, directing fighter squadrons to attack enemy strongholds, including those involved in the Battle of Monte Cassino.

Anzio

In January, the Allies launched Operation Shingle, an amphibious landing at Anzio intended to weaken the German defensive line by drawing Nazi forces away from Monte Cassino. A unit from the Wing was deployed to Anzio alongside Col. Darby's Rangers, ensuring close coordination with ground forces.
At Anzio, the Wing continued refining its operations, introducing a new system of close control for precision bombing. Previously, bombing missions were conducted beyond a Bomb Safety Line positioned five to ten miles ahead of Allied forces. However, at Anzio, a new approach was tested. In coordination with VI Corps officers, a special bomb line was established, and pilots of the 324th Fighter Group were briefed accordingly. Since the front remained static, pilots had precise knowledge of Allied positions. Wing detachments would receive target requests directly from Army Corps Headquarters, while controllers stationed in a forward-positioned mobile stations guided pilots to enemy strongpoints along the Rome-Cisterna railway. These targets were dangerously close to Allied lines, raising concerns among troop commanders about friendly fire. Despite these risks, the operation proved highly effective, neutralizing numerous enemy positions. Following this success, controllers with Forward Control began directing aircraft against enemy motor columns, destroying over 10,000 vehicles in the period surrounding the breakthrough from Anzio. This innovative strategy of advancing Forward Control with frontline troops marked a major shift in air-ground coordination. Lt. Gen. Lucien Truscott commander of the VI Corps acknowledged the Wing's contribution, stating, "I have another arm."
On March 18, 1944, Mount Vesuvius erupted, causing widespread destruction to aircraft and airfields used by the wing and other Allied units.