Veronese Easter


The Veronese Easter was a rebellion during the Italian campaign of 1797, in which inhabitants of Verona and the surrounding areas revolted against the French occupying forces under Antoine Balland, while Napoleon Bonaparte was fighting in Austria. The uprising received its name through association with the anti-French uprising of the Sicilian Vespers of the 13th century. Incited by oppressive behaviour by the French, it began on the morning of 17 April 1797, the second day of Easter: the enraged population succeeded in defeating more than a thousand French soldiers in the first hour of fighting, forcing them to take refuge in the town's fortifications, which the mob then captured by force. The revolt ended on 25 April 1797 with the encirclement and capture of the town by 15,000 soldiers, who then forced it to pay a huge fine and hand over various assets, including artwork.

Context

The Pasque Veronesi were the most important episode in a vast anti-French and anti-Jacobin insurgency movement which arose throughout the Italian peninsula from 1796 to 1814 – other important episodes included the campaigns of the Armata della Santa Fede which, guided by cardinal Ruffo, succeeded in reconquering the kingdom of Naples, the actions of the Viva Maria band in Tuscany and Liguria, and Andreas Hofer's victories in the County of Tyrol. The movement's followers were numerous, with sources talking of at least 280,000 insurgents and 70,000 dead.
These revolts were primarily against French domination Jacobin-inspired French political ideology, opposed as such ideology was to prevailing opinions fundamental to Italian society in that period.

Prelude

Napoleon's objective, even as early as spring 1796, was the conquest of rich Venetian Lombardy, and in effect French troops, initially welcomed on the assumption that their stay would be brief, had reached Brescia and Verona by the end of the year : these cities were technically under Venetian domination, and thus the foundations were laid for the events of the following year. The French troops arrived in Verona on 1 June 1796, occupying the military strong-points and billeting troops in other buildings despite the Republic of Venice already having declared its neutrality.
The relations between the population and the Venetian departments on one side, and the French troops on the other, was difficult from the start, for the French troops behaved more as occupiers than guests. Bergamo, in contrast, resisted the French invasion.

Democratization of Bergamo

, podestà of Bergamo and a patriot who had raised 10,000 men for the defence of the Bergamasca Nation, at the end of December had to accept general Louis Baraguey d'Hilliers's request to billet French troops inside the city, since without soldiers they could not have resisted the French force and since the city could not consent to an attack. The French general, however, did not lower the flags of San Marco, given that this city too was officially under Venetian control.
The next phase of Napoleon's plan assumed that the region's democratisation would lead to the administration passing into the hands of the Jacobin Lombards, who would then create a republic allied to France. When secret information of this reached Ottolini, he immediately informed Venice's provveditore. Francesco Battaia, hesitating to follow up his actions with force, replied that Ottolini should double-check if this information was true. Thanks to a spy, Ottolini quickly confirmed Napoleon's intentions, but still Battaia did nothing.
The work of democratising Bergamao was initiated by François Joseph Lefebvre, the successor to Baraguay d'Hilliers, but there were too few Jacobin locals. Napoleon reminded the general that the democratisation should appear to be the will of the people – the general, therefore, whilst keeping Ottolini otherwise occupied, summoned representatives of the citizen-body to secede from Venice's rule. These representatives protested but were obliged to assent. Ottolini had in the meantime recalled some military companies from the provinces, and the French used this action as a pretext for occupying the city. Bergamo thus officially became the first city in the Veneto removed from Venice's rule, and Ottolini was forced to give up the city. In the meantime, Napoleon set off to march on Vienna via the defiles of Carinthia, ultimately ending up in Leoben negotiating a treaty with Austria.

Democratization of Brescia

The next step would have to be the democratisation of Brescia. In this case, despite the town already being partially under French control, the democratisation would have to be conducted by the local Jacobins, given that at Bergamo French involvement in the process had been too obvious. On 16 March, a column of soldiers left for Brescia. Its podestà, Giovanni Alvise Mocenigo, wished to attack this hostile column but was stopped from doing so by Battaia, who was still worried about the eventual use of force.
Two days later 200 men entered Brescia and, with the aid of Brescian Jacobins, put down what little resistance was offered. Their first act after gaining the city was to hunt down Battaia, who had fled to Verona. Although lacking the support of the population, with French help the Jacobins succeeded in democratising the countryside and the town of Crema.

The Veronese revolts and campaign

The provveditore Battaia arrived at Verona on 22 March, and immediately called a meeting of the council, which included several other military leaders. During the council, Maffei, Ottolini and Emilei tried to convince the other members of the importance of reconquering the territory they had lost and that at that moment this was the most important thing for the defence of the Veronese nation, against the Jacobin members' objections. Battaia urged caution, but conte Emilei noted that passive resistance had already lost them Brescia, and that Verona's citizens were ready to take up arms against the Jacobin Lombards. Battaia, realising that many of those present were of Emilei's opinion, changed his mind and so it was unanimously decided to provide for the defence of Verona's borders, nominally against the local Jacobins but in effect also to prevent Napoleon's own force returning into Italy.
Action was immediately taken: Miniscalchi was put in command of the long defence-line at Garda, and Bevilacqua of the line between Villafranca di Verona and the border with Ferrara, with Maffei positioned between these two lines.
Meanwhile, conte Augusto Verità had returned to Verona. Always enjoying good relations with the French, he proposed to get an assurance of French neutrality before the Veronese forces clashed with the Jacobins. Writing to the commander of the French troops at Verona, general Antoine Balland, he stated:
The substance of the letter was a request for authorisation to defend Verona's boundaries against aggressors, which the French general was forced to consent to, since if he did not the only way they could officialice their arrival would be through Venice's authority over her territories. Bonaparte agreed with Balland's decision, and informed the Venetian senate that French troops would not intervene and that he was hurt by how much success they had had at Bergamo and Brescia. Balland's response to the letter aroused Verona's inhabitants to great enthusiasm for defending their own territory.
Initially the military leaders were instructed to defend Verona's borders with practically no men, although the cernide was able to offer 6,000 men, and many volunteers arrived, especially from Valpolicella.
On 23 March news reached Verona that 500 Jacobin soldiers headed for Peschiera del Garda or Valeggio sul Mincio had set out from Brescia – the officials and troops rushed to take up their positions. Miniscalchi went to Colà, a small village above the hills of Lazise, Giusti to Povegliano Veronese, Bevilacqua to Cerea, and Maffei to Valeggio. From Valeggio Maffei could see that the enemy troops were still not in sight, and was thus had time to put his own troops in better order. 24 fanti coming from Brescia also joined his force, as well as 40 Croatian cavalrymen and 2 cannons coming from Verona. On 27 March he decided to send off a scouting party, whilst at Castelnuovo del Garda 1,500 volunteers gathered.
File:Napoleon Polish troops by Bellange.jpg|thumb|left|Uniform and weapons of the Polish troops in French service, who met the insurgents on 29 March at Villanuova, near Salò
News of the Veronese troop movements arrived at the Bermagascene valleys, where several anti-French revolts
were breaking out. On 29 March the whole Bergamasque mountainous zone rose in revolt, in such great numbers that its leaders decided to march on Bergamo.
Around the same time the population of Salò rose up, urged to resistance by Battaia, who assured them by letter that he would send them munitions and 80 dragoons. The letter roused the population's enthusiasm, and they succeeded in raising the Leone di San Marco flag and forcing the Jacobins to flee the city. A short time later the inhabitants of Maderno, Toscolano and Teglie also rose up. 1,000 men – Lombard Jacobins, Polish soldiers and French soldiers – that had gathered at Brescia were invited to Salò. These men met the insurgents at Villanuova, not far from the little town of Garda, but they lacked ammunition and had to quickly retreat into Salò itself. A second encounter saw a victory by the inhabitants of Salò, thanks to an attack on the three sides of the mountain range of the val Sabbia: among the enemy troops, 66 were killed and several taken prisoner, including several Jacobin leaders.
Battaia, as he had promised, sent off 80 dragoons on 30 March. In the meantime Calcinato and Bedizzole hunted down local Jacobins, clearing the road to Salò for the dragoons, who thus reached Salò after capturing several fleeing Jacobins.
In the meantime a Veronese attack on Desenzano failed: news of the uprising in the Bergamasque and Brescian valleys, at Lonato and Salò encouraged the territories of the Venetian Republic, but on the same day came news that the French were attacked the insurgents who had surrounded Bergamo, and the following day that two battles had occurred – one had been won by the French, and the other by the insurgents, with the insurgents nevertheless having to retreat into the mountains and surrender, thus demonstrating the French army had the upper hand.
Maffei had decided to march on Brescia, but was convinced out of it by Battaia, for France could use such an action as a pretext for declaring war on Venice. With the support of Iseppo Giovannelli e Alvise Contarini, Maffei had a clear road down which to advance but had orders to stop 10 miles short of Brescia – the troops would march to the top of the Mincio but not advance on the city, with themselves and the insurgents blockading it on 3 sides.
General Charles Edward Kilmaine gathered 7,000 men at Milan and left for Brescia, along the way attacking the rebelling villages and forcing them to fund his expedition. Meanwhile, at Brescia general Landrieux threatened Maffei with a bombardment of Verona if he did not leave the field and so, after two short clashes between French and Venetian troops on 8 and 9 April, Maffei decided to retreat towards Verona.