Territorial Support Group
The Territorial Support Group is a Met Operations unit of London's Metropolitan Police Service which focuses on public-order policing and other specialist areas. In 2012 it consisted of 793 officers and 29 support staff. The TSG is a uniformed unit of the MPS that replaced the similarly constituted Special Patrol Group in 1987. TSG units patrol London in marked police vans or "carriers", using the call sign prefix "Uniform". Generally, each carrier has an advanced driver, six constables, and a sergeant. Territorial Support Group "serials" often comprise three carriers, twenty-one constables, and three sergeants reporting to an inspector. They separately patrol designated areas experiencing serious levels of gang violence or disorder. When deployed, a group is managed by the MPS Information Room. Due to the public-order nature of their role, a number of carriers will often be assigned to a specific event. TSG officers can be identified from the distinctive "U" on their epaulettes. Some TSG officers are also plainclothes officers, who carry tasers and handcuffs.
Role
Today the TSG has three main tasks in the policing of the Metropolitan Police District:- Securing the capital against terrorism.
- Responding to disorder anywhere within London.
- Reducing priority crime through borough support.
Public order
Borough support
TSG provides support to regular divisional officers through high-visibility patrols, surveillance and decoy operations while also providing a presence on the streets. Boroughs are also supported through the provision of a "Commissioner's Reserve", a section of TSG that is on standby all year round. The Commissioner's Reserve is designed so such units are always available for rapid response of a sizeable number of officers anywhere within the metropolis to quell public-order problems, from a bar brawl to large-scale public disorder and public protest. On a day-to-day basis, TSG assists the boroughs in handling and relocating particularly violent prisoners.Terrorism response
Whilst the majority of TSG officers are unarmed, and therefore do not engage in the initial confrontation of terrorists, the TSG is equipped and trained to deal with the aftermath or evacuation during or after a terrorism emergency in London, and the unit includes a CBRN trained team. Working closely with SO15 TSG also has counterterrorism responsibilities. 200 TSG officers are now trained as firearms officers, and are available to be called upon in the event of a major attack.Recruitment
Potential TSG candidates are selected from mainstream divisional officers. Officers are selected on merit and much emphasis is placed upon their personal policing ability, motivation, resilience and good communication skills. Fitness and stamina are also seen as essential attributes of TSG personnel. Applicants must be recommended by a senior officer whilst on division.Equipment
Large police vans are the standard vehicle of TSG and each van transports six constables and a sergeant. Three of these vans can form an operational Serial ready to respond to incidents; following the national PSU model, this would include an inspector, three sergeants, eighteen constables, two medics and three drivers. The TSG also maintains a fleet of armoured Ford F450 based Jankel Guardians for use in serious public-order situations, like the 2011 England riots. These are identical to, and interchangeable with, the Guardians used by SCO18 Aviation Command and SCO19 Firearms Command, but do not carry armed officers in public-order situations.TSG officers are not routinely armed, but are equipped with speedcuffs, fixed batons and CS/PAVA incapacitant spray like all officers. TSG does, however, have its own firearms capability with some officers being trained as Authorised Firearms Officers. These officers may conduct certain infrequent armed patrols across London, typically in response to a threat of terrorism.
Instead of TSG officers wearing standard black trousers and white shirt, when policing demonstrations they often wear fire-retardant overalls with their stab vests underneath.
| Officer Position | Corresponding Epaulette |
| TSG Constable | |
| Public-Order Medic | |
| TSG Sergeant | |
| TSG Inspector | |
| TSG Chief Inspector | |
| TSG Superintendent | |
| TSG Chief Superintendent |
Bases of operations
The TSG operates from four bases located around London:- 2TSG, Athlon Road, Alperton
- 3TSG, Grove Road, Chadwell Heath
- 4TSG, Aitken Road, Catford
- 5TSG, Larkhall Lane, Clapham
List of known commanding officers
- Michael "Mick" Johnson
- Chief Superintendent Mark Bird
- Chief Superintendent Colin Wingrove
TSG Senior Command Team
- 1× Assistant Commissioner
- 1× Chief Superintendent
- 1× Superintendent
- 4× Chief Inspector
- 1× Chief Inspector based at HQ.
Criticism
The TSG and its predecessor, the SPG, has been likened to paramilitary units during riot control operations by Tony Jefferson in The Case against Paramilitary Policing. He argued this because of their use of shields, batons and helmets, their centralised command structure, their willingness to use force, and their squad-like formations. Peter Waddington, who has been credited with developing kettling, countered this conclusion in The British Journal of Criminology by pointing out that their equipment is mainly defensive. As employees, the police force has a duty to protect them from harm; he further notes that paramedics in riot situations also wear similar helmets and armour. Jefferson argues that by the police preparing for an event, such as a march or protest where they expect there to be violence, they create a self-fulfilling prophecy and that violence will occur. Waddington responds to this by pointing out that the TSG were deployed at the Notting Hill Carnival every year and yet there was not always violence. Jefferson also believes that by controlling the ground the TSG incites violence. Waddington cites examples where problems were caused by the police not controlling the ground and that when they have then tried to gain control violence ensued.Waddington argued that if the presence of the TSG caused violence, then violence would not occur if they were not deployed. Waddington uses examples from three Poll Tax Riots to illustrate that the assumption that their deployment causes violence is not correct. When the TSG was not deployed, serious disorder occurred, including a fully-fledged riot. In contrast, when the TSG, including specialists in riot control, was deployed, there was less violence. What is more, he found that the more the police planned for the 'worst-case scenario' the less disorder there was. When they controlled the space and the crowd was at its greatest, violence was lowest. Waddington states that whilst the deployment of the TSG in a riot situation is never desirable, it is often essential to maintain order and limit violence. However, he also believes that the use of force should be as minimal as possible and that it should only be used to achieve publicly acceptable purposes.
Officers in the TSG have faced criticism about their policing methods and complaints have been made against officers of the TSG. Senior officers say that the type of work that the TSG are involved with, policing protests and performing drug raids makes them more likely to have complaints made against them.
As the result of a freedom of information request made by The Guardian newspaper, it was revealed that more than 5,000 complaints were made against the TSG in 4 years but only 9 have been upheld. Commenting on these figures, a member of the Metropolitan Police Authority stated that officers in the TSG are "practically immune" from criticism.
One ex-Metropolitan Police officer suggested that TSG members "spend days waiting for action, and far too many officers join seeking excitement and physical confrontation." Some officers are ex-military personnel and these are "the worst bullies" as "the laws of the battlefield are not appropriate to the streets of our capital".