Tanks of the United States
The United States has produced tanks since their inception in World War I, up until the present day. While there were several American experiments in tank design, the first American tanks to see service were copies of French light tanks and a joint heavy tank design with the United Kingdom.
In the interwar period there was reduced development due to the low expenditure on war material following the US non-interventionist policy and the financial position.
In World War II, the US came to the fore with tanks designed for mass production and reliability reflecting the US position as the "arsenal of democracy".
The U.S. has been greatly influential in the design philosophy, production and doctrine of tanks, and has been responsible for some of the most successful tank designs.
World War I
The U.S. entered the First World War on the side of the Entente Powers in April 1917, without any tanks of its own. The following month, in light of a report into British and French theories on tank operation, the American Expeditionary Forces' commander-in-chief, General John Pershing, decided that both light and heavy tanks were essential for the conduct of the war and should be acquired as soon as possible. A joint Anglo-French-American program was launched to develop a new heavy tank based on British heavy tank designs, though it was expected that sufficient quantities of tanks would not be available until April 1918. The Inter-Allied Tank Commission decided that, because of the wartime demands on French industry, the quickest way to supply the American forces with tanks was to manufacture the French Renault FT light tank in the United States. Some heavy tanks would also be supplied by the British.File:The American Army in France during the First World War Q49398.jpg|thumb|301st Tank Battalion going into action with Mark V tanks at Saint-Souplet, France in October 1918
Captain Dwight Eisenhower had gone to Camp Meade, Maryland, in February 1918 with the 65th Engineer Regiment, which had been activated to provide the organizational basis for the creation of the Army's first heavy tank battalion. In March, the 1st Battalion, Heavy Tank Service was ordered to prepare for movement overseas, and Eisenhower went to New York with the advance party to work out the details of embarkation and shipment with port authorities. The battalion shipped out on the night of 26 March, however Eisenhower did not join them. He had performed well as an administrator, and upon his return to Camp Meade, he was told he would be staying in the United States, where his talent for logistics would be put to use in establishing the Army's primary tank training center at Camp Colt in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. Eisenhower became the #3 leader of the new tank corps and rose to the temporary rank of lieutenant colonel in the National Army and trained tank crews at "Camp Colt"–his first command–on the grounds of "Pickett's Charge" on the American Civil War battle site. The American Army in France had Captain George S. Patton as the first officer assigned to train the crews. While tanks like the Mark V and FT were being shipped over from France and Britain for training, Eisenhower trained his units with trucks that had bolted down machine guns. Once the tanks arrived Eisenhower had to learn how to operate one first before letting his men use it.
The Six Ton Tank M1917 was the U.S.'s first mass-produced tank, a license-built near-copy of the French Renault FT. The U.S. Army ordered approximately 4,440 M1917s between 1918 and 1919, receiving about 950 before canceling the contract. The initial requirement of 1,200 was decided upon then later increased to 4,400, and some sample Renault tanks, plans, and various parts were sent to the US for study. The design was to be carried out by the Ordnance Department, under the job title "Six-ton Special Tractor", and orders for the vehicles placed with private manufacturers. However, the project was beset by problems: the French specifications were in metric, and thus incompatible with American machinery; coordination between military departments, suppliers, and manufacturers was poor; bureaucratic inertia, lack of cooperation from military departments, and possible vested interests all delayed progress.
The Army in France was expecting the first 300 M1917s by April 1918, but by June, production had yet to begin, which forced the US to acquire 144 Renault FTs from the French. Production of the M1917 did not begin until the autumn, and the first completed vehicles emerged in October. Two arrived in France on 20 November, nine days after the armistice with Germany, and a further eight in December.
The Ford 3-Ton M1918 was one of the first light tank designs by the U.S. It was a small two-man, one-gun tank, armed with an.30 M1919 Browning machine gun and capable of a maximum speed of. Design on the 3-ton tank started in mid-1918. The 3-Ton was a two-man tank designed so that American forces could use another tank besides the Renault FT. Its twin Model T Ford engines were controlled by the driver, while the gunner sat beside him and controlled a.30-06 machine gun on a limited-traverse mount.
A contract for 15,000 of these vehicles was awarded; however, the U.S. Tank Corps felt that the design did not meet their requirements. The contract for the 15,000 tanks was ended after the Armistice, when only fifteen had been produced.
Post-World War I
After the end of the conflict, the U.S. Army was reorganized. In 1919, Pershing recommended to a joint session of the Senate and House Committee on Military Affairs that the tank be subordinated to the infantry. As a result, the 1920 National Defense Act disbanded the U.S. Tank Corps, and reassigned its tanks to the infantry branch, with only two heavy tank battalions and four light tank battalions escaping post-war demobilization.The M1917 tanks came too late, and did not take part in any combat during the war. Afterwards, however, five accompanied the U.S. Marine Expeditionary Force to Tianjin in April 1927 under General Smedley Butler. They returned to the U.S. in late 1928. After the Tank Corps was abolished as a separate branch, and control of tanks handed to the infantry, the number of tank units was progressively reduced, and the vehicles mothballed or scrapped.
The Tank Mark VIII was an Anglo-American tank design of the First World War, a collaborative effort to equip France, the U.K., and the U.S. with a single heavy tank design built in France for an offensive in 1919. Testing of the design was not finished until after the war, and it was decided to build 100 vehicles in the U.S.; these were constructed in 1919 and 1920. The American Liberty tanks equipped a single unit: the 67th Infantry Regiment, based in Aberdeen, Maryland. The curious designation of the unit had its origin in the fact that since 1922 by law all tanks had to be part of the Infantry. Some Liberty tanks were assigned to the 301st Tank Battalion, later redesignated the 17th Tank Battalion. Throughout most of 1921 and 1922, Major Dwight D. Eisenhower commanded this unit.
Although the tank of World War I was slow, clumsy, difficult to control, and mechanically unreliable, its value as a weapon had been clearly demonstrated. In addition to the light and heavy categories of American-produced tanks of World War I, a third classification, the medium, began receiving attention in 1919. The meaning of the terms light, medium, and heavy tanks changed between the wars. During World War I and immediately thereafter, the light tank was considered to be up to 10 tons, the medium was roughly between 10 and 25 tons, and the heavy was over 25 tons. Later, during World War II, increased weights resulted in light tank designs often weighing over 20 tons, medium tank designs weighing over 30 tons, and heavy tank designs weighing over 60 tons.
Patton and Eisenhower remained involved in developing the armored arm, which found a temporary home at Camp Meade under Rockenbach's command. In particular, the two men formulated theory and doctrine for the use of tanks in mass formations to achieve breakthroughs and carry out flanking attacks. They were met with vigorous opposition to their ideas from senior army officers, who favored the use of armor to support the infantry, not as a separate arm conducting independent operations. Congress took this view as well, when enacting the 1920 legislation that dissolved the Tank Corps as a separate entity.
The National Defense Act of 1920 placed the Tank Corps under the Infantry. Patton had argued for an independent Tank Corps, and understood that tanks operating with Cavalry would stress mobility, while tanks tied to the Infantry would emphasize firepower. However, the supply of slow World War I tanks and the subordination of tanks to the infantry branch impeded the development of any role other than direct infantry support, so the United States moved slowly in the development of armored and mechanized forces, which resulted in a significant cut in funding for tank research and development. Patton, convinced there was no future in tanks, applied and received a transfer to the cavalry in September 1920. Eisenhower got out two years later, in January 1922, when he was assigned to the staff of an infantry brigade in Panama.
The U.S. War Department considered that two types of tanks, the light and the medium, should fulfill all missions. The light tank was to be transportable by truck, and not exceed 5 tons gross weight. The medium tank was not to exceed 15 tons, so as to bring it within the weight capacity of railroad flatcars. Although an experimental 15-ton tank, the M1924, reached the mock-up stage, this and other attempts to satisfy the War Department and infantry specifications proved to be unsatisfactory. In reality, it was simply impossible to build a 15-ton vehicle meeting both War Department and infantry requirements.
In 1926, the General Staff reluctantly consented to the development of a 23-ton tank, although it made clear that efforts were to continue toward the production of a satisfactory 15-ton vehicle. The infantry were in agreement that a light tank, transportable by truck, best met their requirements. The net effect of the infantry's preoccupation with light tanks, and the limited funds available for tank development in general, was to slow the development of heavier vehicles and, ultimately, to contribute to the serious shortage of medium tanks at the outbreak of World War II.
The real beginning of the Armored Force was in 1928, twelve years before it was officially established, when Secretary of War Dwight F. Davis directed that a tank force be developed in the Army, after observing the maneuvers by the British Experimental Armoured Force. Davis' 1928 directive for the development of a tank force resulted in the assembly and encampment of an experimental mechanized force at Camp Meade, Maryland, from 1 July to 20 September 1928. The combined arms team consisted of elements furnished by Infantry, Cavalry, Field Artillery, the Air Corps, Engineer Corps, Ordnance Department, Chemical Warfare Service, and Medical Corps. An effort to continue the experiment in 1929 was defeated by insufficient funds and obsolete equipment, but the 1928 exercise did bear fruit, as the War Department Mechanization Board, appointed to study results of the experiment, recommended the permanent establishment of a mechanized force.
Despite inadequate funding, the Ordnance Department managed to develop several experimental light and medium tanks, and also worked with auto engineer J. Walter Christie to test a Christie design model by 1929. None of these tanks were accepted, usually because each of them exceeded standards set by other Army branches. Patton later worked closely with Christie to improve the silhouette, suspension, power, and armament of the tanks. Christie's ideas had a great impact upon tank tactics and unit organization in many countries and, finally, upon the U.S. Army as well.
On 21 November 1930, Douglas MacArthur had been made chief of staff, with the rank of general. As chief of staff from 1930 to 1935, MacArthur wanted to advance motorization and mechanization throughout the Army. In late 1931 all arms and services were directed to adopt mechanization and motorization, and were permitted to conduct research and experiment as necessary. The Cavalry was given the task of developing combat vehicles that would enhance its role of reconnaissance, counter-reconnaissance, flank action, and pursuit.
With the law passed, tanks belonged to the infantry branch, so the cavalry gradually bought a group of combat cars, lightly armored and armed tanks that were often indistinguishable from the newer infantry "tanks". In 1933, MacArthur set the stage for the complete mechanization of the cavalry, declaring "The horse has no higher degree of mobility today than he had a thousand years ago. The time has therefore arrived when the Cavalry arm must either replace or assist the horse as a means of transportation, or else pass into the limbo of discarded military formations."
In November 1936, the U.S. Army's cavalry branch decided to modernize and needed a fully armored vehicle, capable of keeping up with the cavalry and of fulfilling regular combat duties. It came up with the T7 Combat Car, designed and built at the Rock Island Arsenal between 1937 and 1938, which was based on the M1 Combat Car but with an extended chassis and a convertible suspension - the ability to travel using wheels or tracks. The only prototype T7 Combat Car was shipped to Aberdeen Proving Grounds in August 1938 for testing. While it showed good speed and performance, cavalry branch representatives were not impressed. Tests were delayed until 1939, but they were reasonably successful. The vehicle even participated in the First Army maneuvers at Plattsburgh, New York, in 1939, where the cavalrymen liked it. However, in October 1939, the cavalry branch formed new requirements for their combat vehicles which specified regular tracked suspension. The reason for that decision was that the tracks were already available in reasonable quantity and quality and thus there was no need for the complexity and higher cost associated with convertible vehicles. Furthermore, the heavy M2 Browning machine gun it was equipped with was determined insufficient for the role. The ongoing war in Europe at the time proved that, in order for a vehicle to be successful, it needed a proper cannon. In October 1939, despite its potential, the Mechanized Cavalry Board recommended further development and test of the T7 Combat Car program, and all other such convertible vehicles, be canceled, marking the end of wheel-tracked combat vehicle development for the U.S. Army.