Super statute


The term super statute was applied in 2001 by William Eskridge and John Ferejohn to characterize an ordinary statute whose effort "to establish a new normative or institutional framework... 'stick' in the public culture" and has "a broad effect on the law". As a result, it has a "quasi-constitutional" significance that exceeds its formal status as a statute with interpretive significance for other legislation.

Characteristics

Super statutes have a broad effect on law due to cultural influence, affecting even interpretation of constitutional provisions. The fabric of the society would be fundamentally changed by repeal. In practical political terms, super-statutes are embedded in the constitutional order and changing them carries political risks. When super-statutes conflict, the Supreme Court will trim the one less impaired by nonapplication.
Adrian Vermeule criticized the category boundaries as opaque.

Other uses

According to Eskridge and Ferejohn, previous legal commentators had used the term "super-statute" for other purposes. Some writers have used the term to describe a constitution, e.g., A. E. Dick Howard, The Road from Runnymede: Magna Carta and the Constitutionalism in America . Other writers believe it's simply a big statute with no force outside its four corners, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, "Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law", 99 Yale Law Journal 453, 522 .

Examples

Eskridge and Ferejohn give these examples noting others exist.:1227