Georgian Special Operations Command
The Georgian Special Operations Command are the special operations forces component of the Defense Forces of Georgia. They have been established to conduct special operations, special-and long range reconnaissance, military counter intelligence, counter terrorism, counter insurgency, amphibious and asymmetric warfare in and outside Georgia.
Georgian special operation forces are subordinated under the MOD Special Operations Main Division to a brigade-level command structure. Each formation is split into several sub-divisions which are allocated on different Georgian regions, cities and strategically important areas. Most instructor units are composed of veterans of past conflicts including the Soviet–Afghan War and the internal conflicts in Georgia. Officers and instructors served as in former Soviet Army or NATO special services.
History
The very first such formation was founded during the War in Abkhazia in 1992. At the time there was no clear division between paramilitary and military units, while cadres that received training from former Soviet and Russian instructors generally enjoyed more popularity among the Georgian leadership.A lot of effort was put into the establishment of a sustainable system of development of special military units, which was achieved in 1999. In order to replace the Soviet model with something that would approximate the highest international standards, the so-called SOF Train and Equip Program was established with financial and material assistance from Turkey. Some officers had already completed Army Ranger and special forces courses in the United States. Because Georgia lacked the infrastructure and means at that time, the first applicants and candidates for Georgian special forces were sent to Turkey to train there. Since 2001, Georgia has intensified the training of its elite forces in cooperation with American, French, British, Israeli and other countries' special services.
In 2002 as part of the United States's Georgia Train and Equip Program over 2,000 soldiers including 1,000 paramilitary troops were trained by US instructors for special-and counter-terrorism operations. About $65 million were invested by the United States for the training of 400 army commandos and state security forces. In the framework of said program over $6 million were committed by the Georgian government itself to properly arm and supply the country's special forces battalion so that training in accordance to US and NATO standards was ensured.
The US 10th Special Forces Group of SOCOM was tasked with assisting in setting up the proper infrastructure and training ground for Georgia's special operations forces, identified by NATO as GSOF. Georgian commandos were part of KFOR, played a limited role during the 2001 Macedonia insurgency and participated in the Iraq War from 2003 until the complete withdrawal of the Georgian contingent in 2008 due to an escalation of hostilities in South Ossetia. Another $11.5 million were raised by the US in 2008 for special forces training. However, as a result of the Russo-Georgian conflict the US ceased providing any type of assistance in training Georgian forces, including special forces as unofficial and undeclared embargoes were in full effect against the country until a new government took over in 2012.
Despite that brief setback a foundation had been laid, and Georgia's elite units became much less dependent on foreign assistance. Instead, focus was shifted towards cooperation, bilateral exercises and inter-operability with their NATO and European, particularly Eastern European counterparts. Georgian special forces have taken part in numerous international missions and joint exercises. Following the 2014 Wales summit joint training exercises between US-and Georgian special forces officially renewed and since then are held on a regular basis. Several NATO certifications were achieved in 2017 following multinational manoeuvers.
Another close partner besides SOCOM is the Polish Special Forces Command, in particular JW GROM, JWK and JW AGAT which took part in the general assessment, mentoring and qualification leading to a NATO operational certification for GSOF. The years-long assessment and enhancement of operational capabilities culminated in a final certification during a 2017 exercise in which several Polish special forces components played the opposing force against their Georgian counterparts. GSOF are thereby NATO certified and qualified to operate a Special Operations Task Group or SOTG within Alliance structures, which is unique for non-Nato countries. Joint exercises and qualification with Polish SOF are commenced on a regular basis since 2013.
Early 1990s
Several elite units were created in 1992. Those included Omega and Alpha, as well as another undisclosed special unit of the State Security. They were formed under the supervision of Igor Giorgadze, who took orders directly from then-Chairman of the Parliament Eduard Shevardnadze.In contrast to their Soviet counterparts, the Georgian units were not specialized in counter-terrorism, instead deployed into conflict zones shortly after their establishment. They acted as combat and intelligence assets for the military. Alpha was also trained in assassination of HVTs, which caused great controversy in connection with some murder cases, and the attempted assassinations of the Georgian head of state, that remain unsolved to this date.
While Omega received training from Western instructors, the members of Alpha were trained and headed primarily by decorated Georgian veterans of the Soviet–Afghan War and former KGB officers, as well as Russian officers from Spetsnaz GRU. Some of whom were recruited and initially part of Alpha to participate in the 1990s conflicts, on the Georgian side. Alpha had various military hardware at its disposal, including armored personnel carriers and artillery, but operated mostly covertly. It was the only unit in the country at the time that could equip its soldiers with state of the art Western and Soviet communication devices, which enabled the accurate execution of operations, and a constant line of communication with the government. This technology was otherwise a rarity to non-existent, in the mostly poorly-organized and poorly-equipped Georgian military.
The unit strictly opposed the violent behaviour of autonomous paramilitary groups such as Mkhedrioni who committed ethnically-motivated crimes, and forbade its members to partake in such actions under the threat of capital punishment. Their good standing with the local populace and ethnic minorities kept the unit supplied and informed. Alpha gained a reputation mostly for accomplishing tasks with great deception and swiftness, and with as little bloodshed as possible.
Examples include the surprise raid and recapture of Khobi from rebels, spreading misinformation among opposition forces that resulted in the unit securing strategically vital locations for the government, such as the port city Poti, disarming insurrectionist groups and recovering military equipment captured by the enemy.
Many successes were achieved partially due to recruiting or employing the help of ethnic minorities. Alpha would send small diverse teams of four in civilian or other suitable disguise, and often with its Russian members, to successfully infiltrate hostile territory and on some occasions also the Russian headquarters in Gudauta, in order to gather intelligence for military action. However, the Alpha unit would not engage in direct combat operations in Abkhazia as it was mostly tasked with confronting Zviadist forces in Georgia proper. It also carried out a number of successful hostage rescue operations, but its inexperience and bold approach with such situations resulted in friction between them and the police, and sometimes near disasters. Alpha would be officially disbanded in 1995 following several controversial events and trials.
The "White Eagles", one of the few professional units of the Georgian military at the time, National Guard specifically, were part of the garrison in the coastal town Gagra which was struck by a massed separatist assault during the War in Abkhazia. Despite initial success for the defenders Gagra was eventually overrun. Russian involvement became very apparent in that period when an unidentified force consisting of hundreds of soldiers with unmarked uniforms were landed at the coast south of the town and started to push against the Georgian defences. Part of the same force also headed towards Gagra.
In the ensuing battle, which was costly for both sides, Gocha Karkarashvili, the leader of the White Eagles, and 11 of his men were killed defending Gagra. All sides kept commencing raids and skirmishes against each other after the war and specifically throughout the late 1990s.
Pankisi Gorge crisis
In 2002 Georgian troops carried out operations in the Pankisi Gorge, which at the time was host to Chechen separatist militants sheltering from the war in Russia, and foreign - mostly Arab - jihadists. Multiple large-scale operations were carried out in the Gorge, mostly by the Internal Troops of Georgia, who set up checkpoints and carried out patrols.In addition, Georgian special forces appear to have been involved in at least two individual operations. On 28 April a Georgian unit, acting on U.S. intelligence and led by a U.S.-trained commander, ambushed a group of insurgents in Pankisi by ramming their vehicle, and then firing on it, killing the driver. The ambush sparked consternation among militants in the area, who initiated 24-hour patrols and lookouts. The Georgians captured three Arabs, of whom one, a Yemeni named Omar Mohammed Ali al-Rammah, was subsequently transferred to U.S. custody and incarcerated in Guantanamo Bay.
In Early October, according to one report, "Georgian special forces" captured 15 Arabs in Pankisi, among them the Al-Qaeda leader known as Saif al-Islam al-Masri. Other reports referred to al-Masry's capture having taken place earlier, in the summer, and to "over 13" Arab fighters having been turned over to the U.S. that Autumn by Georgia. By late October, according to yet another report, Georgia had netted about a dozen Arab militants, including "two mid-level Al-Qaeda leaders."
According to Yevgeny Primakov, Prime Minister of Russia from 1998-1999, Georgian special forces captured a number of other rebels in Pankisi during 2002, and transferred them to Russian control, which had the effect of defusing the crisis. Primakov wrote that some saw this as the result of pressure from the United States, who wanted to stabilise Russian-Georgian relations.