Sheikh Mansur movement


The Sheikh Mansur movement, was a major war between the Russian Empire and the North Caucasians, caused by the Chechen religious and military leader Sheikh Mansur, who opposed the Russian expansionist policies and wanted to unite the North Caucasians under a single Islamic state.
Starting off as a failed Russian campaign to capture Sheikh Mansur, who had spread Islam among the Chechens, it quickly turned to a region-wide anti-Russian insurgency. Although victorious at first, brutal Russian tactics, among them burning and destruction of villages as well as repeating military losses of the mountaineers, led to the decline of the insurgency, which saw Mansur lose many of his supporters. He left for Circassia in July 1787, where he suffered his final defeat during the siege of Anapa of 1791. Regardless, he is honored as a national hero among the Chechens and Circassians in the current day.

Background

[Sheikh Mansur]

Uscherman was born around the year 1760 to a poor family in Aldy. He spent most of his life shepherding and herding live stock until travelling to Dagestan around the year 1778 to study Islam.
In 1784, he declared himself an Imam and in February of 1785 he held his first public ceremonies. He called on the Chechens to abandon their old pagan traditions and observe the laws of Islam. He quickly grew a following, and soon most of Aldy began accepting Islam.

First Phase (July – December 1785)

Aldy Expedition">Battle of Aldy">Aldy Expedition

Between April and June of 1785, the Russian Empire began preparing for a campaign against the rebellious Chechens and to capture Sheikh Mansur. In early July, a 3,000 strong Russian detachment led by the Russian officer Nikolai de Pieri was sent to Aldy and Alkhan–Yurt. The detachment arrived at Aldy on July 7 and entered the village, only to find it almost empty. The Russian army burnt the village down and began retreating, although without having captured Sheikh Mansur.
In the forest near the village, several hundred Chechen fighters led by Mansur himself surrounded the Russian detachment and dispersed it through the woods, killing 745 soldiers and capturing another 162 as well as two cannons. Thus, the detachment was defeated and Pieri himself was killed. According to Mansur, during interrogations, only around 100 Chechen fighters died.
As a result, Mansur rose in popularity across the North Caucasus, and several thousand fighters from across the region came to join his army, allowing him to conduct military operations only days after the battle.
On the 8th of the same month, another Russian detachment led by Fyodor Apraksin attacked the Chechen village Alkhan–Yurt, defeated its defenders and destroyed the village during the Battle of Alkhan–Yurt. This did not change the mood of the rebels however, who kept joining Mansur's camp.

[Siege of [Kizlyar (July 1785)|First campaign against Kizlyar]]

Mansur held a speech to all of his followers, urging them to attack Russian fortifications and fight Russian expansion. He himself announced that he would attack Kizlyar soon.

[Attack on Karginsk]

A few days after the Battle of Aldy, on July 14, the rebels, counting more than 5,000, attacked the Karginsk redoubt. They started a fire, which soon spread to the powder magazine, as a result of which the entire redoubt, along with most of its defenders, blew up. Mansur's forces stormed the redoubt and captured the remaining defenders, as well as four cannons. This was the first victory of Mansur outside Chechnya.

Siege of Kizlyar

On July 15, the rebels began their siege of Kizlyar. In total, they launched 5 attacks on the fortress, but each one was repelled. Towards the end of the day, they retreated to their camps.
Early next day, the Russian command sent the Tomsk infantry regiment to attack the rebel camp and push them away from Kizlyar. The regiment however suffered heavy casualties and was forced to retreat back to the fortress, ending the first siege of Kizlyar in no deciding victory for either side.
Mansur held a speech afterwards, in which he complimented his army on the capture of the Karginsk redoubt and the defeat of the Tomsk regiment, but also motivated them to keep fighting. His speech worked, and almost non of the rebels perceived the retreat from Kizlyar as a defeat. In general, wealthy and powerful nobles and princes of the North Caucasus refused to join Mansur, while many of the peasants and civilians did, as the former feared Russian punitive campaigns against them or losing their power. There were notable exceptions however, such as Akhmet Dudarov from Ossetia or several of the sons of the rulers of the Kumyk Khanates.
As rumors about a second campaign against Kizlyar began to spread, the Russian command undertook several defensive operations and began reinforcing Kizlyar. The Astrakhan infantry regiment as well as a 2,000 strong Kalmyk detachment were sent to the fortress.

Grigoriopolis campaign">Battle of Grigoriopolis">Grigoriopolis campaign

The Kabardian princes sent an invitation to Sheikh Mansur, which, according to the report Major Zhiltsov, Mansur accepted, and he travelled to Kabardia on July 26. Immediately, Russian commanders sent reinforcements to the Grigoriopolis redoubt, and also sent a detachment led by Brigadier Fyodor Apraksin to the Malka River to prevent Mansur from meeting the Kabardians. Mansur managed to meet the princes of Lesser Kabardia, with whom he planned future attacks and campaigns. He also convinced the princes Dol Mudarov and Berd Khaptsug to join him and attack Grigoriopolis.
On July 29, the rebel army arrived at Grigoriopolis and encircled it. They tried entering the fortress, but failed. With their experience from the Attack on Karginsk, the rebels began burning down houses, stables and other buildings around the fortress and tried to climb the walls again. This attack was repelled with heavy losses.
After a day, 180 Russian soldiers stormed out of the fortress and conducted a surprise attack on the mountaineers, who were caught off guard and forced to retreat, ending the Battle of Grigoriopolis.

Minor Military operations

In August of 1785, Mansur announced that the second attack on Kizlyar would soon start. However, many highlanders opposed this choice. The Kachkalikov clan Chechens and other Chechen clans invited Mansur to discuss future operations. At the council, they declared that they agreed to jointly oppose Russia, but not against Kizlyar, but against the numerous settlements between the Shelkozavodskaya and Shchedrinskaya Cossack villages. They did not hope for luck near Kizlyar and believed that for a start it would be better to capture the weakly defended villages, steal herds of horses and capture people. Mansur agreed, but he did not want to abandon his plans for campaigns against Kizlyar, Vladikavkaz and others because he believed that only such major operations would decide the outcome of the war. Soon after, the highlanders began attacking military settlements on the Terek River.
The next day, 400 rebels attacked the Kalinovka village, but were repelled by the Cossacks who were warned and had prepared. The same day, 200 rebels conducted several successful raids on soldiers' settlements near Vladikavkaz, during which they captured 800 heads of cattle and 50 people. Several other successful raids found success as well.
The recent successes also motivated the Circassians, and they began picking up arms against the Russian forces. Around 1,800 Circassian fighters gathered at the Kuban River, ready to attack the Russian fortifications.
The troops and settlers were forced to live without letting go of their weapons. Not a single trade caravan, not a single transport with goods and weapons, not a single delegation could set off without a large military convoy. In fact, the troops, Cossacks and settlers were locked up in the walls of their settlements. Mansur's plan was to drive them back to Russia and prevent them from seizing the lands of the Chechens and other Caucasian peoples.
On August 4, a detachment of Kabardians attacked a Russian army on the Malka River, but was repelled. The Kabardians suffered 24 losses.
In September, 1,000 rebels marched on Naurskaya, while another detachment attacked Mozdok. The Kabardians also constantly invaded the Russian borders, stole cattle and took people into captivity. In the autumn of 1785, the rebellious Kabardians made their way across the line to the Kura River, plundered the Cherkesskaya village and took all the inhabitants with them. The example of the rebellious Chechens and Kabardins was followed by the peoples beyond the Kuban. The Russian troops, which consisted mainly of infantry, could not successfully counteract the detachments of cavalry, who made quick and unexpected movements. Dispersed along the entire border in small detachments, they could not concentrate in time to deliver a strong blow. The cavalry regiments on the Caucasian line were in a particularly bad state. They were not manned; there was also a great shortage of horses.
Among the captives of the rebel army was a Georgian named Peter, and in a letter he sent to the commander of Kizlyar, he stated: "I swear to God they have 20,000 cavalry and 15,000 infantry, and their will to march on Kizlyar in 2 weeks is strong!" Although the information given by Peter about the size of the army of the highlanders is strongly exaggerated, it is known that a large number of fighters gathered under the banner of Mansur—Greater than the army during the First siege of Kizlyar.
General Potemkin began to act. In addition to measures of military intimidation, he continued to send out letters and proclamations, trying to win over either the peasants or the rulers. However, these attempts had no serious effect. "Many reports assure me," the Kizlyar commandant Veshnyakov wrote to the Kostek ruler Khamza Alishev, "that the highlanders are going to march into the Russian borders, and their path will certainly pass through the Kumyk villages. Being loyal to the Russian side, you should forbid the highlanders from passing through their villages, and dismantle the ferry across the Koisu River so that they cannot use it."
In the late autumn of 1785, the entire Russian border from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea was on fire, subjected to constant attacks by local peoples. General Potemkin was forced to reorganize the line's defenses. Of all the available troops, he made three large detachments. One was supposed to hold back the Kumyks, Dagestanis and Chechens, the other — the Kabardians, the third — the Circassians.
Until then, not using military means to prevent the attacks of the mountaineers, Potemkin again sent out proclamations to the peoples who were on the side of Mansur. From some places he got answers. In a letter dated October 12, 1785, in the Tatar language, residents and foremen of the villages of Bolshie Atagi, Chechen-Aul and Aldy reported that the imam living with them had no hostile intentions towards the Russians. Sheikh Mansur only glorifies the Muslim religion, demands strict observance of the law, and executes thieves without mercy. At the same time, the foremen frankly admitted that without the permission of the imam they could not and did not dare to enter into negotiations with the authorities. "We are in strict obedience to Imam Mansur," the Chechen elders wrote, "we do whatever he orders. He is a person honored and chosen by God, kind and just, and does not order to offend Christians and other lawless people, but calls to observe the Muslim law. He does not want the side of your loss. Therefore, now, whatever he commands, we will do it."