Second Battle of Bull Run


The Second Battle of Bull Run or Battle of Second Manassas was fought August 28–30, 1862, in Prince William County, Virginia, as part of the American Civil War. It was the culmination of the Northern Virginia campaign waged by Confederate Gen. Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia against Union Maj. Gen. John Pope's Army of Virginia, and a battle of much larger scale and numbers than the First Battle of Bull Run fought on July 21, 1861, on the same ground.
Following a wide-ranging flanking march, Confederate Maj. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson captured the Union supply depot at Manassas Junction, threatening Pope's line of communications with Washington, D.C. Withdrawing a few miles to the northwest, Jackson took up strong concealed defensive positions on Stony Ridge and awaited the arrival of the wing of Lee's army commanded by Maj. Gen. James Longstreet. On August 28, 1862, Jackson attacked a Union column just east of Gainesville, at Brawner's Farm, resulting in a stalemate but successfully getting Pope's attention. On that same day, Longstreet broke through light Union resistance in the Battle of Thoroughfare Gap and approached the battlefield.
Pope became convinced that he had trapped Jackson and concentrated the bulk of his army against him. On August 29, Pope launched a series of assaults against Jackson's position along an unfinished railroad grade. The attacks were repulsed with heavy casualties on both sides. At noon, Longstreet arrived on the field from Thoroughfare Gap and took position on Jackson's right flank. On August 30, Pope renewed his attacks, seemingly unaware that Longstreet was on the field. When massed Confederate artillery devastated a Union assault by Maj. Gen. Fitz John Porter's V Corps, Longstreet's wing of 25,000 men in five divisions counterattacked in the largest simultaneous mass assault of the war. The Union left flank was crushed and the army was driven back to Bull Run. Only an effective Union rear guard action prevented a replay of the First Manassas defeat. Pope's retreat to Centreville was nonetheless precipitous.
Success in this battle emboldened Lee to initiate the ensuing Maryland campaign.

Background

Military situation

After the collapse of Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan's Peninsula campaign in the Seven Days Battles of June 1862, President Abraham Lincoln appointed John Pope to command the newly formed Army of Virginia. Pope had achieved some success in the Western Theater, and Lincoln sought a more aggressive general than McClellan.

Plans

Pope's mission was to fulfill two basic objectives: protect Washington and the Shenandoah Valley; and draw Confederate forces away from McClellan by moving in the direction of Gordonsville. Based on his experience fighting McClellan in the Seven Days, Robert E. Lee perceived that McClellan was no further threat to him on the Virginia Peninsula, so he felt no compulsion to keep all of his forces in direct defense of Richmond. This allowed him to relocate Jackson to Gordonsville to block Pope and protect the Virginia Central Railroad.
Lee had larger plans in mind. Since the Union army was split between McClellan and Pope and they were widely separated, Lee saw an opportunity to destroy Pope before returning his attention to McClellan. He committed Maj. Gen. A.P. Hill to join Jackson with 12,000 men.

Initial movements in the Northern Virginia campaign

On August 3, General-in-Chief Henry Halleck directed McClellan to begin his final withdrawal from the Peninsula and to return to Northern Virginia to support Pope. McClellan protested and did not begin his redeployment until August 14.
On August 9, Nathaniel Banks's corps attacked Jackson at Cedar Mountain, gaining an early advantage, but a Confederate counterattack led by A.P. Hill drove Banks back across Cedar Creek. Jackson's advance was stopped, however, by the Union division of Brig. Gen. James B. Ricketts. By now Jackson had learned that Pope's corps were all together, foiling his plan of defeating each in separate actions. He remained in position until August 12, then withdrew to Gordonsville. On August 13, Lee sent Longstreet to reinforce Jackson.

Prelude to battle

From August 22 to 25, the two armies fought a series of minor actions along the Rappahannock River. Heavy rains had swollen the river and Lee was unable to force a crossing. By this time, reinforcements from the Army of the Potomac were arriving from the Peninsula. Lee's new plan in the face of all these additional forces outnumbering him was to send Jackson and Stuart with half of the army on a flanking march to cut Pope's line of communication, the Orange & Alexandria Railroad. Pope would be forced to retreat and could be defeated while moving and vulnerable. Jackson departed on August 25 and reached Salem that night.
On the evening of August 26, after passing around Pope's right flank via Thoroughfare Gap, Jackson's wing of the army struck the Orange & Alexandria Railroad at Bristoe Station and before daybreak on August 27 marched to capture and destroy the massive Union supply depot at Manassas Junction. This surprise movement forced Pope into an abrupt retreat from his defensive line along the Rappahannock. During the night of August 27–28, Jackson marched his divisions north to the First Bull Run battlefield, where he took position behind an unfinished railroad grade below Stony Ridge. The defensive position was a good one. The heavy woods allowed the Confederates to conceal themselves, while maintaining good observation points of the Warrenton Turnpike, the likely avenue of Union movement, only a few hundred yards to the south. There were good approach roads for Longstreet to join Jackson, or for Jackson to retreat to the Bull Run Mountains if he could not be reinforced in time. Finally, the unfinished railroad grade offered cuts and fills that could be used as ready-made entrenchments.
In the Battle of Thoroughfare Gap on August 28, Longstreet's wing broke through light Union resistance and marched through the gap to join Jackson. This seemingly inconsequential action virtually ensured Pope's defeat during the coming battles because it allowed the two wings of Lee's army to unite on the Manassas battlefield.

Opposing forces

Union

Key commanders

Gen. Pope's Army of Virginia of approximately 51,000 men was divided into three army corps:
The I Corps, under Maj. Gen. Franz Sigel consisted of the divisions of:
  • Brig Gen. Robert C. Schenck.
  • Brig Gen. Adolph von Steinwehr.
  • Brig Gen. Carl Schurz.
  • Independent Brigades of Brig Gen. Robert H. Milroy, Col. John Beardsley, and Cpt. Louis Schirmer)
The II Corps, under Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks
The III Corps, Maj. Gen. Irvin McDowell, who had led the losing Union army at First Bull Run, consisted of the divisions of:
  • Brig Gen. Rufus King
  • Brig Gen. James B. Ricketts
The Kanawha Division and parts of three army corps of Gen. McClellan's Army of the Potomac, eventually joined Pope for combat operations, raising his strength to 77,000:
The III Corps, under Maj. Gen. Samuel P. Heintzelman, consisted of the divisions of:
The V Corps under Maj. Gen. Fitz John Porter, consisted of the divisions of:
  • Brig Gen. Daniel Butterfield
  • Brig Gen. George Sykes
The VI Corps under Maj. Gen. William B. Franklin
The IX Corps under Maj. Gen. Jesse L. Reno, consisted of the divisions of:
  • Brig Gen. Isaac I. Stevens
  • Maj. Gen. Jesse L. Reno

    Confederate

On the Confederate side, Gen. Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia was organized into two "wings" or "commands" totaling about 55,000 men:
Maj. Gen. James Longstreet's Right Wing or Command consisted of the following divisions:
  • Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson
  • Brig Gen. David R. Jones
  • Brig Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox
  • Brig Gen. John B. Hood
  • Reserve Artillery of James B. Walton
Maj. Gen. Stonewall Jackson's Left Wing or Command consisted of the following divisions:
  • Brig Gen. William B. Taliaferro
  • Maj. Gen. A. P. Hill
  • Maj. Gen. Richard S. Ewell
  • The Cavalry Division, under Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart was attached to Jackson's wing.
An exact estimate of both armies' strength at the battle is not possible as different reports and returns provide differing figures. The total strength of the Army of Northern Virginia, cavalry and artillery included, was slightly less than 55,000 men. Factoring in only infantry, the effective Confederate strength was probably about 50,000 men, possibly as low as 47,000. Union strength was around 63,000 men if Banks's corps is excluded as it was not present at the battle aside from a few detachments. The total Union strength with Banks added in was approximately 70,000 men.

Battle

August 28: Brawner's Farm (Groveton)

The Second Battle of Bull Run began on August 28 as a Federal column, under Jackson's observation just outside Gainesville, near the farm of the John Brawner family, moved along the Warrenton Turnpike. It consisted of units from Brig. Gen. Rufus King's division: the brigades of Brig. Gens. John P. Hatch, John Gibbon, Abner Doubleday, and Marsena R. Patrick, marching eastward to concentrate with the rest of Pope's army at Centreville. King was not with his division because he had suffered a serious epileptic attack earlier that day.
Jackson, who had been relieved to hear earlier that Longstreet's men were on their way to join him, displayed himself prominently to the Union troops, by riding up next to the marching Federals in his horse as a farmer, to the horror of his aides, but his presence was disregarded, as the Federals had no interest in a seemingly harmless farmer. Concerned that Pope might be withdrawing his army behind Bull Run to link up with McClellan's arriving forces, Jackson determined to attack. Returning to his position behind the tree line, he told his subordinates, "Bring out your men, gentlemen." At about 6:30 p.m., Confederate artillery began shelling the portion of the column to their front, John Gibbon's Black Hat Brigade. Gibbon, a former artilleryman, responded with fire from Battery B, 4th U.S. Artillery. The artillery exchange halted King's column. Hatch's brigade had proceeded past the area and Patrick's men, in the rear of the column, sought cover, leaving Gibbon and Doubleday to respond to Jackson's attack. Gibbon assumed that, since Jackson was supposedly at Centreville, and having just seen the 14th Brooklyn of Hatch's Brigade reconnoiter the position, that these were merely horse artillery cannons from Jeb Stuart's cavalry. Gibbon sent aides out to the other brigades with requests for reinforcements, and sent his staff officer Frank A. Haskell to bring the veteran 2nd Wisconsin Infantry up the hill to disperse the harassing cannons. Gibbon met the 2nd in the woods saying, "If we can get you up there quietly, we can capture those guns."
The 2nd Wisconsin, under the command of Col. Edgar O'Connor, advanced obliquely back through the woods the Federal column was passing through. When the 430 men emerged from the woods on John Brawner's farm they were quietly formed and advanced up the hill. Upon reaching the plateau, they deployed skirmishers who drove back Confederate skirmishers. They soon received a heavy volley into their right flank by 800 men of the fabled Stonewall Brigade, commanded by Col. William S. Baylor. Absorbing the volley from, the 2nd Wisconsin did not waver, but replied with a devastating volley at the Virginians in Brawner's orchard. The Confederates returned fire when the lines were only apart. As units were added by both sides, the battle lines remained close together, a standup fight with little cover, trading mass volleys for over two hours. Jackson described the action as "fierce and sanguinary". Gibbon added his 19th Indiana. Jackson, personally directing the actions of his regiments instead of passing orders to the division commander, Maj. Gen. Richard S. Ewell, sent in three Georgia regiments belonging to Brig. Gen. Alexander R. Lawton's brigade. Gibbon countered this advance with the 7th Wisconsin. Jackson ordered Brig. Gen. Isaac R. Trimble's brigade to support Lawton, which met the last of Gibbon's regiments, the 6th Wisconsin.
After Trimble's brigade entered the action, Gibbon needed to fill a gap in his line between the 6th Wisconsin and the rest of the Iron Brigade regiments. Doubleday sent in the 56th Pennsylvania and the 76th New York, who advanced through the woods and checked the new Confederate advance. These men arrived at the scene after dark and both Trimble and Lawton launched uncoordinated assaults against them. Horse artillery under Captain John Pelham was ordered forward by Jackson and fired at the 19th Indiana from less than. The engagement ended around 9 p.m., with Gibbon's men slowly retreating backwards still firing, making their line at the edge of the woods. Doubleday's regiments retired to the turnpike in an orderly fashion. The fight was essentially a stalemate, but at a heavy cost, with over 1,150 Union and 1,250 Confederate casualties. The 2nd Wisconsin lost 276 of 430 engaged. The Stonewall Brigade lost 340 out of 800. Two Georgia regiments—Trimble's 21st and Lawton's 26th—each lost more than 70%. In all, one of every three men engaged in the fight was shot. Confederate Brig. Gen. William B. Taliaferro wrote, "In this fight there was no maneuvering and very little tactics. It was a question of endurance and both endured." Taliaferro was wounded, as was Ewell, whose left leg was shattered by a Minié ball and had to be amputated, removing him from action for the next ten months.
Jackson had not been able to achieve a decisive victory with his superior force, due to darkness, his piecemeal deployment of forces, the loss of two of his division commanders, and the tenacity of the enemy. But he had achieved his strategic intent, attracting the attention of John Pope. Pope wrongly assumed that the fight at the Brawner Farm occurred as Jackson was retreating from Centreville. Pope believed he had "bagged" Jackson and sought to capture him before he could be reinforced by Longstreet. Pope's dispatch sent that evening to Maj. Gen. Philip Kearny stated, in part, "General McDowell has intercepted the retreat of the enemy and is now in his front... Unless he can escape by by-paths leading to the north to-night, he must be captured." Gibbon conferred with King, Patrick, and Doubleday as to the next move, because McDowell was "lost in the woods". The division was in an exposed position with two of its brigades badly cut up, and facing Stonewall Jackson's entire corps. Although the Union generals did not know exactly how many men Jackson had with him, it was almost certainly a far greater number than the 4000 men in King's division. Moreover, Confederate prisoners taken in the fighting around Brawner's Farm claimed that Jackson's command numbered between 60,000 and 70,000 men and was poised to strike at first light the next morning. Reynolds and Sigel were some miles away and would not be on the scene until morning, by which time Jackson could easily crush King. Ricketts was closer, but had Longstreet following far behind. Since staying in place at Groveton was clearly unacceptable, the only other options were retreating either to Manassas Junction or Centreville. Gibbon recommended the former since the exact disposition of the enemy was unknown and going to Centreville risked a disastrous march across his front. King finally agreed, and the division formed up into columns and moved south to Manassas Junction. At the same time, Ricketts had arrived at a similar conclusion and marched south and away from Jackson as well, in his case towards Bristoe Station.
Pope issued orders to his subordinates to surround Jackson and attack him in the morning, but Jackson was not where Pope thought he was, nor were Pope's own troops where he assumed. He believed that McDowell and Sigel were blocking Jackson's retreat west across the Bull Run Mountains when in fact King and Ricketts had both retreated southward, while Sigel and Reynolds were south and east of Jackson, who had no intention at all of retreating and was well dug-in and awaiting Longstreet's arrival, which Pope refused to believe was a possibility.