Sea Tigers
The Sea Tigers was the naval wing of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam during the Sri Lankan Civil War. It was founded in 1984. The Sea Tigers had a number of small but effective suicide bomber vessels. During its existence it had gained a reputation as a capable adversary for the Sri Lankan Navy. During the civil war, the Sea Tigers had sunk at least 29 Sri Lankan small inshore patrol boats, 20 Dvora-class fast patrol boats, 3 gunboats, 2 large surveillance command ships, and one freighter.
The Sea Tigers were led by Soosai, with their main base at Mullaitivu, on the north-eastern coast of Sri Lanka. Their last base was taken when the Sri Lanka Army captured Chalai in Mullaitivu in February 2009.
Background
The LTTE was dominated by members with its leader Velupillai Prabhakaran being a Melongi Karaiyar. This caste were traditional fishermen living in the northern and eastern coastal areas of the island, with a strong traditional knowledge on seafaring and the waterways of the Palk Strait. Over the years members of this community had developed strong relations with other communities in the coastal regions of Tamil Nadu, engaging in the lucrative trade of smuggling contraband during the periods of import restrictions during poor economic period following Ceylon's independence from British rule in 1948.In 1983, the Indian Research and Analysis Wing established training camps Tamil Nadu to train and arm Tamil insurgents in Sri Lanka. The rebels found it easy to travel back to Sri Lanka from training camps and smuggled in their supplies from India via small crafts cross the Palk Strait. With the Sri Lanka Navy intercepting these crafts, Prabhakaran ordered the formation of maritime wing within the LTTE in 1984 tasked with smuggling personnel and equipment between the LTTE's bases in Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka, in particular Jaffna. A year later these crafts manned by LTTE cadres now known as Sea Tigers had been evading naval patrol crafts began mounting machine guns with which they began engaging the navy in gun battles at sea.
Major operations
In 1994, Colonel Soosai who had been a deputy district commander was appointed by Prabhakaran as the head of the Sea Tigers. In 1994, the Sea Tigers were able to score notable victories when it sank the offshore patrol vessel of the navy SLNS Sagarawardena and captured its captain and sank the surveillance and command ship A 516 at Kankesanthurai. They broke the short lived ceasefire by the bombing of SLNS Sooraya and SLNS Ranasuru using frogmen and later sank the surveillance and command ship SLNS Edithara Kankesanthurai.In August 1996, the Sea Tigers attacked a cargo vessel MV Princess Wave while it was loading Ilmenite from Pulmoddai, a traditional Tamil homeland. 9 local workers were wounded in the underwater bomb blast. That year, Sea Tigers took part in the Battle of Mullaitivu landing troops along the coast as part of the main attack and then preventing the navy from landing a relief force, sinking the SLNS Ranaviru in the process.
In May 1997, Sea Tigers badly damaged another cargo vessel by placing two to five kilograms of explosives on the hull, below the water, just near the propeller. The vessel was a cargo vessel named Athena loaded with 42,000 metric tons of Argentinian wheat worth over Rs 570 million.
In 2001, the Sri Lankan Navy launched the Operation "Varuna Kirana", to stop LTTE sea tiger convoys from retrieving weapons and equipment from LTTE smuggling ships in the open seas. However, this was ultimately unsuccessful. The SLN units were spread out, and frequently found themselves outnumbered by LTTE convoys, with 10-15 vessels in each caravan pitted against SLN vessels operating in pairs. The sea tigers also benefitted from weak intelligence gathering by the navy and the poor communications between the navy and the air force.
During several of the LTTE offensive campaigns the Sea Tigers landed troops to engage and distract Sri Lankan Army units; the latest was when the LTTE attacked the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal faction in the east in 2004. The most significant use of combined operations was at the Second Battle of Elephant Pass in the Spring of 2000, when some 1,200 cadres were landed behind enemy lines.
Sea Tigers' fast patrol boats and smaller suicide boats had engaged and sunk around 29 Sri Lanka Navy fast patrol boats. They also attacked the main SLN naval base in a suicide bomber vessel mission at Trincomalee and damaged one of the two SLN catamarans used as troop transports.
On October 20, 2006, the Sri Lankan Navy reported that it had sunk 2 boats, and damaged several others in a major skirmish which reportedly left at least 20 rebels killed in the naval battle but not confirmed by the Sea Tigers.
On November 1, 2008, a sea battle occurred between Sri Lankan navy and Sea Tigers. During the initial attack at about 05:45 seven Black Sea Tigers died, while four LTTE attack craft were destroyed, 14 Tamil Tigers were killed and about as many others were reported injured. The Sea Tigers then intercepted a twenty-vessel strong Sri Lankan Navy flotilla escorting a hovercraft that resulted in a heavy sea fight. According to pro-rebel sources, at about 7:00 After losing a Dvora Fast Attack Craft and the hovercraft, the Lankan navy was forced to withdraw, and had to tow a water jet propelled naval craft that was severely damaged to the Kankesanturai naval base. The battle followed reports that the Sri Lanka's air force had claimed to have bombed a base of the Sea Tiger chief, Soosai and captured a Sea Tiger base at Nachchikuda, along the north-western seaboard. The Sri Lanka Army launched heavy artillery barrages across the Northern Front following the sea battle. The attack also followed a dual Air Tiger air attack.
Demise
After 2005 the Sri Lankan Navy had undergone several major reforms and unlike in the past the navy received more political support. Thus with the beginning of the Fourth Eelam War the Sea Tigers faced a more organised enemy adapted to asymmetric warfare. Development of the navy's intelligence wing and centralizing intelligence agencies allowed the government to track LTTE smuggling ships and instead of attempting to stop convoys bringing weapons ashore the navy attacked smuggling ships. Initially stopping at 200 nautical miles to unload cargo to smaller boats, the LTTE was forced to carry out operations further away due to loss of ships and in 2007 SLN followed and sank them near Australian territory. During naval engagements the Sea tigers who relied on swarming and suicide boats found themselves outnumbered due to the introduction of the Arrow-class which was of higher quality. When the LTTE used the standard tactic of swarming larger patrol vessels the SLN would fall back while the confused Sea Tiger units were swarmed by arrow boats and outnumbered 10 to 40. The use of sonar alongside simpler methods such as booms as well as increased patrols around ports countered frogmen actions.As a result of the military offensive that ended in May 2009, in the North of the country the Sri Lanka Armed Forces first recaptured all of the western seaboard that was once controlled by the LTTE, thus depriving the Sea Tigers of the bases it had in the west.
On the eastern seaboard the LTTE had also lost all of its Sea tigers bases and coast line it controlled including the headquarters of the Sea Tigers in the town of Mullaitivu.
Although the Sea Tigers were initially able to put up stout resistance during several major sea engagements that occurred in the early months of 2009 with the Sea tigers trying to penetrate the naval blockade maintained by the Sri Lanka Navy in the eastern seaboard, they have now been virtually eliminated as an organized naval force. On land the Sri Lanka Army has been able to capture several Sea Tiger boats and a boat yard including several partially completed submersibles.
In early February 2009, the military reported once again that it captured the last major Sea Tiger base killing three senior commanders in the process thus limiting Sea Tiger operational capabilities. As of 16 May 2009, the entire Sri Lankan coastline was captured by the Sri Lankan Armed Forces. Currently, the Sea Tigers are presumed to have been effectively and completely destroyed.
Units
Boats
Boats used by the LTTE are divided into Gunboats, Explosive Boats and Low Profile Vessels. Boats designs ranged from those based on leisure to fishing craft. These boats could be up to 15 meters long, and were usually equipped with four to six 250 Hp outboard engines and a mixture of weaponry: light and heavy machine guns mainly of 12.7mm, 14.5mm calibers and grenade launchers. While inferior to the patrol craft of the Sri Lankan Navy, the use of swarm tactics together with suicide boats negated the disadvantage. The LTTE were also said to possess radar evading stealth boats which are believed to be from North Korea. While their radar evading capabilities have been questioned their low profile makes them harder to spot.Light fibreglass boats were used for suicide bomber attacks, called the Idayan class. For every 20 Gunboats in a swarm there were 3 or 4 suicide craft which attempt to destroy or at least immobilize the larger vessels while gunboats distract them. The LTTE also manufactured several Low Profile Vessels which are slower than other boats but stealthier.
The Sea Tiger attack vessels are only at sea during operations and training; when idle they are loaded on large trailers and hidden in the dense jungle southwest of Mullaitivu or even transported to the west coast if needed.