SS El Faro
SS El Faro was a United States-flagged, combination of roll-on/roll-off and lift-on/lift-off cargo ship crewed by U.S. merchant mariners. Built in 1975 by Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. as Puerto Rico, the vessel was renamed Northern Lights in 1991 and, finally, El Faro in 2006. She sank with her entire crew of 33 on October 1, 2015, after steaming into the eyewall of Hurricane Joaquin.
El Faro departed Jacksonville, Florida, under the command of Captain Michael Davidson, bound for San Juan, Puerto Rico, at 8:10 p.m. EST on September 29, 2015, when then-Tropical Storm Joaquin was several hundred miles to the east. Two days later, after Joaquin had become a Category 4 hurricane, the vessel likely encountered swells of and winds over as she sailed near the storm's eye. Around 7:30 a.m. on October 1, the ship had taken on water and was listing 15 degrees. The last report from the captain, however, indicated that the crew had contained the flooding. Shortly after that, El Faro ceased all communications with shore.
On October 2, the 40-year-old ship was declared missing. An extensive search operation was launched by the United States Coast Guard, with help from the United States Navy, the United States Air Force, and the Air National Guard. During the search, another vessel, Emerald Express, was discovered in the eye of the hurricane. Searchers recovered debris and a damaged lifeboat, and spotted an unidentifiable body. El Faro was declared sunk on October 5. The search was called off at sunset on October 7, by which time more than had been covered by aircraft and ships. The Navy sent to conduct an underwater search for El Faro on October 19, 2015. Apache identified wreckage on October 31 "consistent with the cargo ship... in an upright position and in one piece". The next day, November 1, the Navy announced a submersible had returned images that identified the wreck as El Faro.
Construction, modification and earlier career
El Faro was built by the Sun Shipbuilding and Drydock Corporation in Chester, Pennsylvania, in 1975 as Puerto Rico. As operated by the Navieras de Puerto Rico Steamship Company, Puerto Rico hauled cargo to and from the East Coast for fifteen years. In 1991, she was purchased by Saltchuk Resources, the parent company of TOTE Maritime, and renamed Northern Lights. Under Saltchuk, she frequently sailed between Tacoma, Washington, and Anchorage, Alaska.In 1992, the ship underwent a conversion at Atlantic Marine Shipyard in Mobile, Alabama. A 90-foot mid-body, which included an additional cargo hold and a spar deck, was added. Between 2005 and 2006 the ship was modified a second time, also at Atlantic Marine Shipyard, to carry lift-on/lift-off cranes. An additional 4875 long tons of fixed ballast was added, and the ship's load line was raised by about two feet so additional cargo could be carried. However, a required damage stability assessment was not performed.
In February 2003, just before the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, the ship was chartered by the Military Sealift Command as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom; she ferried Marines and military equipment from San Diego, California, to Kuwait. On March 19, while in the Persian Gulf, the vessel came under fire from missiles. The nearby explosions rocked the ship but caused no damage or injuries.
Through October 2005, near the end of the ship's chartered service, she made 25 voyages and 49 port calls. Collectively, 12,200 pieces of military equipment—weighing in all—were transported by the ship. Robert Magee, then president of TOTE, and the ship's crew were praised by United States Air Force general Norton A. Schwartz: "You and your team of professionals showcased the US flag industry at its best." After completing her military services in 2006, the ship was transferred by TOTE to its subsidiary company Sea Star Lines and renamed El Faro. The vessel returned to the original route and served as a "lifeline" between the U.S. mainland and Puerto Rico.
When she sank on October 1, 2015, El Faro was scheduled to return to Tacoma to relieve another vessel.
Vessel condition
El Faro had passed two inspections, one by the United States Coast Guard, in March and June 2014. She completed the American Bureau of Shipping class and statutory surveys in February 2015. The National Transportation Safety Board found that safety drills were conducted weekly and that the ship met stability criteria when she left Jacksonville, Florida, for her fateful voyage.Former crew members of El Faro expressed surprise and shock that the vessel had set sail with a major storm along its planned track. They said the vessel was "a rust bucket" that was not "supposed to be on the water" and that it suffered drainage problems and leaks in the galley compartment. They reported that the ship's decks were filled with holes as recently as two months before her sinking.
Following the ship's disappearance, the Coast Guard's Marine Safety Center staff examined El Faros sister ship, El Yunque. The staff found that the condition of El Yunques cargo ventilation system was poor and likely would have been a source of intermittent flooding during rolling in 25–30 ft seas.
Final voyage
On September 29, 2015, at 8:10 p.m., El Faro left Jacksonville for San Juan, Puerto Rico, carrying a cargo of 391 shipping containers, about 294 trailers and cars, and a crew of 33 people—28 Americans and 5 Poles. The decision to depart Jacksonville by the captain, Michael Davidson, was reasonable given the options available to avoid Hurricane Joaquin; however, he subsequently failed to take sufficient action to avoid the hurricane.Vessel route
Upon departure, Captain Davidson planned on using El Faros normal, direct route to San Juan, which he expected would pass south of Hurricane Joaquin; however, tropical storm and hurricane wind fields were forecast to be near the vessel's normal route.At the time, Hurricane Joaquin was still a tropical storm, but meteorologists at the National Hurricane Center forecast that it would likely become a hurricane by the morning of October 1, on a southwest trajectory toward the Bahamas. The vessel's voyage plan took it within of the storm, where seas in excess of were likely.
On September 30 at 6:40 a.m. after a review of updated weather data, Davidson and his chief mate decided to alter course slightly southward. Later, at 11:05 p.m., the third mate called Davidson and told him that maximum winds from Joaquin had increased to 100 mph and that the storm was moving toward El Faros planned track-line. A few minutes later, at 11:13 p.m., the third mate called a second time and suggested a diversion to the south. The second mate, Danielle Randolph, also called Davidson at about 1:20 am on October 1 and suggested a course change through Crooked Island Passage. Randolph voiced concern in an email to friends and family: "There is a hurricane out here and we are heading straight into it."
Hurricane Joaquin
Joaquin became a hurricane by 8:00 a.m. on September 30, then rapidly intensified. Throughout the rest of the day and into the morning of October 1, the storm continued to track southwest. By 11:00 pm, the storm had reached Category 3 intensity with maximum sustained winds of.Ten hours after departing from Jacksonville, El Faro had deviated from her charted course. Less than twenty hours later, at around 7:30 a.m. on October 1, the Coast Guard received a satellite notification that the vessel had lost propulsion, taken on water—though flooding was contained at the time of the message—and had a 15-degree list. The Coast Guard also received a single ping from the ship's Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacon. Subsequent attempts to open communications with El Faro were unsuccessful.
Marine Traffic's last reported position for El Faro was at 4:01 a.m., heading south-southeast at. According to a different marine positioning database, relayed by Reuters, the final relayed position of El Faro was at 7:56 a.m., about northeast of Crooked Island. This placed the vessel within the eyewall of the hurricane, situated near at 8:00 a.m., where winds in excess of and waves of likely battered the ship.
Voyage data recorder audio
On December 13, 2016, the NTSB released a 500-page transcript of the conversations that occurred on the bridge in the ship's final twenty-six hours, as recorded by the vessel's voyage data recorder and its six microphones.The transcript described a quickly deteriorating situation. At 5:43 a.m. on the morning of the sinking, Davidson took a phone call indicating suspected flooding in the no. 3 cargo hold and sent the chief mate to investigate. The crew began taking measures to try to assess and control the flooding. Thirty minutes later, the ship lost its steam propulsion plant. At 6:54 a.m., Davidson took a phone call describing the situation on board:
- "It's miserable right now. We got all the uhh—all the wind on the starboard side here. Now a scuttle was left open or popped open or whatever so we got some flooding down in three hold—a significant amount. Umm, everybody's safe right now, we're not gonna abandon ship—we're gonna stay with the ship. We are in dire straits right now. Okay, I'm gonna call the office and tell 'em . Okay? Umm there's no need to ring the general alarm yet—we're not abandoning ship. The engineers are trying to get the plant back. So we're working on it—okay?"
- "I have a marine emergency and I would like to speak with a QI. We had a hull breach- a scuttle blew open during the storm. We have water down in three hold. We have a heavy list. We've lost the main propulsion unit. The engineers cannot get it goin'. Can I speak with a QI please?"
- "We have uhh secured the source of water coming into the vessel. Uh, A scuttle was blown open... it's since been closed. However, uh, three hold's got a considerable amount of water in it. Uh, we have a very, very healthy port list. The engineers cannot get lube oil pressure on the plant, therefore we've got no main engine, and let me give you, um, a latitude and longitude. I just wanted to give you a heads up before I push that- push that button."
- "The crew is safe. Right now we're trying to save the ship now, but, uh, all available hands. We are forty-eight miles east of San Salvador. We are taking every measure to take the list off. By that I mean pump out that- pump out that hold the best we can but we are not gaining ground at this time."
- "Right now it's a little hard to tell because all the wind is... on that side too so we got a good wind heel goin'. But it's not getting any better."
- " gonna stay with the ship... no one's panicking, everybody's been made aware... Our safest bet is to stay with the ship during this particular time. The weather is ferocious out here and we're gonna stay with the ship... swell is out the northeast, a solid ten to twelve feet spray, high winds, very poor visibility..."
At 7:15 a.m., the chief mate returned to the bridge:
- Chief mate: "I think that the water level's rising, Captain."
- Captain: ". Do you know where it's comin' from?"
- Chief Mate: " first the Chief said something hit the fire main. Got it ruptured. Hard."
- Captain: "Um, there's no way to secure that?"
- Chief Mate: "We don't know if they still have any pressure on the fire main or not. Don't know where's sea – between the sea suction and the hull or what, uh, but anything I say is a guess."
At 7:24 a.m., Davidson, with a crew member on the phone, said, "We still got reserve buoyancy and stability." He then instructed the second mate to ring the general alarm and wake up the crew. Davidson then gave the order to abandon ship, and about a minute later could be heard on the bridge calling out, "Bow is down, bow is down!" He then called over the UHF radio for the chief mate to "Get into your rafts! Throw all your rafts into the water! Everybody get off! Get off the ship! Stay together!"
For the next several minutes, Davidson tried to help a panicked helmsman get off the bridge, with alarms ringing all around. The captain repeatedly told the helmsman not to panic: "Work your way up here", "You're okay, come on", and "I'm not leavin' you, let's go!" The helmsman exclaimed, "I need a ladder! A line!" and "I need someone to help me!" The VDR recording ends at 7:39 a.m. with the captain and the helmsman still on the bridge. The final words recorded were from Davidson to the helmsman one second before the end of the recording, "It's time to come this way!"