Roger Masson
Roger Masson was a Swiss military officer who held the rank of Colonel-Brigadier. Masson joined the Swiss armed forces straight from university and rose rapidly through the ranks during the interwar period to become a member of the general staff. In 1931, he became co-editor and later editor of the "Swiss Military Review", a position he held until 1967. In 1935, he became a lecturer at the ETH Zurich. In 1936, he was put in command of the "Nachrichtendienstes der Schweiz", the military intelligence service of Switzerland.
During the World War II, there were two political groupings in Switzerland. The first group believed that if the country was attacked by the Allies, it would be best to take the lead to ensure an advantage. The other group, of which Masson was a member, believed that the Swiss army would fight any aggressor, so it was in the interest of the German Reich to ensure the country maintained its neutrality. In 1942, to ensure the Germans understood that Switzerland was seeking to remain neutral, Masson decided to met with German SS officer Walter Schellenberg with the approval of General Henri Guisan and senior echelons. Schellenberg knew that a group close to Hitler wanted to invade Switzerland and he wanted assurances on the actions of the Swiss Army in the event of an Allied attack. When Guissan met Schellenberg, Guisan offered a statement that confirmed that should the Allies attack Switzerland, they would be attacked. This confirmed the question of Swiss neutrality for the Germans and removed the threat of invasion. After the war, Masson was investigated by a federal judge, who concluded that Masson was acting in the best interests of the country. Historical analysis of his actions concluded that Masson took unnecessary risks and could have been blackmailed, but it did settle the question of neutrality. What is overlooked is that Masson created an effective and professional military intelligence service during the interwar period.Life
Masson was born on 1 July 1894 in Zürich. He was the son of commercial director Jules Auguste and Eugénie Jeanneret. After completing his high school diploma and studying history at the University of Neuchâtel, Masson joined the Swiss Armed Forces, becoming an infantry soldier. In 1915, he was promoted to lieutenant. In 1922, Masson was promoted to Captain, becoming an infantry instructor and by 1927 had become a member of the general staff. In 1928, he attended ETH Zurich where he studied military science, before continuing study at the École supérieure de guerre in Paris. In 1931, Masson became a co-editor and later editor-in-chief of the Swiss Military Review, which is a Swiss publication devoted to security and defence policy issues, a position he held until 1967. In 1935, Masson became a lecturer in the ETH Zurich. At the same time, he was promoted Chief of Staff of Division 1.Swiss military intelligence organisation
In 1936, Masson was put in charge of section 5 of General staff, which constituted the military intelligence service of the Swiss armed forces. In the years leading up to the war, he attempted to rebuild the section that had been virtually dissolved during the interwar period. This happened due to a number of complex reasons that included personal problems, lack of understanding, the general staff disliked having an intelligence agency and the false belief in the security provided by the League of Nations as well as the false belief that peace-time sources of information would be available during a time of war or crises. With the approach of war, Chief of the Army General Staff Jakob Labhart issued an order on 22 February 1938 that contained instructions to rebuild army intelligence. Combined with an increased budget, it authorised Masson to form a strategic intelligence service, known as "Id". At the time, Masson recognised that Swiss Intelligence would no longer only offer intelligence on basic military facts but instead focus on all German operations. At the time that agency was still both underfunded and understaffed but it wasn't until the Munich crisis of August 1938 and the agencies successful intelligence operation that the Swiss Government recognised that it needed a well-funded intelligence service. Masson was able to use the money to open field-offices on the northern, western, and southern front as well as fund training for new agents as well as recruit new informants.
On the 1 March 1942, Masson was promoted to Assistant Chief of Staff with the rank of colonel-brigadier. In January 1944, group Id was expanded to include the territorial service and renamed Group "Ib". This resulted in Masson commanding a unit consisting of 300,000 men.Masson's contact with the German Reich
Origin of the Masson-Schellenberg contact
The first person who was directly involved in initiating the connection was Swiss lawyer and police fiction writer. On 23 March 1938, Meyer purchased Wolfsburg Castle near Ermatingen, that would eventually be used to host the meetings between Masson and Schellenberg. On 29 August 1939, Meyer joined the Army and on 7 November 1939, Meyer was transferred to the army staff in Interlaken at the request of Roger Masson and promoted to the rank of captain, effectively to work in the Swiss intelligence service. Meyer's responsibility as a lawyer was to evaluate, view and forward the reports of the intelligence collection points as well as monitor the domestic political situation. One of these tasks was to observe the National Movement of Switzerland, a Nazi umbrella organization, which was to merge various Nazi organizations into a National Socialist Unity Party.Business connections with Henry Guisan Jr.
In 1941, Captain Meyer was best man to Lieutenant Colonel Henri Guisan Jr., the son of General Henri Guisan, a Swiss military officer who held the office of General of the Swiss Armed Forces. General Guisan was pleased that Meyer was looking after his son. On 23 August 1941, General Guisan, appointed Meyer as his personal intelligence officer and also entrusted him with duties of his personal security. Guisan Jr. approached Meyer in the autumn of 1941 to ask his help in obtaining an entry visa for SS officer Hans-Wilhelm Eggen. Meyer succeeded in this in consultation with his superiors, Masson's deputy Werner Müller and Masson himself. The Federal Police Department issued the visa and Eggen left for Zürich on 30 October 1941. Eggen explained to him that Warenvertriebs-G.m.b.H., a procurement company for the SS, which he had founded on behalf of the SS, wanted to buy wooden barracks. Eggen had Extroc SA, a shareholding company founded in Lausanne on 29 August 1941, in mind as the seller. Guisan Jr. was a member of the board of Extroc SA, shareholders were the Basel merchants Rudolf Haenger sr. and Rudolf Walter Haenger Jr. 3,000 barracks were delivered to Warenvertriebs G.m.b.H., and Meyer represented first Extroc SA and later Warenvertriebs-G.m.b.H., receiving substantial fees from first one and then the other. The fee for the barracks amounted to 12 million francs, which was provided by the SS Main Economic and Administrative Office. This office required the approval of the head of foreign intelligence in Amt VI of the Reich Security Main Office, Brigadeführer Walter Schellenberg, to release the money. Eggen and Schellenberg had become close and often worked together. In doing so, Eggen avoided being subordinate to Schellenberg so that he would retain his personal independence, and remained in the SS-Führungshauptamt.German press campaign against Switzerland
In the autumn of 1941, German newspapers led a campaign against Switzerland accusing it for a "lack of neutrality". Masson therefore feared a pre-emptive attack on Switzerland. Another argument in favour of a pre-emptive attack was that of the Russian campaign, which had just begun in June 1941 and was still going well for Germany and the Nazi state still had strategic reserves available that could be used for invasion of Switzerland. Respect for Swiss sovereignty was not to be expected from Germany in the long term. It was basically not foreseen in Adolf Hitler's conception. Carl Schmitt, at the time the leading German jurist in international and constitutional law, described it as follows: The world is divided into Großräume, huge areas connected by history, economy, and culture. Each of these is dominated by one major imperial power. Germany, like every empire, has its own Großraum, into which its political ideas radiate and to which foreign intervention may not be exposed. In the order of these Großräume, the Großraumordnung, the leading people grant the people being led at most a graduated degree of autonomy. In the Großraum, there would be no sovereignty, no independence and no territorial integrity for the peoples being led.First meetings of Masson and Eggen
Meyer was aware of his superior Masson's position and suggested that he talk to Eggen who might be able to help. Masson agreed and instructed Meyer to organise a meeting with Eggen. On 24 November 1941, Masson, Eggen, and Meyer met at the Hotel Schweizerhof in Bern. Eggen gave Masson the impression that he was friendly to Switzerland and was full of ideas, and more importantly, that he had access to key German figures. Masson decided to meet Eggen again because, in his eyes, he could arbitrate Germany's false impression of Switzerland. In early December 1941, Masson asked Eggen for the first favour, namely that Germany forbid the Nazi Swiss journalist and propagandist Franz Burri from publishing informational pamphlets produced by the International Presseagentur, inciting hostility against Switzerland. Burri claimed that General Guisan was under the influence of Jews, plutocrats and Freemasons and was a lackey of Anglo-Saxon politics. Eggen was able to fulfill Masson's wish with the help of his commanding officer, Hans Jüttner, the head of the SS Führungshauptamt, and the head of the SS-Hauptamt Gottlob Berger. In early December 1941, Masson reported his contacts with Eggen to the head of General Guisan's personal staff, Bernard Barbey. Barbey advised him to keep quiet about the contact.