Paul Reynaud


Paul Reynaud was a French politician and lawyer prominent in the interwar period, noted for his economic liberalism and vocal opposition to Nazi Germany.
Reynaud opposed the Munich Agreement of September 1938, when France and the United Kingdom gave way before Hitler's proposals for the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. After the outbreak of World War II, Reynaud became the penultimate Prime Minister of the Third Republic in March 1940. He was also vice-president of the Democratic Republican Alliance center-right party. Reynaud was Prime Minister during the German defeat of France in May and June 1940; he persistently refused to support an armistice with Germany and unsuccessfully attempted to save France from German occupation in World War II, and resigned on 16 June.
After unsuccessfully attempting to flee France, he was arrested by Philippe Pétain's administration. Surrendering to German custody in 1942, he was imprisoned in Germany and later Austria until liberation in 1945, where he was released after the Battle of Itter Castle in which one of the leaders, German Major Josef Gangl, declared a hero by the Austrian resistance, took a sniper's bullet to save Reynaud.
Elected to the National Assembly in 1946, he became a prominent figure again in French political life, serving in several cabinet positions. He favoured a United States of Europe, and participated in drafting the constitution for the Fifth Republic, but resigned from government in 1962 after disagreement with President de Gaulle over changes to the electoral system.

Early life and politics

Reynaud was born in Barcelonnette, Alpes-de-Haute-Provence, the son of Alexandre and Amelie Reynaud. His father had made a fortune in the textile industry, enabling Reynaud to study law at the Sorbonne. He entered politics and was elected to the French Chamber of Deputies from 1919 to 1924, representing Basses-Alpes, and again from 1928, representing a Paris district. Although he was first elected as part of the conservative "Blue Horizon" bloc in 1919, Reynaud shortly thereafter switched his allegiance to the centre-right Democratic Republican Alliance party, later becoming its vice-president.
In the 1920s, Reynaud developed a reputation for laxity on German reparations, at a time when many in the French government backed harsher terms for Germany. In the 1930s during the Great Depression, particularly after 1933, Reynaud's stance hardened against the Germans at a time when all nations were struggling economically. Reynaud backed a strong alliance with the United Kingdom and, unlike many others on the French Right, better relations with the Soviet Union as a counterweight against the Germans.
Reynaud held several cabinet posts in the early 1930s, but he clashed with members of his party after 1932 over French foreign and defense policy. In June 1934, Reynaud defended in the Chamber of Deputies the need to devalue the French franc, whose belonging to the gold standard was increasingly harmful for the French economy, but in those years French public opinion was opposed to any devaluation.
He was not given another cabinet position until 1938. Like Winston Churchill, Reynaud was a maverick in his party and often alone in his calls for rearmament and resistance to German aggrandizement. Reynaud was a supporter of Charles de Gaulle's theories of mechanized warfare in contrast to the static defense doctrines that were in vogue among many of his countrymen, symbolized by the Maginot Line. He strongly opposed appeasement in the run-up to the Second World War. He also clashed with his party on economic policy, backing the devaluation of the franc as a solution to France's economic woes. Pierre Étienne Flandin, the leader of the Democratic Republican Alliance, agreed with several of Reynaud's key policy stances, particularly on Reynaud's defence of economic liberalism.
The franc was devalued, in a range between 25% and 34%, by the Popular Front government presided by Leon Blum on 1 October 1936.

Return to government

Reynaud returned to the cabinet in 1938 as Minister of Justice under Édouard Daladier. The Sudeten Crisis, which began not long after Reynaud was named Minister of Justice, again revealed the divide between Reynaud and the rest of the Alliance Démocratique; Reynaud adamantly opposed abandoning the Czechs to the Germans, while Flandin felt that allowing Germany to expand eastward would inevitably lead to a conflict with the Soviets that would weaken both. Reynaud publicly made his case, and in response Flandin pamphleted Paris in order to pressure the government to agree to Hitler's demands. Reynaud subsequently left his party to become an independent. However, Reynaud still had the support of Daladier, whose politique de fermeté was very similar to Reynaud's notion of deterrence.
Reynaud, however, had always wanted the Finance ministry. He endorsed radically liberal economic policies in order to draw France's economy out of stagnation, centered on a massive program of deregulation, including the elimination of the forty-hour work week. The notion of deregulation was very popular among France's businessmen, and Reynaud believed that it was the best way for France to regain investors' confidence again and escape the stagnation its economy had fallen into. The collapse of Léon Blum's government in 1938 was a response to Blum's attempt to expand the regulatory powers of the French government; there was therefore considerable support in the French government for an alternative approach like Reynaud's.
Paul Marchandeau, Daladier's first choice for finance minister, offered a limited program of economic reform that was not to Daladier's satisfaction; Reynaud and Marchandeau swapped portfolios, and Reynaud went ahead with his radical liberalization reforms. Reynaud's reforms were implemented, and the government faced down a one-day strike in opposition. Reynaud addressed France's business community, arguing that "We live in a capitalist system. For it to function we must obey its laws. These are the laws of profits, individual risk, free markets, and growth by competition."
With Reynaud as Minister of Finance, the confidence of the investors returned and the French economy recovered.
Reynaud's reforms involved a massive austerity program. At the outbreak of war, however, Reynaud was not bullish on France's economy; he felt that the massive increase in spending that a war entailed would stamp out France's recovery.
The French Right was ambivalent about the war in late 1939 and early 1940, feeling that the Soviets rather than Nazi Germany were the greater long-term threat. Daladier regarded the war with Germany as the greater priority and so refused to send aid to the Finns, who were under attack from the USSR, then loosely allied to Germany, in the Winter War. News that the Finns had sued for peace in March 1940 prompted Flandin and Pierre Laval to hold secret sessions of the legislature that denounced Daladier's actions; the government fell on 19 March. The government named Reynaud Prime Minister of France two days later.

Prime minister, resignation, and arrest

Appointment

Despite Reynaud's growing popularity, the Chamber of Deputies elected him as Premier by a narrow margin of just one vote, with most of his own party abstaining. Notably, over half of the votes in Reynaud's favour came from the French Section of the Workers' International party. Given the significant support from the left and opposition from many right-wing parties, Reynaud's government faced considerable instability. Many on the right called for Reynaud to shift focus from Germany to the Soviet Union. Additionally, the Chamber mandated that Daladier, whom Reynaud personally blamed for France's weaknesses, serve as Reynaud's Minister of National Defence and War.
One of Reynaud's initial actions was attending a meeting of the Anglo-French Supreme War Council in London on 28 March 1940. The meeting culminated in a declaration with British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, stating that neither country would seek a separate peace. The joint communiqué asserted, "Both Governments mutually undertake that during the present war they will neither negotiate nor conclude an armistice or treaty of peace except by mutual agreement. They undertake to maintain after conclusion of peace a community of action for so long as may be necessary".
On 15 June 1940, the French cabinet rejected a British proposal—conceived by Jean Monnet and supported by De Gaulle—for a union between France and Britain. Reynaud abandoned the idea of a "long war strategy" based on attrition. To divert German attention from France, Reynaud considered expanding the war to the Balkans or Northern Europe. He played a key role in initiating the Allied campaign in Norway, although it ended in failure. Following Britain's decision to withdraw on 26 April, Reynaud travelled to London to personally urge the British to continue their fight in Norway.

The German breakthrough

The Battle of France began less than two months after Reynaud assumed office. The initial German attack in early May 1940 severely damaged French defences, and Paris was under threat. On 15 May, just five days after the invasion began, Reynaud reached out to Churchill and famously remarked, "We have been defeated... we are beaten; we have lost the battle... The front is broken near Sedan." The dire state of French equipment and morale was underscored by a postcard found on the body of an officer who had committed suicide in Le Mans. The postcard read: "I am killing myself Mr President to let you know that all my men were brave, but one cannot send men to fight tanks with rifles."
On 18 May, Reynaud dismissed Commander-in-Chief Maurice Gamelin and replaced him with Maxime Weygand.
On 26 May, Reynaud attended a meeting in London with Churchill. During the meeting, Churchill informed the War Cabinet that Reynaud had declared the French military situation as hopeless. Reynaud stated he had no intention of signing a separate peace with Germany but might be compelled to resign, leaving the possibility that others in the French government could sign such a treaty. Churchill also mentioned that he did not rule out talks with Mussolini, who was still neutral at that time. Later that day, Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax met with Reynaud before his return to France. This marked the beginning of the British May 1940 War Cabinet Crisis, where Halifax supported what was known as "the Reynaud Option"—exploring negotiations with the Italians for acceptable peace terms, potentially involving concessions in the Mediterranean. However, Churchill ultimately overruled Halifax.
On 28 May, Churchill sent a telegram to Reynaud confirming that there would be no immediate approach to Mussolini, although the option remained open. Mussolini had already rejected an overture by President Roosevelt based on suggestions from Britain and France. It was also revealed on 28 May that Italy was preparing to enter the war on Germany's side, which would occur on 10 June.
In early June, Charles de Gaulle, whom Reynaud had long supported and one of the few French commanders to achieve success against the Germans in May 1940, was promoted to brigadier general and appointed undersecretary of war.