Battle of Tarakan (1945)
The Battle of Tarakan was an engagement fought between Allied and Japanese forces on the island of Tarakan off Borneo during May and June 1945. It formed the first stage in the World War II Borneo campaign. The Allies' main goal in attacking Tarakan was to capture the island's airfield and develop it into a base to support further offensives in the Borneo area.
After several weeks of preparatory air and naval bombardments Allied forces comprising the Australian 26th Brigade and a small Netherlands East Indies contingent conducted an amphibious landing in south-west Tarakan on 1 May 1945. This operation was heavily supported by Australian and United States air and naval units. The Japanese garrison had expected an attack and after several days of fighting withdrew to defensive positions in the centre of the island. It took several weeks of tough fighting for the Australian troops, who continued to be supported by Australian and US air units, to secure Tarakan. Most Japanese resistance ended in mid-June.
The airfield on Tarakan which was the main objective of the invasion was so heavily damaged by the pre-invasion bombardments that it could not be brought into service until the last phase of the Borneo Campaign. As a result, the battle is generally regarded as having not justified its costs to the Allies.
Background
Geography
is a triangle-shaped island off the coast of Borneo. The island is roughly long from its northernmost point to the southern tip and wide towards the north of the island. The small island of Sadau is located about off Tarakan's west coast. Almost all of Tarakan's coastline is swampy, and in 1945 mangroves on the northern half of the island stretched to inland. The coastal mangroves in the southern portion of the island were narrower. Inland from the swamps, most of central Tarakan comprised a series of steep and densely forested hills just over high. Tarakan is located three degrees north of the equator and has a tropical climate. The maximum temperature for most days is about, and relative humidity is consistently high at about 90 percent.In 1945, Tarakan Town was the main settlement of the island. This town was located inland, and was separated from the south-west coast by several small hills covered in low vegetation. Four piers used to dock oil tankers were located on this coastline at the settlement of Lingkas, and were connected to Tarakan Town by three surfaced roads. Tarakan airfield was located about north-west of Tarakan Town. Of the island's two oilfields, Sesanip Oilfield was located at the north-east edge of the airfield while the larger Djoeata or Juata Oilfield was to the north. The village of Djoeata was located on Tarakan's north-west coast and linked to Djoeata Oilfield by a track.
Japanese occupation
Prior to World War II, Tarakan formed part of the Netherlands East Indies and was an important oil production centre. The island's two oilfields produced 80,000 barrels of oil per month in 1941. Securing Tarakan's oilfields formed one of Japan's early objectives during the Pacific War. Japanese forces landed on the island's east coast on 11 January 1942. They defeated the small Dutch garrison during two days of fighting in which half the defenders were killed in battle or executed thereafter. While the oilfields were sabotaged by the Dutch before surrendering, Japanese engineers were able to swiftly restore them to production. By early 1944 350,000 barrels of oil were being extracted from the island each month.Tarakan's 5,000 inhabitants suffered under Japan's occupation policies. The large number of troops stationed on the island caused food shortages and many civilians suffered from malnutrition. The Japanese authorities brought 600 labourers to Tarakan from Java who were treated brutally. Approximately 300 Javanese women also travelled to Tarakan after receiving false offers of clerical and clothes-making jobs from the Japanese and were forced to work as prostitutes.
Tarakan's value to the Japanese evaporated with the rapid advance of Allied forces into the area during 1944. The last Japanese oil tanker left Tarakan in July 1944, and heavy Allied air raids later in the year destroyed the oil production and storage facilities. Hundreds of Indonesian civilians may have also been killed by these raids. The Allies also laid mines near Tarakan, which, combined with patrols by air and naval units, prevented Japanese merchant vessels and transports from docking at the island.
In line with the island's declining importance, the Japanese garrison on Tarakan was reduced in early 1945. One of the two infantry battalions stationed on the island was withdrawn to Balikpapan. This battalion was destroyed by the Australian 7th Division in July during the Battle of Balikpapan.
Planning
Allied strategy
In late February 1945 General Douglas MacArthur, the commander of the Allied South West Pacific Area, issued plans for landings in the southern Philippines islands and Borneo. These operations would build on the success of the American forces that had liberated Leyte and most of Luzon in the Philippines during late 1944 and early 1945. The attack on Borneo formed part of what was designed Operation Oboe. MacArthur allocated the Australian forces under his command to Oboe, with the landings in the Southern Philippines being assigned to American units.MacArthur justified Operations Victor and Oboe on the grounds that they would improve Allied prestige in the region, begin the process of re-establishing Dutch government in the NEI and ultimately free up American forces for the planned invasion of Japan. MacArthur also argued that the landings in Oboe would capture oilfields and ports that could be used by the Allied forces. The Australian government had been pressing MacArthur to use the Australian Army's I Corps in an operation that could improve Australia's standing during peace negotiations and he believed that Oboe would suit this purpose. This corps, which comprised two divisions of the Second Australian Imperial Force, had been out of action since early 1944. This had contributed to concerns in Australia that the country's military was being sidelined. MacArthur informed Australian Prime Minister John Curtin of the Oboe plan on 5 March. At this time MacArthur told the Australian Government that he would use I Corps' 7th and 9th Divisions in north Borneo and was considering using the 6th Division, which had been detached for operations in New Guinea, in Java. Senior Australian Army officers did not believe that the goals of Operation Oboe were worthwhile. In line with these concerns, Curtin withheld the 6th Division.
The initial aim of Operation Oboe was to first secure strategic locations in Borneo. Landings would then be made on Java in the Japanese-occupied NEI. The plan called for three landings on the east coast of Borneo; the landing on Tarakan was designated Oboe 1. It was to be followed by Oboe 2 at Balikpapan and Oboe 3 at Bandjarmasin. Allied troops would then be landed near Surabaya in Java as Oboe 4. Further planning added Oboe 5, which was to involve operations in the eastern NEI, and Oboe 6 which would capture the Brunei area in north-western Borneo. The attack on Java was dropped due when it wasn't authorised by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. This also led to the cancelation of Oboe 3, which had been intended to secure a base to support the landings on Java.
Further planning of Operation Oboe took place in early March. Operation Oboe 1 was scheduled for 1 May and assigned to the 26th Brigade, which was to be detached from the 9th Division. It would be followed by Oboe 6 on 10 June which would involve the remainder of the 9th Division. The 7th Division was allocated to Oboe 2, with the landing at Balikpapan being scheduled for 1 July. The landing forces in all three operations would be reinforced by additional units.
Planning for the attack on Tarakan
The primary objective for the Allied attack on Tarakan was to secure and develop the island's airstrip so that it could be used to provide air cover for subsequent landings in Brunei, Labuan and Balikpapan. The secondary objective for the operation was to secure Tarakan's oilfields and bring them into operation as a source of oil for the Allied forces in the theatre. The 3rd Company, Technical Battalion, KNIL was responsible for this.The 9th Division and 26th Brigade headquarters were responsible for planning the invasion of Tarakan. This work began in early March when both units had arrived at Morotai, and the final plans were completed on 24 April. The planners' work was hampered by poor working conditions and difficulties in communicating with General MacArthur's General Headquarters at Leyte. As part of the planning process each of Tarakan's hills was assigned a code name ; during the Australian Army's campaigns in New Guinea geographic features had been named on an ad hoc basis, and it was hoped that selecting names prior to the battle would improve the precision of subsequent planning and communications.
File:OG2415RAAFCommand.jpg|thumb|left|alt=Three men wearing military uniforms walking towards the camera. A tent and palm trees are in the background.|Rear-Admiral Forrest B. Royal, Lieutenant-General Sir Leslie Morshead and Air Vice-Marshal William Bostock during discussions of the planned landing at Tarakan on 12 April 1945
The Allied planners possessed detailed intelligence on Tarakan and its defenders. This intelligence had been gathered from a variety of sources which included signals intelligence, photographic reconnaissance flights and Dutch colonial officials. During the planning process the Allies believed that Tarakan was defended by a force of 4,000 men, including two infantry battalions. This estimate was considerably reduced shortly before the invasion when it was learned that one of the Japanese battalions had departed the island.
It was expected that Tarakan would be secured quickly. The planners anticipated that the operation would involve a short fight for the airfield followed by a consolidation phase during which the island's airfield and port would be developed. Significant fighting in Tarakan's interior was not foreseen, and no plans were developed for operations in areas other than the landing beaches, Tarakan Town and airfield. The planners did, however, correctly anticipate that the Japanese would make their main stand in an area other than the invasion beach and would not be capable of mounting a large counterattack.
The Allied plans also expected that Tarakan would be transformed into a major base within days of the landing. Under the pre-invasion planning it was intended that a wing of fighter aircraft would be based at Tarakan six days after the landing and this force would be expanded to include an attack wing nine days later and staging facilities for a further four squadrons of aircraft within 21 days of the landing. It was also expected that the 26th Brigade Group and its supporting beach group would be ready to leave Tarakan by 21 May and the RAAF units could be redeployed in mid-June after providing support for the landing at Balikpapan.
Tarakan was the Australian Services Reconnaissance Department's first priority from November 1944. Prior to the invasion, I Corps requested that the SRD provide intelligence on Japanese positions in northern and central Tarakan. A five-man strong party landed on the island on the night of 25/26 April and reconnoitred the defences on Tarakan's north coast, though the operative who was assigned to the centre of the island became lost and did not reach this area. The SRD operatives withdrew from Tarakan on the night of 29/30 April and landed on the mainland of Borneo. They were unable to transmit the intelligence they had collected, however, as their radio set malfunctioned. Members of the party eventually landed within the Allied beachhead on Tarakan on 3 May to report to the 26th Brigade, but Whitehead was disappointed with the results of this operation and made no further use of the SRD during the battle.