Operation Appearance
Operation Appearance was a British landing in the British Somaliland Protectorate against troops of the Italian Army. The Italian conquest of British Somaliland had taken place in August 1940, seven months earlier. The British had withdrawn from the protectorate after a delaying action at the Battle of Tug Argan. This withdrawal, after the disastrous conclusion of the Battle of France and the Italian declaration of war on 10 June 1940, had repercussions among British leaders. It led the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, to lose confidence in General Archibald Wavell, the British commander in the Middle East, which culminated in Wavell's sacking on 20 June 1941.
British, Empire and Commonwealth forces from Britain, British India, Australia and South Africa in Aden trained for a prospective invasion of British Somaliland. The Far Eastern Fleet provided Force D, comprising two cruisers, two destroyers and a collection of adapted troop transports. To deceive the Italians in Ethiopia about British intentions in East Africa, Operation Camilla was leaked, suggesting that troop movements to Sudan were for an invasion of British Somaliland and that a diversionary operation would come from Kenya in the south. In Operation Canvas, the real invasion plan, Kenya was the base for the main invasion.
Force D and the Aden Striking Force conducted a beach landing at Berbera on 16 March 1941, taking the port by The Italian garrison made a symbolic resistance and following their orders from the Duke of Aosta, withdrew into Ethiopia, most of their local troops deserting. In a few days, Berbera was developed to receive troops and supplies for the operations against Ethiopia, reducing the supply distance to the fighting front by. A British military administration was imposed on the protectorate, the local police and the Somaliland Camel Corps were re-established, civilians were disarmed and the economy was revived.
Background
Strategic situation, 1940
On 10 June 1940, when Italy declared war on Britain and France, Italian military forces commanded by the viceroy and governor general of Italian East Africa, the Duke of Aosta became a threat to the British and French holds on their colonies in East Africa. Italian forces in Eritrea endangered British sea routes along the coast of East Africa, to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, French Somaliland, British Somaliland and Kenya Colony were vulnerable to attacks from the AOI. The collapse in France and the Armistice of 22 June 1940 drastically weakened the British strategic position in the Middle East and East Africa. The closure of the Mediterranean to British sea traffic left only the voyage around Africa, to supply the British forces in the Middle East. On the eve of the Italian declaration of war, the Italian colonies in East Africa had members of the armed forces and police and Ethiopian and Somali Askari. In July, the British had in British Kenya, Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and British Somaliland.Italian invasion
On 3 August 1940, British reconnaissance aircraft discovered that about troops had crossed the Ethiopian–British Somaliland frontier at Biyad, near Borama. The Italian invasion force moved in three widely dispersed columns, co-ordinated by wireless and liaison aircraft. The main Italian column advanced from the region of Harar in Italian Ethiopia, crossed the border south of Borama and reached Hargeisa on 5 August. The Somaliland Camel Corps skirmished with the Italians as they advanced and the central column attacked Hargeisa with infantry and light tanks covered by artillery and air attacks. A Rhodesian infantry company blocking the road retreated, after knocking out three light tanks, while the main British force slowly retired from the town. On the same day, the northern invasion column captured the port of Zeila, not far from French Somaliland and then slowly advanced the down the coast road to Berbera, taking Bulhar, about from Berbera, on 17 August.The main Italian force advanced in the centre from Hargeisa along the road to Berbera, only slightly delayed by road demolitions and improvised land mines. British troops in advanced positions were withdrawn on 10 August and the Battle of Tug Argan took place from 11 to 15 August. The Italians had achieved air superiority by 6 August and the defenders held the gap against Italian attacks for 72 hours, eventually running out of ammunition. Italian artillery superiority led to the defenders gradually being overwhelmed. By the time that the northern Italian column reached Bulhar, the defence of the Tug Argan gap had begun to collapse. Major-General Alfred Reade Godwin-Austen had been sent to command the forces in British Somaliland and on 14 August, judged that the situation at Tug Argan was irretrievable and was instructed by the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief Middle East Henry Maitland Wilson to withdraw from the protectorate. The garrison retreated to Berbera and by 18 August, most of the contingent had been evacuated to Aden, with the HQ sailing in on the morning of 19 August; Italian forces entered Berbera that evening. The British suffered killed and wounded; the Italians
Operation Camilla
After the retreat to Aden, the British established Military Mission No. 106 to conduct sabotage and subversion operations in occupied British Somaliland. The former Senior Administrative Officer of the protectorate, Reginald Smith, made several secret journeys to the land to glean information. In Cairo, General Archibald Wavell, GOC-in-C Middle East Command concocted Operation Camilla, a deception to mislead the Italians about the transfer of troops to Sudan. The operation was intended to convince the Italians that the troops movements were part of a plan to invade British Somaliland in February 1941 and then advance on Harar. Wavell wrote in a document that,The document purported Operation Canvas, the invasion of Italian Somaliland and Ethiopia from Kenya, to be a diversion; it was sent to the local commanders in East Africa using means by which the British expected it to leak to the Italians. The main invasion from Kenya required a huge supply effort and the plan to re-capture British Somaliland was intended to create a much closer supply route from Berbera for the southern invasion force. The port was rudimentary but improvements could quickly be effected. Aosta, the Italian commander of the AOI was convinced by February that an invasion of the colony was imminent.