1996 Spanish government formation


After the Spanish general election of 3 March 1996 failed to deliver an overall majority for any political party, extensive negotiations ensued to form a government in the country. As a result, the previous cabinet headed by Felipe González was forced to remain in a caretaker capacity for 62 days until the next government could be sworn in, the longest cabinet formation period in Spain until that time, to be surpassed only in 2015–2016.
The election failed to provide a majority for either the People's Party or a prospective left-wing bloc comprising the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party and United Left, with regionalist and nationalist political forces such as Convergence and Union, the Basque Nationalist Party and Canarian Coalition being left as kingmakers in negotiations. The PSOE's electoral overperformance compared to expectations had triggered speculation on whether Felipe González would be able to cling on to government instead of PP leader José María Aznar, an hypothesis that the former tried to cast off as he let the party with the most seats make its attempt at investiture, without ruling out "other possibilities" in the event of a failure.
After weeks of negotiations, the PP was able to reach confidence and supply agreements with CiU, the PNV and CC, ensuring Aznar's election as prime minister of a minority cabinet on 4 May 1996 and ending almost 14 years of uninterrupted Socialist governments under González. Aznar's agreement with CiU leader and president of the Government of Catalonia Jordi Pujol came to be known as the "Majestic Pact", under which Aznar agreed to the development of regional financing—which had already started during González's tenure—in addition to the transfer of new powers to Catalonia in various matters. The significance of such accord came to endure the 1996–2000 period, with critics blaming it for starting political dynamics that culminated in the 2017–2018 Spanish constitutional crisis.

Legal provisions

The Spanish Constitution of 1978 outlined the procedure for government formation, which started with the monarch summoning representatives of the various political groups in the Congress of Deputies to a round of talks or consultations, after which a candidate was to be nominated through the President of the Congress to attempt investiture as prime minister.
For a nominated candidate to be granted confidence, he or she required to secure the support of an absolute majority in the Congress, or of a plurality in a subsequent vote held 48 hours later. If any of such ballots was successful, the monarch would appoint the elected candidate as prime minister. Otherwise, a two-month period would begin in which new investiture proposals could be attempted under the aforementioned procedure, with parliament being automatically dissolved and a snap election held if no candidate was successful in securing the confidence of parliament.
The procedure for investiture processes was regulated within Articles 170 to 172 of the Standing Orders of the Congress of Deputies, which provided for the investiture debate starting with the nominated candidate explaining their political programme without any time limitations. Subsequently, spokespeople from the different parliamentary groups in Congress were allowed to speak for thirty minutes, with an opportunity to reply or rectify themselves for ten minutes. The nominated candidate was allowed to take the floor and speak at any time of his or her request during the debate.

Post-election developments

Initial positions

Ahead of the 1996 Spanish general election, the People's Party under José María Aznar had hoped to secure a "sufficient majority" of seats in the Congress of Deputies: a parliamentary plurality close enough an absolute majority to be able to govern alone. The election, however, saw an unexpectedly close result as the PP underperformed opinion poll expectations, falling 20 seats short of an overall majority in the Congress and leading the ruling Spanish Socialist Workers' Party of Prime Minister Felipe González by 1.2 percentage points and 15 seats, the smallest margin victory of a party in a Spanish election up to that point since 1977. This left the peripheral nationalist Convergence and Union and the Basque Nationalist Party —both of which had been very critical of the PP's perceived centralist platform during the electoral campaign—as the likely kingmakers. Additionally, Canarian Coalition had offered to support the party coming out on top if it supported its "non-negotiable" proposals for the Canary Islands.
The discussed outcomes in light of the election results were:
  • An alliance of the PP, CC and Valencian Union —parties with which the PP was allied at the regional level—with CiU, comprising 177 seats.
  • An unlikely alliance of PSOE with CiU, PNV and Basque Solidarity, which would add up to only 163 seats. Adding United Left to the bloc would raise the number to 184 seats, but such an agreement was deemed as impractical due to the ideological and personal animosities between IU's leader, Julio Anguita, and both González and CiU.
  • A PP–IU agreement, which would command 177 seats, was deemed as unnatural despite both parties' collaboration during the previous parliamentary term and their common opposition to González's government.
  • Parliamentary deadlock lasting for two months from a first failed investiture ballot, leading to a new general election to be held at some point throughout 1996.
In his election night speech, Aznar offered to reach out to other parties if he was granted the responsibility of forming a government; González conceded the election saying that he would propose to King Juan Carlos I that the party with the most seats be offered the chance to govern but that, if this failed, other possibilities would open up; whereas CiU leader and president of the Government of Catalonia, Jordi Pujol, argued that it was Aznar's turn to move but that he would stand up to the PP, hinting at difficult negotiations; PNV leaders Xabier Arzalluz and Iñaki Anasagasti demanded the PP to act with a different approach going forward, but argued that the results allowed their party to "intervene in Spain". Because of the diverging positions, the government formation process was widely expected to be lengthier than the one in 1993, which lasted for 33 days. The political differences between the PP and CiU were made evident during the celebration of the former's victory at its headquarters on election night, with party supporters chanting "Pujol, dwarf, speak Spanish", with Aznar downplaying these as being in a joking tone due to people's euphoria over the election results.

CiU as kingmaker

The parties' starting positions made clear that CiU's role was decisive. CiU announced that they would likely abstain or vote against Aznar's first investiture ballot, hoping that other parties such as the PSOE and the PNV would follow suit in order to allow the formation of a new government. On the PSOE side, González claimed that, while he did not contemplate the hypothesis of forming a government and would ensure an "orderly and responsible" transfer of power as interim prime minister, his party would vote against Aznar in any prospective investiture. Concurrently, Public Works minister Josep Borrell called for CiU to not allow Aznar's election on the basis that electoral results in Catalonia had shown "a general and clear rejection of a PP government". CC leader and president of the Canary Islands, Manuel Hermoso, offered to both CiU and the PNV to agree on minimum conditions to negotiate as a bloc any support to a future PP government. The Galician Nationalist Bloc, which had entered parliament for the first time, proposed an alliance between the PSOE and Catalan, Basque and Galician nationalist parties in the event that Aznar failed in his efforts. A citizen initiative issued a manifesto on 5 March, "We do not resign ourselves", claiming that voters had given 2.5 million more votes to parties to the left-of-centre than to the PP and its prospective nationalist allies and calling for PSOE, IU and other left-wing nationalist parties to set aside their political differences and try to form a government. The PNV was willing to enter negotiations with the PP, provided that the latter changed its policy of rejecting the reintegration of terrorist group ETA convicted prisoners.
The PP acknowledged that the only way to prevent a new election was to court Pujol's party, as parliamentary arithmetics meant that no government was possible without CiU at least consenting to it. At first, a successful Aznar's investiture in the first ballot was considered as unlikely due to the existing tensions between PP and CiU and the impossibility of reaching the 176-mark of an absolute majority without the latter, whereas a simple majority in the second ballot would require a way to circumvent the likely opposition from the left-of-centre parties, which added up to 166 seats as opposed to the 161 that a PP–CC–UV bloc could muster. As a result, Aznar's party set out a strategy to attract CiU, PNV and CC to a government, with an offer to CiU to negotiate a new concept of the income tax that would give autonomous communities the capacity to legislate and collect it. CiU, in turn, considered proposing a bilateral "fiscal agreement". These approaches raised concerns among PP's regionalist allies, UV and the Aragonese Party, who were hostile to some of CiU's positions and worried about an excessive decentralization that favoured Catalonia in detriment of their own regions. On 12 and 13 March, Aznar met with González and Anguita to inform them of his immediate plans and the framework of the agreements he was attempting with CiU, PNV and CC.
On 15 March, González encouraged Aznar to fully commit to an agreement with CiU that guaranteed Spain's governability—stating that a PP-led government would, in his opinion, be the most reasonable outcome in light of election results—but also reminded him of the limits established by the Constitution for the process of power transfers to the autonomous communities, set in the maintenance of territorial and social cohesion. Following a secret meeting between Aznar and Pujol on 17 March, the first between the two leaders since the election, González predicted that a prospective Aznar government would prove "unable to make decisions" and would "give the majority" back to the PSOE in a snap election.