Late Francoism
Late Francoism represents the final phase of the Francoist dictatorship, concluding with the death of Francisco Franco on November 20, 1975. This period is commonly dated from October 1969, when the "monocolor" government was established under the effective leadership of Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, Franco's chief advisor. This era is also recognized as the final crisis of Francoism, with some historians pinpointing its onset to the "Burgos trial" of December 1970. Shortly after Franco's demise, and Luis López Guerra observed that "from the early 1970s, it became apparent to the majority of Spaniards that, following a period of apparent stability, the nation was re-entering a pronounced crisis, evidenced primarily by escalating contemporary conflicts and profound uncertainty regarding the future".
According to Javier Tusell, this last phase was shaped by Franco's physical decline, the fragmentation of the regime's elite, the stagnation caused by uncertainty over the succession, and the increasing influence of the anti-Francoist opposition. Luis Suárez Fernández similarly noted the scarcity of clear policy directions between 1969 and 1975.
argues that the final six years of the regime reveal why it could not survive Franco's death: the erosion and political crisis affecting the dictatorship were so severe that any effort to sustain it lost credibility.
Background
In the 1960s, Francoist leaders considered the regime's future after the anticipated death of the Generalísimo Francisco Franco, who turned seventy in 1962. Two distinct factions emerged:- The "immobilists" sought to preserve the regime's continuity by maintaining the institutional framework of the Fundamental Laws of the Realm. They supported establishing—rather than restoring—a "Catholic, social, and representative" monarchy distinct from the liberal monarchy overthrown in 1931—embodied by Juan Carlos, son of Juan de Borbón, who had been under Franco's tutelage since 1948. This group included the majority of "" associated with Opus Dei, with Admiral Carrero Blanco—Franco's principal advisor and de facto government head—as their key figure, alongside the "old guard" Falangists of the National Movement.
- The "aperturists" advocated reforms that would align the political system with the social and economic changes produced by the post-1959 development cycle. They argued that economic modernization required corresponding political evolution. Drawn from within the Movement, their principal figures were Ministers: Manuel Fraga Iribarne, Minister of Information and Tourism; Fernando María Castiella, Minister of Foreign Affairs; and José Solís Ruiz, and. Solís attempted to revitalize the Movement through "political associations" and to expand worker participation in the Trade Union Organization, seeking broader social support. Some aperturists, including Solís and possibly Fraga, opposed Carrero Blanco's monarchic approach and favored a presidential model inspired by Gaullism.
The aperturists achieved one significant reform, the promoted by Fraga. However, Solís failed to implement the Statute of Associations, and union elections were used by clandestine workers' commissions to gain influence. The immobilists secured two decisive victories: the approval of the Organic Law of the State in 1967 and Franco's designation of Juan Carlos as his successor in July 1969. Juan Carlos swore allegiance to the Principles of the National Movement and assumed the title Prince of Spain. In presenting Juan Carlos to the Cortes, Franco declared that the decision would ensure that "everything be tied and well tied for the future".
Failure of Immobilist Continuism (1969-1973)
"Monocolor" Government
The ascendancy of Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco after Juan Carlos's designation as successor intensified the divide between the "technocrats" and the "aperturists." This tension culminated in the of August 1969, in which two Opus Dei–linked "technocrat" ministers—Economy Minister Juan José Espinosa San Martín and Commerce Minister Faustino García-Moncó Fernández, both of whom resigned—were indirectly implicated. The aperturists, José Solís Ruiz and Manuel Fraga Iribarne, attempted to use the scandal to weaken the technocrats, publicizing it through Movement-controlled media; Arriba even called it a "national disaster." The effort backfired: the technocrats emerged strengthened when Franco accepted Carrero Blanco's call for a "united government without wear and tear". Carrero submitted to Franco a sharply critical report on Solís, Fraga, and Foreign Minister Fernando María Castiella; it denounced Fraga's for enabling attacks "on the Spanish way of being and on public morality," citing the proliferation of morally objectionable material in print and theater.The crisis resulted in the "monocolor" government of October 1969, so termed by its critics because it was dominated by Opus Dei technocrats and figures loyal to Carrero Blanco and his associate Laureano López Rodó—though some historians note that the label is imprecise, as significant ministerial differences persisted. Carrero, while remaining vice president, effectively assumed presidential responsibilities, convening weekly meetings with ministers and presiding over preparatory "little councils" that shaped Council of Ministers decisions. The three aperturist ministers—Fraga, Solís, and Castiella—were dismissed, Falangist representation was further reduced, and López Rodó's influence was evident in the appointment of four ministers from the Commissariat of the. A symbolic gesture accompanying the reshuffle was the appearance of the new, Torcuato Fernández Miranda, in a white shirt rather than the traditional Falangist blue.
The 1969 cabinet departed from the long-standing balance among regime "families" that Franco had maintained. Javier Tusell interpreted this as evidence of the decline of Franco's political judgment; at seventy-five, he no longer arbitrated effectively between competing factions. Paul Preston likewise argues that Franco's approval of such an unbalanced government showed a diminished grasp of Spain's political and social realities. For Borja de Riquer, the new government marked a decisive triumph for Carrero Blanco, widely seen as Franco's presumptive successor and the chief guarantor of continuity. In his year-end message, Franco insisted that "everything had been tied and well tied". Yet Tusell emphasizes that Carrero lacked the qualifications to exercise what amounted to a presidency over a society increasingly distant from his worldview. The cabinet's formation deepened the existing rift between immobilists and aperturists. To counterbalance the Carrero–López Rodó axis, Franco appointed the Falangist Alejandro Rodríguez de Valcárcel to preside over the Cortes and the Council of the Realm, breaking the tradition of entrusting the post to a traditionalist.
File:Audiencia r.jpg|thumb|left|The Generalísimo Francisco Franco during an audience at the El Pardo Palace.
During the four years of the "monocolor" government, the divide between the immobilists—now firmly led by Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco with Franco's backing—and the aperturists deepened. Carrero was convinced that the regime faced a coordinated "subversive" campaign by communism and Freemasonry; in 1972 he warned the National Council of the Movement that Spain, like the "entire free world," was targeted by communist subversion and "liberal propaganda sponsored by Freemasonry". By contrast, aperturist leader Manuel Fraga Iribarne argued, shortly after his dismissal, that the country "would not tolerate stagnation" and questioned how new generations and middle classes could be integrated "without associations". Franco himself reaffirmed the ideological foundations of the regime, describing the Movement in October 1970 as "Spain's great reserve in any near or distant contingency" and stressing the need to transmit the "national spirit" to younger generations. He again invoked the Army as the guardian of national conscience and justified the July 18, 1936, uprising as a defense of Christian civilization.
Both immobilists and aperturists aimed to preserve the regime after Franco's death but diverged fundamentally: the former sought to maintain the authoritarian framework within a monarchy "of July 18", established by Franco rather than by dynastic right, while the latter advocated broadening participation through associations within the Movement. The immobilists, especially the most inflexible sector—termed "ultras" or the bunker for their resistance to change akin to Hitler's stance in the bunker of the Third Reich's Chancellery—dominated the National Council of the Movement. Their influence rested on strong military support and on a network of organizations, including the, the Guardia de Franco, the, the Hermandad del Maestrazgo, the, Fuerza Nueva, and the Guerrilleros de Cristo Rey.
A third faction emerged in these same years: the reformists, composed of former aperturists who viewed an internally guided, vaguely defined transition to "democracy" as the only viable exit from Francoism. Led by Manuel Fraga Iribarne, this group included senior administrators and public-sector executives, and younger Movement cadres such as, Rodolfo Martín Villa,, and Adolfo Suárez. Another prominent subgroup was the Christian-democratic "Tácito" collective, whose members would later play significant roles in the Spanish transition.
The central political objective of the government remained securing the succession of Don Juan Carlos. This process was complicated by the December 1971 announcement of the marriage between Don Alfonso de Borbón Dampierre and Franco's granddaughter María del Carmen Martínez-Bordiú Franco. Because the law allowed modification of the succession, the engagement prompted speculation that Alfonso—who claimed headship of the House of Bourbon by virtue of his father Infante Jaime's original dynastic position—might replace Juan Carlos. Juan Carlos intervened with Franco to avoid this outcome. Franco instead granted Alfonso the title Duke of Cádiz, placing him unusually high in the protocol, which Javier Tusell characterized as a "peculiar situation." Loyal to the regime, Alfonso sought the Ministry of Sports but was appointed instead to the largely ceremonial presidency of the Institute of Hispanic Culture.
Despite escalating social tensions, the monocolor government introduced no major political reforms. The only significant change was the abandonment of the name FET y de las JONS for the National Movement. The earlier project to create associations within the Movement was definitively shelved: on December 15, 1969, the National Council rejected the proposal at the request of Minister-Secretary General Torcuato Fernández Miranda. Franco himself warned the Cortes in November 1971 that ideological groups would effectively become political parties, which he rejected. Fernández Miranda, following Franco's instructions, ensured that associations would not be permitted "in his lifetime" or, as he confided, even afterward. Similarly, José Solís Ruiz's initiative to establish a framework for trade-union autonomy was abandoned; the 1971 Union Law merely reinforced the bureaucratic nature of the Trade Union Organization. Over these years, Carrero Blanco increasingly aligned with the position of the bunker, distancing himself from the "," who thereby lost their chief protector. Carrero argued that intransigence was a "duty" when "fundamental issues" were at stake and developed what Javier Tusell terms an "apocalyptic" view of political life, attributing all conflict to a concealed "subversive" minority of communists and Freemasons, occasionally extending this accusation to Christian democracy. This perspective was codified in a 98-page report submitted to Franco on March 17, 1970, titled Planning of a Government Action, which identified communism, Freemasonry, and Christian democracy as the regime's principal threats.
The government's immobilism soon provoked resignations, beginning with Minister of Public Works Federico Silva Muñoz in April 1970, who also sought greater funding for his department. His replacement, Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora, represented the most reactionary sector of the technocrats and opposed any form of pluralism. Two years later, Interior Minister Tomás Garicano Goñi resigned for similar reasons. Following Silva Muñoz's departure, only one member of the regime's Catholic "family," Alberto Monreal Luque, remained in the government.
Among the few notable accomplishments of the monocolor government was the 1970 , which introduced substantial reforms to the outdated Francoist educational system. Foreign policy under Gregorio López Bravo was also comparatively successful. Spain concluded a Preferential Agreement with the European Economic Community on 30 June 1970—though full membership remained impossible under an authoritarian regime—and signed a Friendship and Cooperation Agreement with the United States in August, followed by President Richard Nixon's visit to Spain the next month. A more contentious development involved commercial treaties with Eastern European socialist states and the Soviet Union in 1972, strongly opposed by the ultras, as well as Spain's recognition of the People's Republic of China. López Bravo was unable, however, to advance negotiations with the Holy See on revising the Concordat of 1953 in accordance with the reforms of the Second Vatican Council.
Efforts to improve the regime's international image included visits abroad by Prince Juan Carlos and Princess Sofía. These were not without difficulties. During a late 1971 visit to Washington, several newspapers cited Juan Carlos as saying that Spaniards desired "greater freedom," adding that the question was one of pace. Upon his return, Franco reprimanded him, reminding him that certain matters could be addressed abroad but not discussed domestically. Months earlier, The New York Timeshad run an interview under the headline "Juan Carlos Promises a Democratic Regime," prompting Minister Laureano López Rodó, Carrero's closest associate, to warn the prince to exercise greater caution.