Larry Temkin
Larry Temkin is an American philosopher and Distinguished Professor Emeritus of philosophy at Rutgers University. Temkin’s research focuses on normative ethics and political philosophy, and his work has been highly influential, particularly his works Inequality and Rethinking the Good.
Temkin received his Ph.D. in philosophy from Princeton University in 1983 under the supervision of Derek Parfit. He has previously taught at The University of Oxford and Harvard University. From 2000-2017, Temkin was professor of philosophy at Rutgers University, serving as chair of the department from 2014 to 2017.
Biography
Temkin graduated number one with a BA-Honors Degree from the University of Wisconsin–Madison in 1975, and received his Ph.D. in philosophy from Princeton University in 1983 under the supervision of Derek Parfit. He also studied at Oxford University in 1978-79. He began his professional career at Rice University, moving to in 2000. He has held Visiting Fellowships at the Australian National University, the National Institutes of Health, All Souls College, Harvard University’s Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics, and the National Humanities Center. In 2011-2012, and is the Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Distinguished Teaching at Princeton University in the University Center for Human Values. Temkin served as the chair of the philosophy department at Rutgers University from 2014 until 2017.The nature of equality
Most work on equality asks whether equality is desirable, and, if so, what kind of equality we should seek. In Inequality, Temkin asks a more basic question: when is one situation worse than another with respect to inequality?Sometimes the answer is obvious, but sometimes it is not. Consider, for instance, three situations: one in which many are well off and just a few are badly off, one in which many are badly off and just a few are well off, and one in which there is an equal number of well off and badly off people. The first situation may be one in which a minority has been singled out for mistreatment, making the inequality seem especially gratuitous or cruel. The second situation may be one in which a dominant elite oppresses and exploits the masses. And the third situation seems to feature the greatest deviations from pure equality. Other things being equal, it is hard to say which situation is worst with respect to equality. A case, it seems, can be made for any of the three.
Temkin uses such thought experiments to show that equality is not the simple notion it is often taken to be. Judgments of inequality's badness, he shows, turn on a host of considerations, such as how much deviation there is from pure equality, how gratuitous the inequality seems, and the extent to which individuals have an equality-based complaint. An individual's equality-based complaint, moreover, can depend on how she compares with the average person, the best off person, or all those better off than she; and, in addition, one might arrive at a judgment concerning the badness of an outcome’s inequality by adding individual complaints, focusing on the worst-off's complaints, or adding everyone's complaints, but giving special weight to larger complaints. In all, Temkin argues that at least eleven distinct aspects underlie egalitarian judgments.
Temkin also challenges the conventional view that equality is holistic and that it is essentially distributive. While inequalities between groups can be important, Temkin argues that, often, the proper object of moral concern is inequalities between individuals. And while equality is indeed a distributive principle, Temkin argues that what makes it distinctive is that it is essentially comparative – it expresses a fundamental concern for how individuals fare relative to each other. No other distributive principle, he argues, has that feature.
In all, Temkin mounts a case against the conventional view that equality is simple, holistic, and essentially distributive, and a powerful case for the view that it is complex, individualistic, and essentially comparative.
Luck egalitarianism
Many contemporary egalitarians have been identified as luck egalitarians, believing, roughly, that it is bad when one person is worse off than another through no fault or choice of her own. Temkin argues that the egalitarian’s fundamental concern should not be with luck per se but with comparative fairness. His view is that, among equally deserving people, it is bad, because unfair, for some to be worse off than others through no fault or choice of their own. But, among unequally deserving people, it is not bad, because not unfair, for someone less deserving to be worse off than someone more deserving, even if the former is worse off through no fault or choice of her own.To illustrate, egalitarians need not object if criminal John is worse off than law-abiding Mary, even if John craftily avoided capture and is worse off only because, through no fault or choice of his own, a falling limb injured him. In that case the effects of luck need not trouble egalitarians because they do not undermine comparative fairness.
On the other hand, egalitarians might well have reason to object if Betty injures herself saving a drowning child, and thus ends up worse off than others, even if the injury is a result of responsible free choice.
One might object that, on Temkin’s view, egalitarian concerns reduce to concerns about desert. But Temkin offers arguments suggesting that this is not so. First, on Temkin’s view, it is important that equally deserving people fare equally well, even if, in absolute terms, they are not getting what they deserve. Suppose that Fred and Martha both deserve to fare badly, and equally badly, but they both fare well, and equally well. That would be bad from the perspective of absolute desert but not from the perspective of comparative desert. From the perspective of absolute desert, but not from the perspective of comparative desert, it would be better if just one of them fared badly. So, Temkin shows that the concern for comparative fairness is not the same as the concern about absolute desert. Second, Temkin further argues that the concern about comparative fairness is distinct from the concern about comparative desert. Suppose that Susan is a really good person who chooses to give most of her income to the badly off, and that John is a less good person who permissibly chooses to spend his money on himself. If Susan predictably ends up worse off than John, this would be objectionable from the standpoint of comparative desert, since Susan is a morally more deserving person than John; but Temkin suggests that there may be no egalitarian objection to Susan’s being worse off than John, on the grounds that there may be no comparative unfairness in their relative positions, given that Susan autonomously chose to make herself worse off than John.
Welfarism and the leveling down objection
Many reject egalitarianism because of the leveling down objection, which holds that there is no respect in which merely lowering someone from a higher to a lower level of welfare improves a situation, even if it increases equality. So, for example, it is argued that there is no respect in which putting out the eyes of the sighted would improve matters even though this would make everyone equally blind. If that is right, then equality would seem to lack intrinsic value.Temkin defends egalitarianism against the leveling down objection. He argues that this objection derives much of its force from a widespread assumption – welfarism – according to which nothing matters morally except insofar as it impacts individual wellbeing. That view, Temkin argues, is counter-intuitive. It seems bad, after all, for sinners to fare better than saints even if there is no respect in which that is worse for the sinners or the saints. In general, Temkin argues that we value fairness and justice beyond the extent to which they are good for people. Welfarism, he writes, rules out impersonal ideals – those whose value does not lie wholly in their contributions to individual wellbeing – and many of our most important ideals, such as that of fairness, justice, knowledge, beauty, and truth are impersonal.
Of course, even if welfarism were false, it could still be the case that there is no respect in which leveling down the better off improves a situation. Temkin, however, thinks there is a respect in which this improves a situation – it does so with respect to equality. That, of course, does not mean that leveling down the better off would make things better all things considered. Equality, Temkin argues, is not all that matters, but it matters some.
Equality and priority
Much recent work in political theory addresses whether egalitarianism should be replaced by prioritarianism. Prioritarians hold that an outcome’s goodness is a function of overall wellbeing across all individuals, with extra weight given to worse off individuals. This view first appeared under the name “the priority view” in Derek Parfit’s renowned 1991 article “Equality or Priority.” But the idea dates back to Temkin’s 1983 Ph.D. thesis, where it was presented under the name “extended humanitarianism.” And the word “prioritarianism” first appears in Temkin’s “Equality, Priority, and the Levelling Down Objection”.Prioritarianism has great plausibility. Many are drawn to the idea that making improvements in the wellbeing of the badly off should take priority over making equal improvements in the wellbeing of the well off. Prioritarianism, moreover, avoids the leveling down objection. Temkin, however, argues that it would be a mistake to jettison egalitarianism altogether since only egalitarianism reflects a fundamental concern for comparative fairness. There is an important place for egalitarian considerations in our all things considered judgments, Temkin argues, in addition to considerations of priority.