Irish Boundary Commission
The Irish Boundary Commission met in 1924–25 to decide on the precise delineation of the border between the Irish Free State and Northern Ireland. The 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty, which ended the Irish War of Independence, provided for such a commission if Northern Ireland chose to secede from the Irish Free State, an event that occurred as expected two days after the Free State's inception on 6 December 1922, resulting in the partition of Ireland. The governments of the United Kingdom, of the Irish Free State and of Northern Ireland were to nominate one member each to the commission. When the Northern government refused to cooperate, the British government assigned a Belfast, Unionist newspaper editor to represent Northern Irish interests.
The provisional border in 1922 was that which the Government of Ireland Act 1920 made between Northern Ireland and Southern Ireland. Most Irish nationalists hoped for a considerable transfer of land to the Free State, on the basis that most border areas had nationalist majorities. However, the commission recommended relatively small transfers, and in both directions. This was leaked to The Morning Post in 1925, causing protests from both unionists and nationalists.
To avoid the possibility of further disputes, the British, Free State, and Northern Ireland governments agreed to suppress the overall report, and on 3 December 1925, instead of any changes being made, the existing border was confirmed by W. T. Cosgrave for the Free State, Sir James Craig for Northern Ireland, and Stanley Baldwin for the British government, as part of a wider agreement which included a resolution of outstanding financial disagreements. This was then ratified by their three parliaments. The commission's report was not published until 1969.
Provisional border (1920–25)
The Government of Ireland Act 1920 was enacted during the height of the War of Independence and partitioned the island into two separate home rule territories of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, to be called Northern Ireland and Southern Ireland. In its determination of this border, the Parliament of the United Kingdom heard the arguments of the Irish Unionist Party, but not those of most of the elected representatives of the Irish nationalist population. Sinn Féin, the largest nationalist party in Ireland following the 1918 General Election, refused on principle to recognise any legitimate role of the London Parliament in Irish affairs and declined to attend it, leaving only the Irish Parliamentary Party present at the debates, whose representation at Westminster had been reduced to minuscule size. The British government initially explored the option of a nine-county Northern Ireland ; however, James Craig, leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, told the British House of Commons unambiguously that the six northeastern counties were the largest possible area that unionists could realistically "hold". Craig posited the idea of a Boundary Commission "to examine the distribution of population along the borders of the whole of the six counties and to take a vote in districts on either side of and immediately adjoining that boundary in which there was no doubt as to whether they would prefer to be included in the Northern or the Southern Parliamentary area." However, the idea was rejected as likely to further inflame divisions, and the Government of Ireland Act 1920 was passed based on a six-county Northern Ireland delimited using traditional county borders.The Boundary Commission's ambiguous terms
During the discussions that led to the Anglo-Irish Treaty, the British prime minister David Lloyd George raised the possibility of a Boundary Commission as a way of breaking the deadlock. The Irish delegation, led by Arthur Griffith and Michael Collins, reluctantly acquiesced to the idea, on the basis that the resulting boundary line based on population at the finely granular district electoral division level would likely be highly advantageous to the Irish Free State, creating a small and weak Northern Irish polity which would likely be unviable in the long run. However, the final treaty included the statement that economic and geographical factors were also to be taken into account, and Lloyd George assured James Craig that "mere rectifications of the Boundary are involved, with give and take on both sides."The boundary scholar Kieran J Rankin states, "the manner in which the Boundary Commission clause was drafted in the final document was only explicit in its ambiguity." Clause XII of the 1921 Treaty was the work of the British negotiators and although it stated that the "wishes of the inhabitants were to be ascertained" it provided no process for obtaining them. The Clause did not indicate whether transfers would be made in one or both directions. The newly established Southern Irish cabinet was given an opportunity to study the Clause yet failed to provide any suggestions for a more workable process. The historian Jim McDermott felt that Lloyd George had succeeded in deceiving the southern leader while the northern Craig was assured that the Boundary Commission would only make small adjustments.
Griffith and Collins had different forecasts on the final decisions of the Boundary Commission.
Griffith was said to believe that exclusion from Northern Ireland on the basis of whole counties would not occur.
Collins was said to believe that the commission would cede almost half of the area of the six counties and that the financial provisions of the Act would make a small northern state unsustainable: Years earlier, in a 29 May 1916 letter from Lloyd George to the longtime leader of the Ulster Unionist Party Edward Carson was urged to never allow Ulster join a new Irish state: "We must make it clear that at the end of the provisional period Ulster does not, whether she wills or not, merge in the rest of Ireland."
Article 12 of the final Anglo-Irish Treaty, signed on 6 December 1921, describes the commission in the following terms:
The treaty was approved by the British Parliament soon after, followed by the Irish Dáil in early 1922. Some Unionists leaders warned about the use of a boundary commission. On 16 February 1922 Charles Craig warned about the agreed upon boundary commission:In March 1922 Michael Collins and James Craig signed the "Craig–Collins Agreement", an attempt by them to deal with the boundary question without recourse to the British government. Despite Article 12 of the treaty, this agreement envisaged a two-party conference between the Northern Ireland government and the Provisional Government of Southern Ireland to establish: " a. Whether means can be devised to secure the unity of Ireland" and "b. Failing this, whether agreement can be arrived at on the boundary question otherwise than by recourse to the Boundary Commission outlined in Article 12 of the Treaty". However, this agreement quickly broke down for reasons other than the boundary question, and Michael Collins was later killed by anti-treaty elements.
The Irish Free State government thus established the North-Eastern Boundary Bureau in October 1922, a government office which by 1925 had prepared 56 boxes of files to argue its case for areas of Northern Ireland to be transferred to the Free State. A senior member of the NEBB Patrick McCartan, expressed how people near the border felt disillusioned: "My impression both in Armagh and Newry was that very considerable apathy prevailed and that great skepticism existed about the Boundary Commission being effective."
The Northern Ireland government adopted a policy of non-cooperation with the Boundary Commission. The Secretary to the Northern Ireland Cabinet notified his contemporary in the Boundary Commission that the Northern government did not want to make any statement "with reference to the work with which the Commission is charged, nor to appear before the Commission by Counsel, or by accredited representatives, nor to submit to the Commission any evidence dealing with the question". In 1924 Prime Minister Craig did meet with Feetham warning him of "the gravity of the question he was handling and the very grave dangers that would come from any mistakes".
In June 1924 the British appointed Governor-General of the Irish Free State made the following statement on how the border should be determined: The Anglo-Irish Treaty provided no ability for either the Irish Free State or the British government to restrict the power of the Commissions Chairman to interpret Article 12. By December 1924 the Chairman had firmly ruled out the use of plebiscites.
Northern Nationalists viewed the Boundary Commission as a way to save many of their number from a Northern Parliament while many Northern Unionists viewed it as a threat to their state which was established by the 1920 Government of Ireland Act.
The commission and its work
The Irish Civil War broke out in the Irish Free State between pro and anti-treaty forces, causing a delay with the appointment of the Boundary Commission, which did not occur until 1924. In August 1924 a chairman of the Commission was appointed and in September 2,000 members of the Ulster Special Constabulary were mobilized along the border in Counties Fermanagh and south Tyrone. The Northern Ireland government, which adopted a policy of refusing to cooperate with the commission since it did not wish to lose any territory, refused to appoint a representative. The Northern government declined to name a representative to the Commission as it did not consider itself bound by a Treaty which it had never assented to. To resolve this the British and Irish governments legislated to allow the UK government to appoint a representative on Northern Ireland's behalf. It has been argued that the person selected by the British government to represent Northern Ireland in the commission clearly represented the Unionist cause. British Prime Minister Baldwin is quoted on the selection of the Northern Ireland representative to the commission: "If the Commission should give away counties, then of course Ulster couldn't accept it and we should back her. But the Government will nominate a proper representative and we hope that he and Feetham will do what is right." The commission thus convened, it began its work on 6 November 1924, based at 6 Clement's Inn, London, consisting of:- Justice Richard Feetham was born and raised in the United Kingdom and attended New College, Oxford. In 1923 he was the legal adviser to the High Commissioner for South Africa. He served as chairman of the commission.
- Eoin MacNeill, Irish Free State Minister for Education. MacNeill has been characterized as a part-time commissioner as he simultaneously held the demanding job of Minister of Education. While Justice Feetham is said to have kept his superiors well informed, MacNeill consulted no one. In 1913 MacNeill established the Irish Volunteers, on learning of the plans to launch the Easter Rising, MacNeill issued countermanding orders, instructing Volunteers not to take part, greatly limiting the numbers who turned out for the rising. The rebel leader Tom Clarke, warned his wife about MacNeill on the day before his execution, "I want you to see to it that our people know of his treachery to us. He must never be allowed back into the National life of this country, for so sure as he is, so sure will he act treacherously in a crisis. He is a weak man, but I know every effort will be made to whitewash him."
- Joseph R. Fisher, a Unionist newspaper editor, author and barrister.
- A small team of five to assist the commission in its work.
The commission met again on 29 January 1925 to consider the responses to the Irish Press advertisement, of which there were 103. A series of formal hearings were then held in Ireland from 3 March to 2 July 1925 in Armagh, Rostrevor, Newcastle, Enniskillen, Derry and Omagh, with the commission meeting directly with those peoples and bodies who had submitted representations. Hearings were also conducted with customs bodies from both sides of the border, as well as Irish Free State officials, the British and Northern Irish governments having declined invitations to attend. The commission then returned to London, continuing with its work throughout August–September 1925.
Despite the wishes of the Irish delegation, Justice Feetham kept the deliberations to a small area either side of the existing frontier, thereby precluding the wide-scale transfers of territory that the Free State had envisaged. The commission's report states that it worked on the principle that it "must start its examination of the whole question on the basis of the division marked by the existing boundary, and must treat that boundary as holding good where no sufficient reason, based on considerations of which the Commission can properly take account, is shown for altering it" and that "no wholesale reconstruction of the map is contemplated... Northern Ireland must, when the boundaries have been determined, still be recognisable as the same provincial entity; the changes made must not be so drastic as to destroy its identity or make it impossible for it to continue as a separate province of the United Kingdom." With Feetham ruling out the use of plebiscites, the commission relied heavily on data concerning religious affiliation from the 1911 census, supplemented by the hearings held in 1925.
A draft outline of the final boundary was decided upon on 17 October 1925. The boundary thus created was only marginally different to the existing one, being reduced from 280 miles to 219 miles, with only small transfers of land to the Free State and indeed some transfers the other way. In total 31,319 people were to be transferred to the Irish Free State and 7,594 to Northern Ireland. Only one in every twenty-five Northern Irish Catholics would have been placed under Free State rule. On 5 November the commission agreed that its work was complete and that they were ready to pass their recommendations on to the British and Irish governments.