Interpretation Act 1978


The Interpretation Act 1978 is an act of the Parliament of [the United Kingdom]. The act makes provision for the interpretation of acts of Parliament, Measures of the General Synod of the Church of England, Measures of the Church Assembly, subordinate legislation, "deeds and other instruments and documents", acts of the Scottish Parliament and instruments made thereunder, and Measures and acts of the National Assembly for Wales and instruments made thereunder. The act makes provision in relation to: the construction of certain words and phrases, words of enactment, amendment or repeal of Acts in the Session they were passed, judicial notice, commencement, statutory powers and duties, the effect of repeals, and duplicated offences.
The Interpretation Act 1954 applies in the same way to Acts of the Parliament of Northern Ireland or Act of the [Northern Ireland Assembly|Acts of the Northern Ireland Assembly].

Section 7

Section 7 of the act, concerned with service of documents by post, replaced section 26 of the Interpretation Act 1889. It states that
Interpretation of the words unless the contrary is proved is discussed in the case of Calladine-Smith v Saveorder Ltd, as to whether the "contrary" means the contrary of the allegation that the letter was properly addressed, prepaid and posted, or whether it refers to the contrary of the deeming provision that the letter in question was delivered in the ordinary course of post. In this particular case, a letter was shown to have been properly addressed, pre-paid and posted, but not received. On a balance of probabilities the court accepted that the "contrary" to the deemed provision had been proved, the letter was not received, and therefore the deemed provision could not hold.

Section 16 – General savings

The following cases are relevant to this section:
Section 18 of the act provides:
This section replaces section 33 of the Interpretation Act 1889. Humphreys J. said that that section did not add anything to the common law, or detract anything from it.

"... shall not be liable to be punished more than once for the same offence"

The words "same offence" at the end of section 18 of the act do not mean "same act" or "same cause". A person may be punished more than once for the same act. Two prosecutions for a single false statement in a brochure is not oppressive.
See also Williams v Hallam 112 LJKB 353, 59 TLR 287, 41 LGR 165.