Fulbright hearings
The Fulbright Hearings refers to any of the set of U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on Vietnam conducted between 1966 and 1971. This article concerns those held by the U.S. Senate in 1971 relating to the Vietnam War. By April 1971, with at least seven pending legislative proposals concerning the war, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, chaired by Democratic Senator J. William Fulbright of Arkansas began to hear testimony. The 22 hearings, titled "Legislative Proposals Relating to the War in Southeast Asia", were held on eleven different days between April 20, 1971, and May 27, 1971. The hearings included testimony and debate from several members of Congress, as well as from representatives of interested pro-war and anti-war organizations.
Committee members
- Jacob K. Javits
- Clifford P. Case
- George D. Aiken
- Karl E. Mundt
- John Sherman Cooper
- Hugh Scott
- James B. Pearson
- J. William Fulbright
- Claiborne Pell
- Stuart Symington
- John Sparkman
- Mike Mansfield
- Frank Church
- Gale W. McGee
- Edmund S. Muskie
- William B. Spong, Jr.
Proposals under consideration
S. 974 — To amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to prohibit any involvement of U.S. Armed Forces in an invasion of North Vietnam without prior and explicit congressional authorization.
S.J. Res. 82 — Proposing that the U.S. agree to complete withdrawal of all U.S. military personnel from South Vietnam within twelve months following completion of the exchange, under appropriate international supervision, of all POWs.
S. Con. Res. 17 — Reaffirming U.S. neutrality in the 1971 South Vietnamese elections, calling upon the President to implement a policy of strict neutrality, and creating a bi-partisan congressional commission, supported by a staff in Vietnam throughout the election campaign, to oversee U.S. policies and activities that might interfere with the electoral process.
S. Res. 62 — Resolving that the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Appropriations, and Armed Services should examine and report on the requirements and consequences of the orderly withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Southeast Asia including the safe return of American POWs.
S. Res. 66 — Urging the President immediately to withdraw all U.S. Armed Forces from Indochina and to terminate all military operations in Indochina except those of a purely defensive character related to the withdrawal, conditioned only upon agreement with the Government of the People's Republic of Vietnam for the release and repatriation of U.S. POWs.
S.J. Res. 89 — Resolving that upon agreement between the U.S. and North Vietnamese Governments as to the release of American POWs, the U.S. shall declare a ceasefire in-place and withdrawal all its military forces and equipment from South Vietnam not later than nine months from the date of the agreement.
The hearings
Chairman Fulbright opened the hearings with a brief statement summarizing their purpose:Fulbright commented that Congress' predicament had a precedent in the frustration experienced by the French National Assembly during the First Indochina War. That war ended only after the National Assembly responded to growing public concern and brought in a new government pledged to negotiate a settlement in Geneva within a month, resulting in the Geneva accords that ended that war.
Testimony 1
April 20, 1971. Testimony given by Senators George McGovern and Mark O. Hatfield on the desirability of Senate Resolution 376; differences in intention and likely consequences of Administration policy and S. 376, including constitutionality of the two approaches; relative merits of proposal by Sen. John Sherman Cooper to make a firm commitment of withdrawal but without setting a definite date.Testimony 2
April 20, 1971. Testimony given by Sen. Vance Hartke on the need for Senate Resolution 66; summary of conversations with each of the four delegations to the Paris peace talks; and the necessity of a fixed date for U.S. military withdrawal from Vietnam.Testimony 3
April 21, 1971. Testimony given by Senator Jacob K. Javits on the weakening effect of Vietnam war on U.S.; desirability of June 30, 1972, terminal date for U.S. military force withdrawal from Vietnam.Testimony 4
April 21, 1971. Testimony by Senator Jack Miller on the need for feasibility of S.J. Resolution 82; reliability of North Vietnamese statements regarding return of POWs.Testimony 5
April 21, 1971. Testimony by Senator Adlai Stevenson on support for announced date of withdrawal of all American forces; desirability and practicability of S. Con. Res. 17 as means of encouraging political settlement in Vietnam.Testimony 6
April 21, 1971. Testimony by Senator Walter Mondale on support for S. 376; summary of and need for S. 974, including feasibility of adding an amendment to an appropriation bill to achieve purpose.Testimony 7
April 21, 1971. Testimony by Senator William B. Saxbe on the questionable value of S. 376 as long as accelerated withdrawal continues.Testimony 8
April 22, 1971. Testimony by John Kerry on the necessity of immediate and unilateral withdrawal based on Vietnam veterans' personal experiences. Discussion then followed on means of disengagement from war and how to achieve political settlement in Indochina, as well as discourse on the viability of the American political system. Kerry was the only representative of Vietnam Veterans Against the War who testified on April 22, but others in VVAW were in the audience and at times supported his remarks with applause. Kerry gave a prepared open statement and was then questioned by the senators.During this testimony Kerry asked his often-quoted question, "How do you ask a man to be the last man to die in Vietnam? How do you ask a man to be the last man to die for a mistake?"
During the 2004 United States presidential campaign, as Kerry was running for President, some critics focused media attention on his participation in the hearings and alleged that parts of his testimony portrayed American war veterans of that era in an unduly harsh light. Other critics went farther and claimed that Kerry's testimony about US atrocities emboldened the North Vietnamese to torment the Americans POWs who were still imprisoned at the time.
Opening statements
Senator Fulbright's opening statement was appreciative of Kerry's views, and also mentioned a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision, subsequently reversed, which ruled that Vietnam Veterans Against the War, the group for which Kerry was a leader and spokesman, did not have a constitutional right to use the National Mall.Kerry's testimony
After a brief supportive statement from Senator Javits, Kerry read his prepared opening statement, and stated:"The men behind me" refers to members of VVAW and others who came to the committee to hear Kerry testify, which by all accounts was very crowded with supporters and media.
Kerry then explained the Winter Soldier Investigation, which took place earlier that year in Detroit, Michigan. This part of the testimony is considered controversial:
After defining "Winter Soldiers" as a play on words from Thomas Paine, Kerry summarized the reason he and his supporting veterans were speaking out:
Kerry described the anger and betrayal felt by Vietnam War veterans, then moved on to political issues:
Kerry expressed his belief that nothing in Vietnam threatened the United States, and that the war was merely a Vietnamese civil war instead of part of a global struggle against Communism. He added: