Battle of Long Tan
The Battle of Long Tan took place in a rubber plantation near Long Tân, in Phước Tuy Province, South Vietnam, during the Vietnam War. The action was fought between Viet Cong and People's Army of Vietnam units and elements of the 1st Australian Task Force.
Australian signals intelligence had tracked the VC 275th Regiment and D445 Battalion moving to a position just north of Long Tan. By 16 August, it was positioned near Long Tan outside the range of the 1 ATF artillery at Nui Dat. Using mortars and recoilless rifles, on the night of 16/17 August, the VC attacked Nui Dat from a position to the east, until counter-battery fire made it stop. The next morning D Company, 6th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, departed Nui Dat to locate the firing positions and determine the direction of the VC withdrawal. D Company found weapon pits and firing positions for mortars and RCLs, and around midday on 18 August made contact with VC elements.
Facing a larger force, D Company called in artillery support. Heavy fighting ensued as the VC attempted to encircle and destroy the Australians, who were resupplied several hours later by two UH-1B Iroquois from No. 9 Squadron RAAF. With the help of strong artillery fire, D Company held off a regimental assault before a relief force of M113 armoured personnel carriers and infantry from Nui Dat reinforced them that night. Australian forces then pulled back to evacuate their casualties and formed a defensive position; when they swept through the area next day, the VC had withdrawn and the operation ended on 21 August.
Although 1 ATF initially viewed Long Tan as a defeat, the action was later re-assessed as a strategic victory since it prevented the VC moving against Nui Dat. The VC also considered it a victory, due to the political success of an effective ambush and securing of the area around the village. Whether the battle impaired the capabilities of the VC is disputed.
Background
The 1st Australian Task Force began arriving in Phước Tuy Province of South Vietnam between April and June 1966. Following the establishment of its base at Nui Dat in Operation Hardihood, standing patrols were established outside the base in the evening and clearing patrols sent out every morning and evening along the perimeter. Daily platoon patrols and ambushes were initially conducted out to Line Alpha, which was the range of the Viet Cong mortars, but were later extended out to Line Bravo to counter the threat from artillery.All inhabitants of Long Phước and Long Hải villages within Line Alpha were removed, and resettled nearby. A protective security zone was established and a free-fire zone declared. Although unusual for allied installations in Vietnam, many of which were located near populated areas, the Australians hoped to deny the VC observation of Nui Dat, and afford greater security to patrols entering and exiting the area. While adding to the physical security of the base through disrupting a major VC support area and removing the local population from danger, such measures may have been counter-productive. The resettlement resulted in widespread resentment.
The VC continued to observe the base from the Nui Dinh hills. Movement was heard around the perimeter over the first few nights as they attempted to locate the Australian defences under the cover of darkness and heavy rain. Although no clashes occurred and the reconnaissance soon ceased, they were believed to be preparations for an attack. On 10 June reports indicated that a VC regiment was moving towards Nui Dat from the north west and was about away. The same day three 120 mm mortar rounds landed just outside the base. That night Australian artillery fired on suspected movement along Route 2, but no casualties were found the next day. Further warnings of an attack hastened the call-forward of 6th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, which arrived from Vũng Tàu to the south on 14 June. No attack occurred, and the initial reaction to 1 ATF's lodgement proved unexpectedly limited.
Opposing forces
Communist forces
The principal communist units in Phước Tuy were main forces from the 274th and 275th Regiments of the VC 5th Division. Under command of Senior Colonel Nguyen The Truyen, the division was headquartered in the Mây Tào Mountains. Operating in Phước Tuy, Biên Hòa and Long Khánh Provinces, it comprised both South Vietnamese VC guerrillas and North Vietnamese People's Army of Vietnam units. Given the task of isolating the eastern provinces from Saigon by interdicting the main roads and highways, including National Routes 1 and 15 and provincial routes 2 and 23, it proved a major challenge to Army of the Republic of Vietnam units that ventured into the province, demonstrating a capacity to mount regimental-size ambushes. The 274th Regiment was the stronger and better trained of the two. Based in the Hát Dịch in north west Phước Tuy with three battalions—D800, D265 and D308—it numbered 2,000 men. The 275th Regiment was based in the Mây Tào Mountains and mainly operated in the east of the province. Commanded by Senior Captain Nguyen Thoi Bung, it consisted of three battalions—H421, H422 and H421—with a total of 1,850 men.In support was an artillery battalion equipped with 75 mm recoilless rifles, 82 mm mortars, and 12.7 mm heavy machine-guns, an engineer battalion, a signals battalion and a sapper reconnaissance battalion, as well as medical and logistic units. Local forces included D445 Battalion, which normally operated in the south and in Long Khánh. Under command of Bui Quang Chanh, it consisted of three rifle companies—C1, C2, C3—and a weapons company, C4; a strength of 550 men. Recruited locally and operating in familiar terrain, they possessed an intimate knowledge of the area. Guerrilla forces numbered 400, operating in groups of five to 60, with two companies in Châu Đốc district, one in Long Dat, and a platoon in Xuyên Mộc. In total, VC strength was estimated to have been around 4,500 men.
Allied Forces
ARVN forces included the 52nd Ranger Battalion, a unit that had previously earned a US Presidential Unit Citation defeating the 275th Regiment the year before, and relatively weak territorial forces of 17 Regional Force companies and 47 Popular Force platoons, in total some 4,500 men. Most villages were garrisoned by an RF company operating from a fortified compound, and PF platoons guarded most hamlets and important infrastructure, but their value was questionable. RF companies were technically available for tasks throughout the province, while PF platoons were mostly restricted to operating around their village. While RF and PF units occasionally defended themselves successfully they rarely conducted offensive operations, and when they did they were usually limited. Mostly recruited from the same population as their opponents, they often suffered equally at the hands of the VC and a largely inept government. Poorly trained and unable to rely on being reinforced, they provided little opposition to the VC. A US Advisory Team operated in support, as did a few Australians from the Australian Army Training Team Vietnam ; despite their efforts, the capabilities of the ARVN remained limited. The arrival of 1 ATF further restricted their ability to operate in Phước Tuy as it increasingly came to dominate the province.Initially, 1 ATF, under the command of Brigadier Oliver David Jackson, consisted of two infantry battalions: the 5th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John Warr, and 6 RAR under Lieutenant Colonel Colin Townsend. Other units included the 1st Armoured Personnel Carrier Squadron operating M113 armoured personnel carriers ; 1st Field Regiment, Royal Australian Artillery, consisting of the New Zealand 161st Battery, two Australian batteries equipped with eighteen 105 mm L5 Pack Howitzers, and six 155 mm M109 self-propelled howitzers from the US A Battery, 2nd Battalion, 35th Artillery Regiment; 3rd SAS Squadron; 1st Field Squadron and 21st Engineer Support Troop; 103rd Signals Squadron; 161st Reconnaissance Flight operating Cessna 180s and Bell H-13 Sioux light observation helicopters; and an intelligence detachment. Support was provided by the 1st Australian Logistic Support Group at Vũng Tàu, and eight UH-1B Iroquois helicopters from No. 9 Squadron RAAF. US forces provided considerable support including artillery, close air support, helicopter gunships, and utility, medium and heavy lift helicopters. The largest Australian force deployed since the Second World War, it had been rapidly assembled. Although many of its officers and non-commissioned personnel had extensive operational experience, it included many National Servicemen. Few had direct experience of counter-insurgency operations, or first-hand understanding of the situation in Vietnam. The task force was unable to train together before departure.
Preliminary operations
With 1 ATF established at Nui Dat, subsequent operations included a search and destroy missions to gain control over Phước Tuy. Seeking to extend its influence beyond Line Alpha, in early July 5 RAR patrolled north through Nui Nghệ, while 6 RAR cleared Long Phước to the south, removing the former inhabitants who had returned since May. 5 RAR then began operations along Route 2, cordoning and searching Dục Mỹ on 19–20 July in preparation for the clearance of Bình Ba, while the SAS conducted long-range patrols to the edge of the Tactical Area of Operations to provide early warning of VC concentrations. With the 5th Division believed able to concentrate anywhere in Phước Tuy within 24 to 48 hours, it was a significant threat. As 1 ATF began to impact the VC's freedom of action, a response was expected. Mortar fire and small probes on the Nui Dat perimeter occurred, with such activity considered a possible prelude to an attack. Assessments of VC intentions changed from those of May and June. Whereas previously a full-scale assault was expected, as Nui Dat's defences were strengthened an attack against an isolated company or battalion was considered more likely. Other possibilities included skirmishes or ambushes during routine patrolling, or an attempt to interdict a resupply convoy from Vũng Tàu.By the end of July, a large VC force had been detected by SAS patrols east of Nui Dat, near the abandoned village of Long Tân. In response, 6 RAR launched a battalion search and destroy operation. In a series of fire-fights on 25 July, a company from D445 Battalion attacked C Company, and in the process of retreating assaulted B Company occupying a blocking position. Over the following days, further clashes occurred around Long Tan, resulting in 13 VC killed and 19 wounded, and Australian losses of three killed and 19 wounded. Yet with the inhabitants resettled, the village fortified and the perimeter regularly patrolled, the Australians considered the area secure. Believing VC sympathisers had returned to Long Tân, they searched the area again on 29 July. That afternoon, as 6 RAR commenced a detailed search following its initial sweep, Jackson ordered its immediate return to Nui Dat in response to South Vietnamese reports of a large VC presence close to the base. Although the warnings were unconfirmed and an attack against Nui Dat was considered unlikely, 1 ATF was re-postured. Company patrols were sent out in each direction over the following days, but found little of significance. Jackson had seemed to over-react, and his requests for assistance from US II Field Force, Vietnam were denied. Later intelligence discredited the original reporting and the crisis subsided, but it was indicative of the alarms experienced during the first months of 1 ATF's lodgement, and their effect.
After two months, 1 ATF had moved beyond the initial requirements of establishing itself and securing its immediate approaches, and commenced operations to open the province. The task force had penetrated the VC base areas to the east and clashed with D445 Battalion. Operations had been conducted in the Núi Dinh hills to west, Bình Ba had been cleared of VC influence and Route 2 opened to civilian traffic. Yet the ongoing need to secure Nui Dat reduced the combat power available to the task force commander, and it was evident that with only two battalions—rather than the usual three—1 ATF lacked operational flexibility, as while one battalion carried out operations the other was required to secure the base and provide a ready reaction force. Significant logistic problems also plagued the task force, as 1 ALSG struggled to become operational amid the sand dunes at Vũng Tàu, resulting in shortages of vital equipment. By the middle of August, the Australian troops were growing tired from constant day and night patrolling with no respite from base defence duties. A rest and recreation program began, with many granted two days leave in Vũng Tàu, but this further stretched the limited forces available to 1 ATF. Meanwhile, in response to the growing threat posed by the Australians, the commander of the VC 5th Division finally ordered the 275th Regiment to move against Nui Dat.
For several weeks, Australian signals intelligence had used direction finding to track a VC radio transmitter from the headquarters of the 275th Regiment westwards to a position just north of Long Tân. Extensive patrolling failed to find the unit. The reports began on 29 July at the height of the false alarm, with the radio detected moving towards Nui Dat from a position north of Xuyên Mộc. The movement continued at a rate of a day and by 13 August was located near the Nui Dat 2 feature, a hill in the vicinity of Long Tân, east of Nui Dat. While direction finding indicated the movement of the radio, no actual communications had been intercepted. However it suggested the presence of the 275th Regiment or at least a reconnaissance party of that unit. Jackson could not rule out deception and therefore took the threat seriously when he decided to send company patrols out. The existence of a SIGINT capability was a closely guarded secret, and knowledge of the source of the reports was limited to Jackson, his two intelligence officers, and the 1 ATF operations officer; neither battalion commander had access. On 15 August D Company, 6 RAR patrolled to Nui Dat 2 and returned through the Long Tân rubber plantation. The following day A Company, 6 RAR departed on a three-day patrol on a route which included Nui Dat 2 and the ridge to the north west. Any sizeable VC force in the vicinity would have been located, but neither patrol found anything of significance. SAS patrols focused on the Núi Dinh hills to the west.
By 16 August, the VC force was positioned east of the Long Tân rubber plantation, just outside the range of the artillery at Nui Dat. The Australians thought that Colonel Nguyen Thanh Hong, a staff officer from the VC 5th Division who was likely in overall control, planned the operation. Although VC intentions have been debated in the years since, the aim was likely both a political and military victory to prove their strength to the local population, and undermine Australian public support for the war. They would probably have known one of 1 ATF's battalions was involved in the search of Bình Ba, and may have considered Nui Dat weakly defended as a result. Undetected, it likely consisted of three battalions of the 275th Regiment with approximately 1,400 men, possibly reinforced by at least one regular PAVN battalion, and D445 Battalion with up to 350 men. Well armed, they were equipped with AK-47 and SKS assault rifles, RPG-2 rocket-propelled grenades, light machine guns, mortars and RCLs. Large quantities of ammunition were carried, with each man issued two or three grenades, and grenadiers up to ten or twelve, and a reserve of small arms, mortar bombs and rounds for their crew-served weapons. The 274th Regiment was probably located north west, occupying a position on Route 2 to ambush a squadron of the US 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, which they anticipated would move down the inter-provincial highway from Long Khánh to support the Australians.